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Seventy years ago, during the depths of the Great Depression, the federal
government instituted a national labor exchange policy to aid economic recov-
ery and labor market stability. Considered by some an important step toward
preserving a capitalist economic system in the United States, the Roosevelt
Administration and Congress established a federal–state system of public em-
ployment offices. Throughout subsequent economic, social, and political
changes, the federal–state system under the Wagner-Peyser Act has provided
steady and equitable labor exchange services to job seekers and employers. In
the policy debate about workforce development reform since the 1980s, pro-
posals have repeatedly surfaced to assimilate state labor exchange services un-
der the Wagner-Peyser Act into local job training structures. Employment ser-
vices in the United States are now delivered mainly through one-stop centers
established by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. Among all the
services available at the nearly 3,500 one-stop centers and affiliated sites na-
tionwide, labor exchange services are used most often.
This book describes the evolution of labor exchange policy in the United
States, summarizes the major findings about the effectiveness of labor ex-
change services, and offers reflections on the future of labor exchange policy.
The chapters in this volume provide an overview of U.S. labor exchange poli-
cy, focusing principally on the last three decades of the 20th century. One
chapter explores how the labor exchange system incorporated tools of the in-
formation age during the 1990s to advance one-stop center customer service
techniques and self-service job finding methods. Another chapter closely ex-
amines the intergovernmental tensions over funding and delivery of services.
Other chapters describe how federal, state, and local governments administer
labor exchange and other workforce development services. Systems for evalu-
ation and evidence on effectiveness of labor exchange services are also re-
viewed. 
Under the original Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, state Employment Service
(ES) agencies could be affiliated with the U.S. Employment Service only if
they provided regular labor exchange services at no cost to employers and job
seekers who are eligible to work in the United States. This universal service re-
quirement was expanded to participants of adult and dislocated worker pro-
grams under Title I of WIA. Consequently, there has been an increase in the
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use of labor exchange services in one-stop centers and at remote self-service
locations. As the chapters of this book explain, WIA has brought the ES full
circle by returning its function to the original intent of the 70-year-old Wagner-
Peyser Act. Under WIA, the ES links customers with service providers who
deliver a consolidated array of workforce development services through one-
stop centers. As we enter a century marked by the emergence of new work
search methods that may significantly alter job finding and employment
arrangements, it appears that government will continue to be engaged in ef-
forts to link education, economic development, and employment. Likewise,
the role of labor exchange services may continue to expand as new public and
private intermediaries are brought into the system. 
This book is intended to serve as a ready companion to two other volumes
published by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Unemploy-
ment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues (1997), and Job
Training Policy in the United States (forthcoming). The past two decades have
yielded few overviews and little research on public labor exchange policy. In
1998, The Johns Hopkins University’s Sar Levitan Center for Social Studies
published a volume about labor exchange services in selected states entitled
The Public Employment Service in a One-Stop World. Aside from that book,
policy researchers must go back to either the 1973 book Counter Point: The
Changing Role of the Employment Service, or the 1964 book The Role of the
United States Employment Service in a Changing Economy published by the
Upjohn Institute, to find an entire volume devoted to national labor exchange
policy and operations. Similarly, there has been very little direct research on
labor exchange policy topics. As this book points out, federal interest in labor
exchange policy has been overshadowed by the juggernaut of job training pol-
icy, and the paucity of labor exchange research is a result.
Draft chapters of this book were written for and presented at a conference
held at Brook Lodge in Augusta, Michigan, during September 2002. The W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and the U.S. Department of Labor
sponsored the conference. At the conference, authors presented overviews of
their chapters and discussants provided constructive critiques aimed at im-
proving the coverage and exposition of chapters. Other employment policy ex-
perts in attendance at the conference added further suggestions from the floor.
In addition to all conference participants, who are listed at the back of this
book, we thank others who assisted in publication, including: Claire Black, Al-
lison Hewitt Colosky, Kevin Hollenbeck, Phyllis Molhoek, and Stephen A.
Wandner. 
The authors and editors have been free to express their own opinions.
Consequently, the text does not necessarily reflect the positions or viewpoints
of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, the U.S. Department
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THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF LABOR EXCHANGE IN A
MARKET ECONOMY
The proper matching of workers with job openings is essential for a
well-functioning market economy. In recent years, more than 10 percent
of the U.S. workforce search for jobs at any one time. Some people
search because they have been recently displaced; others are currently
employed but search in hopes of a better job that perhaps pays more, of-
fers more benefits, has better career possibilities, or fits more closely
with their personal preferences; while others are entering the labor mar-
ket for the first time. Whoever is searching and for whatever reason, the
process typically requires knowledge of job prospects, the qualifications
sought by employers looking for workers, and the ability of workers to
communicate to employers their qualifications and worthiness for suc-
cessfully filling vacancies. Many workers and employers can acquire the
appropriate information when needed and understand the steps required
to undertake a successful interview. Yet, for some, accessing this infor-
mation is more difficult. Obviously, it benefits all of society and the
economy when everyone is afforded this information and assistance. 
The federal and state governments have long recognized the im-
portance of assisting in the job search process. In 1933, the Wagner-
Peyser Act was established to provide federal funding to states to op-
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erate a nationwide network of public employment offices. Since enact-
ment, labor exchange (e.g., job finding and placement) services under
the Wagner-Peyser Act have been available universally to employers
and job seekers without charges or conditions. Today, this network in-
cludes more than 3,400 offices that are associated with state one-stop
delivery systems. The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998
amended the Wagner-Peyser Act to be part of the one-stop delivery
system, which provides universal access to core (i.e., labor exchange)
services and Title I adult and dislocated worker programs. The one-
stop centers provide services to both job seekers and employers. For
the job seeker, services include assessment, counseling and testing, job
search workshops, and job placement. For employers, services include
job order taking, recruitment, screening, and referral of job seekers.
The WIA also mandated the development and continuous improve-
ment of a nationwide system of employment statistics and other infor-
mation that could aid in the job search process. 
This chapter provides an overview of the job search process and the
role of local public employment offices in assisting people and employ-
ers make the proper match. First we offer a brief history of the func-
tions and organizational structure of the Employment Service (ES). In
reviewing its current structure, we focus specifically on how its present
operations under WIA are designed to assist in the job search process.
Next we focus on the job search process and describe the methods peo-
ple use to search for jobs, and also the methods employers use to fill va-
cancies. This discussion includes recent trends in this process and ex-
plores various factors that may have prompted such changes. Greater
employer demand for highly skilled workers, changes in occupational
and industrial structure, and the rapid adoption of the Internet as a
means of sharing information are but a few of the factors that may af-
fect the job search process. We also present evidence of the effective-
ness of the ES vis-à-vis other job search methods.
The following chapters provide detailed coverage of key issues re-
garding the public ES. Historically, state employment security agencies
(lately referred to as state workforce agencies) in the United States are
comprised of the ES agency and the unemployment insurance (UI)
agency. When considered together, these agencies have administered
three workforce development functions: 1) labor exchange (e.g., job
brokering) services, 2) labor market information, and 3) administration
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of labor adjustment programs and UI programs. The role of the state ES
agency in providing labor exchange services has varied with changes in
the economy, both cyclically and structurally, and with changes in the
emphasis placed on finding jobs for different segments of the popula-
tion.1 Chapter 2, written by David Balducchi and Alison Pasternak,
looks at the federal–state relations in labor exchange policy. Since its
inception, the public employment service has been a partnership among
the federal and state governments, and the authors follow the evolution
of that relationship up through the partnerships forged under the Work-
force Investment Act of 1998. In Chapter 3, Neil Ridley and William
Tracy turn their attention to trends affecting the delivery of labor ex-
change services by state agencies, particularly their relationships with
other public programs. Based on interviews with local ES administra-
tors, they see the future of ES as creating paths for individuals and em-
ployers to gain access to emerging labor market intermediaries. 
Chapters 4 and 5 address the issue of performance. First, David
Smole examines the performance and accountability mechanisms un-
der which ES offices operate, then Christopher O’Leary reviews the
studies that have assessed the effectiveness of ES services in helping
job seekers find jobs. Smole concludes that performance measurement
is a valuable tool for effective service delivery and that federal and state
agencies have made considerable progress in establishing such sys-
tems. O’Leary, based upon nearly a dozen evaluations of ES functions
conducted over the past two decades, concludes that job search assis-
tance programs are cost effective, more so than job training and public
employment programs. 
In Chapter 6, Jim Woods and Pam Frugoli examine the burgeoning
number and assortment of tools and sources of information available
on the Internet that can help people find jobs. One of the challenges
this trend presents, they argue, is the ability to discern quality infor-
mation and to use it effectively. Douglas Lippoldt and Melvin Brodsky,
in Chapter 7, present an international perspective of job brokerage
functions, highlighting the diverse approaches but underscoring sig-
nificant, common features in the attempts by various countries to mod-
ernize and reform their labor exchange systems. Chapter 8, by David
Balducchi, Randall Eberts, and Christopher O’Leary, provides an over-
view, as well as a discussion of the current and future role of labor ex-
change services.
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THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICE2
What is the appropriate role for government in helping job seekers
and employers make the proper match? Examining this question is one
of the major objectives of this volume. Economic theory posits that
government intervention is necessary if there are market failures or in-
equities in the access to resources. In the case of the job search process,
the ultimate issues are information about the job seeker and the vacan-
cy and equal and open access to employers. An efficient job-matching
process requires that all job seekers and recruiters have sufficient infor-
mation to make the proper match. This requires access to information
about job openings and information about how to contact employers
and how to present a job seeker’s qualifications in a way that employers
will take notice (Holzer 1998). 
In other countries, the ES typically encompasses four functions—
job brokering, labor market information, administration of labor market
adjustment programs, and administration of unemployment compensa-
tion. While the employment service in the United States has focused
primarily on labor exchange services, it has over its 70-year history
partnered with other programs that have been responsible for the other
functions listed above. 
Table 1.1 offers a synopsis of the way in which key federal em-
ployment programs have addressed these four functions in the United
States. The federal role in the employment service began during the
Great Depression with the passage of the Wagner-Peyser Act in 1933,
by providing funds to provide a national network of state ES offices.
These offices acted primarily as a placement agency to refer applicants
to public sector jobs. Although its mandate was broader in providing
free services to everyone looking for gainful employment, the lack of
private-sector jobs relegated the ES to placing workers in public works
programs, such as the Works Projects Administration and Civilian Con-
servation Corps. This primary focus on job placement, however, did not
last long. Title III of the Social Security Act of 1935 created the unem-
ployment insurance program and directed that benefits be paid through
the public employment offices or other agencies. This role brought the
ES into partnership with the UI program. In order to receive UI bene-
fits, a worker must be actively searching for work and willing to accept
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a suitable job offer. Staff members were asked to help job seekers find
jobs that met their preferences and offered the best match, but they
were also required to report workers to the UI system who failed the
work test by not accepting a job, even though it may not be the pre-
ferred match. This relationship between ES and UI has prevailed over
its entire history. In recent years, however, it may be decoupled to some
extent as more states are implementing phone and Internet UI claim
taking. Research in this area is as yet only expositive.
The ES underwent another transformation after World War II. With
war veterans returning to civilian life and the economy shifting from
war production to civilian operations, the ES was asked to turn its pri-
orities to finding jobs for veterans and for those workers who were dis-
placed by the transition. Instead of focusing on universal access to ES
services, the ES targeted veterans and civilian workers whose skills or
age made it difficult for them to find work in the new economy. By the
mid 1950s, preferential treatment was expanded to youth, older work-
ers, and the disabled (Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997). During this
same period, the ES took on another compliance role by certifying for-
eign workers and showing that the admission of foreign workers would
not harm the employment opportunities or wages of domestic workers. 
During the decade of the 1960s, which ushered in sweeping pro-
grams for the economically disadvantaged under the Great Society leg-
islation, the ES became involved through partnerships in two addition-
al areas—job training and labor market information. Both initially
came about with the enactment of the Area Redevelopment Act in
1961. This legislation required the ES to help establish training pro-
grams in depressed areas. Furthermore, in order to determine which ar-
eas qualified for the services, the legislation also mandated that the ES
collect information on unemployment levels by labor market areas. The
role of the ES in providing job training and an even broader array of hu-
man resource development services to the disadvantaged was rein-
forced with the passage of the Manpower Development and Training
Act in 1962 and the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. 
Reliance on the ES to provide an integrated set of services to the
economically disadvantaged was short lived, however. Within a decade,
the institutional structure of providing services moved toward local de-
sign and delivery of employment and training programs. The Compre-
hensive Employment and Training Act, passed in 1973, established a
6
Table 1.1  Evolution of U.S. Programs Delivering the Four Functions of Labor Exchange Services
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8 Eberts and Holzer
nationwide network of local entities to design and administer training
programs for the economically disadvantaged and for dislocated work-
ers. The role of the ES was not well defined in this new system, and
consequently, the ES returned to its primary function of referring appli-
cants to job openings. A decade later, the Job Training and Partnership
Act further decentralized responsibility for training. This time, the leg-
islation was more explicit about the role and structure of the ES by
amending the Wagner-Peyser Act to give states more authority in de-
signing and administering ES services through federal special purpose
block grants. The direction of the ES during this period of decentraliza-
tion increasingly placed it in the hands of state governments. Some
states implemented innovative approaches to the delivery of services
and the integration of ES labor exchange services with other reemploy-
ment services. Other states deemphasized the labor exchange role of
the ES in assisting job seekers to find reemployment, stressing work
ready skills and self-initiated services instead of acting as mediators
and advocates for workers in referring them to jobs. 
As more responsibility was devolved to the states and local entities,
the federal government became less involved with the labor exchange
functions. For the most part, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL)
assumed the limited role of providing technical assistance to states and
monitoring compliance requirements for various programs. At the same
time, overall funds for ES services were also reduced and some states
experienced further reductions as ES funding to states was based on
need. Smole (Chapter 4 in this volume) estimated that funding (mea-
sured in real terms) fell by 37.2 percent from 1984 to 2002. Some states
during this time period tried to augment these funds through special as-
sessments or by tapping UI funds (Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz
1997). 
As funding fell, so did the delivery of key placement-related ser-
vices. Two reports by the U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO),
both mandated by Congress, documented the deterioration in services.
A 1989 report (USGAO 1989) noted a significant decline in the provi-
sion of one-on-one assistance, counseling, and testing throughout much
of the 1980s. The report also revealed significant variation across local
offices in placement rates, as a result of state and local discretion over
the design and administration of ES services. Another USGAO report a
year later (USGAO 1990) expressed further concern about the decline
in system performance and the variation in performance across states. It
Overview of Labor Exchange Policies and Services 9
found that placement rates were better in states that focused on measur-
able goals and on-site evaluations.
These studies echoed the growing frustration among ES staff and
customers regarding the lack of funds and attention given to labor ex-
change functions. Several key groups—including USDOL, organized
labor, and local workforce agency associations—formed a working
group to address these issues and try to refocus and revitalize the ES.
The working group released a report entitled the Employment Service
Revitalization Work Plan in 1994 that called for the ES to become the
“nation’s recognized leader in providing efficient labor exchange ser-
vices and a universal gateway to workforce development resources by
professional, empowered employees” (p. vi). The report became the
blueprint for revitalizing the ES. 
The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of USDOL
played a key role in revamping the ES. During the mid 1990s, the ETA
sponsored and guided the development of an Internet-based informa-
tion system for labor exchange services. The CareerOneStop portal
Web site (formerly known as America’s Career Kit) includes a nation-
wide electronic resume and vacancy databases, referred to as America’s
Talent Bank and America’s Job Bank, respectively. Other job search
services are available through this Web site. In addition, America’s Ca-
reer InfoNet provides information about alternative occupations, in-
cluding which occupations have the most job openings, the highest
growth rate, the best wages, and the most employment. It also allows a
job seeker to learn about the education and training requirements for an
alternative occupation. 
Development of these tools and other efforts to improve the cover-
age and effectiveness of the ES were incorporated in the Workforce In-
vestment Act (WIA) of 1998. The main philosophy behind the bill is
the integration and coordination of employment services. Central to
achieving this aim is the criterion of one-stop centers, where providers
of various employment services, including ES, within a local labor
market are assembled in one location. This arrangement is expected to
coordinate and streamline the delivery of employment-based programs
and to meet the needs of job seekers and employers more effectively
than did the previous system. 
In many respects, WIA may have brought the ES full circle by re-
turning its function to the original intent of the Wagner-Peyser Act,
passed nearly 70 years ago. Under WIA, the ES joins Title I service
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providers to provide a consolidated array of workforce development
services through one-stop centers. Services under Title I of WIA are of-
fered in three tiers: core, intensive, and training. The core services in-
clude basic labor exchange and may be provided by the ES or Title I
adult and dislocated worker service providers. These services are avail-
able to all and may be self-service or staff-assisted. Intensive services
include activities that may require greater staff involvement, such as
comprehensive assessment and case management. These services may
be provided by Title I service providers and the ES, as appropriate.
Training services comprise the third tier and require the most staff time,
and are provided by Title I service providers. Job seekers access these
services sequentially, moving from one tier to the next if they have not
been successful in securing a job. While the first tier of core services is
open to all job seekers and employers, only those who meet specific cri-
teria, including lack of skills to qualify for a job, are eligible to receive
Title I services in the next two tiers. Therefore, WIA may have restored
the role of the ES to provide basic labor exchange services, while con-
solidating these activities into a broader array of workforce develop-
ment services. 
HOW PEOPLE SEARCH FOR JOBS
The purpose of this section is to describe the various methods by
which people gather information about jobs and apply for work. As we
shall see in this section, the public ES is but one of several ways in
which job searchers gain information about job prospects and contact
employers. We consider two broad groups of job searchers—each of
which have different motivations for searching. The first group includes
the unemployed who are actively searching for work; the second in-
cludes those currently employed who are actively searching for a dif-
ferent job. 
One would expect that the motivation for searching is different for
people in the two groups. The unemployed are trying to find a job to re-
place the one they lost and to restore their lost source of income. The
employed are looking for jobs with higher salary, better benefits, more
favorable working conditions, or better career prospects, to name a few
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prominent reasons. In addition to these factors, the two groups are like-
ly to vary by other characteristics—some of which (e.g., age and edu-
cation) we can observe and control for in our statistical work, while
others (e.g., quality of personal networks, ambitions, and cognitive or
other labor market skills) we cannot. These other characteristics should
affect not only the search methods that employed and unemployed indi-
viduals choose to use, but other dimensions of their search strategies as
well.3
Since 1967, the Current Population Survey (CPS) has included spe-
cific questions about job search activities, but only of those who are
currently unemployed and actively looking for work. Originally six
methods were included:
1) checked with public employment agency,
2) checked with private employment agency,
3) checked with employer directly,
4) checked with friends or relatives,
5) placed or answered ads, and
6) used other search methods.
More recently, three other methods were added to the survey:
1) sent out resumes and filled out applications,
2) checked with university and school placement centers, and
3) checked union/professional registers.
To be counted as unemployed, individuals must answer affirmatively to
one or more of these questions (respondents may report more than one
method). 
Some researchers have categorized these methods as being either
formal or informal. Formal methods include the use of either public or
private agencies, or other institutions (schools, unions, etc.). Informal
methods include checking with friends and relatives and direct applica-
tions to firms.4 Formal and informal methods differ systematically from
each other in that more informal search methods have fewer direct
monetary costs but typically generate a smaller set of potential employ-
ers for the job seeker (Holzer 1998). In addition, informal networks of
friends and relatives might generate more trustworthy information that
leads to higher quality matches (Rees 1966). Formal methods, on the
other hand, can be more expensive but might generate higher-quality
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jobs that are difficult for the job seeker to locate informally. On the oth-
er hand, the public ES, while less expensive than other formal methods,
has been widely perceived as generating potential jobs that offer lower
wages and benefits and require fewer skills. 
In the standard economic models of how search choices are made
(e.g., Holzer 1988), individual job seekers choose one or more of these
methods based on their expected benefits to the job search process rela-
tive to their costs, in terms of time and/or money.5 The expected benefit
is the likelihood that using that method will generate a job offer that is
acceptable to the job seeker (in terms of wages, benefits, working con-
ditions, etc.). As the likelihood increases that an acceptable offer is gen-
erated, the duration of search (and therefore unemployment for some)
shortens. 
But the benefits accruing from the use of any particular method are
also likely to vary across individuals. For instance, African Americans
may encounter less hiring discrimination when using more formal
methods, since informality might breed a kind of subjectivity that lends
itself to greater discrimination (Bradshaw 1973; Holzer 1987; Moss
and Tilly 2001). Furthermore, those whose social networks include
fewer people or only those working at very low wages may find infor-
mal networks somewhat less useful than other methods, such as the use
of the public employment agency.6
In fact, these arguments suggest more broadly why it is important
for the government to offer assistance with the labor exchange process,
despite the availability of several other methods of search among which
individuals are free to make their optimal choices. For one thing, the
privately available methods might generate some type of market fail-
ure, and therefore inefficiency, if information about the quantity and
quality of jobs is very imperfect among private networks and organiza-
tions. Furthermore, even if the markets do not exhibit any failure, there
may be some ability of the public employment agency to help redistrib-
ute job opportunities to those with fewer opportunities on their own,
such as minorities or other disadvantaged groups.
Of course, whether or not the public employment agency success-
fully improves the efficiency of the market or redistributes its benefits
depends on the cost-effectiveness of its activities, an issue to which we
return below and one that will be considered in greater depth in Chap-
ter 5.
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Job Search by the Unemployed
The unemployed, those without jobs who are actively seeking em-
ployment, are comprised of at least three groups: 1) displaced workers,
2) those dismissed or who voluntarily quit, and 3) those entering the
workforce for the first time or after a long hiatus.7 We distinguish
among these three groups because their motivations for finding work,
and thus their process for doing so, may differ. 
Recognizing such differences may be important in understanding
the best role for the ES. People in the first two groups are obviously
searching for a job to replace the one they recently lost. Those dis-
placed from previous jobs may collect regular UI benefits for up to 26
weeks while they look for work. The income support, while not replac-
ing their entire previous earnings, offers job searchers an opportunity to
look for a good job match without forcing them to take the first job of-
fer that comes along, which may be an inferior match. Studies show,
however, that most displaced workers accept jobs that offer wages that
are lower than they received in their previous job.8 The number of dis-
placed workers actively looking for work, relative to other categories of
unemployment, also depends on economic conditions.
Those dismissed or who quit voluntarily are also included in the
group of unemployed but are typically not eligible for UI benefits, so
they might face some greater urgency in finding new employment. On
the other hand, those who quit and become unemployed choose this sta-
tus voluntarily, and might therefore feel less constrained than those
who lose their jobs involuntarily.9
Finally, individuals who are entering the labor force, such as recent
high school or college graduates or older women who have never
worked outside the home, may be unfamiliar with the job search process
and the techniques necessary to find a job. These individuals may be
more likely to ask advice from friends and relatives on how to proceed or
to seek assistance from public and private employment agencies. 
Of course, individuals across three categories of unemployment
differ from one another not only in their access to UI benefits, but also
in terms of skills, attitudes, and a variety of other personal characteris-
tics, as we note below.
According to the CPS, the most widely used job search method is
to contact employers directly. In 2001, 62 percent of job seekers listed
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that method as one of their job search activities, as shown in Table
1.2.10 The second most popular method was filling out job applications
and submitting resumes, with 51 percent of job seekers reporting the
use of that method. The use of the public ES was ranked a distant third,
with 19 percent of the respondents indicating that they checked with the
public employment agency in the past four weeks for help in finding a
job. Interestingly, slightly more than twice as many respondents indi-
cated that they checked with the public employment agency than with a
private employment agency. Since temporary help agencies are likely














Contacted employer directly 62.0 59.5 62.6
Public employment agency 18.8 100.0 0
Private employment agency 8.4 18.9 6.0
Contacted friends and relatives 15.4 20.2 14.3
Contacted school/university
employment ctr. 2.7 4.1 2.4
Sent out resumes/filled out
applications 51.3 46.7 52.4
Checked union/professional
registers 2.3 2.8 2.1
Placed or answered ads 15.4 20.3 14.2
Used other active methods 6.8 4.9 7.2
NOTE: Percentages in the columns do not add up to 100 because job seekers can use
more than one search mode.  Percentages in the first column are based on all unem-
ployed 16 years or older looking for work and are not on layoff.  Percentages in the
second column are drawn from the same group as column one except that percent-
ages in this column are also based on those who reported using the public employ-
ment agency.  Percentages in the third column are constructed in the same way as in
the second column except it includes all those who reported not using the public em-
ployment service.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using the monthly files of the Current Population Sur-
vey, 2001.
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included in the latter category, the role of temporary employment agen-
cies among the unemployed overall thus remains fairly small.11
Slightly more than half of the job seekers engaged in two or more
methods during their job search. For those listing the public employ-
ment agency as one of their search activities, 87 percent of the job seek-
ers used at least one other search mode. Public ES applicants have a
tendency to contact employers directly a little less frequently and to
send out resumes and fill out applications slightly less often than non-
ES users (Table 1.2). On the other hand, they are more likely to contact
friends and relatives, place or answer ads, check with university/school
placement centers, and check union/professional registers. Interesting-
ly, they are three times more likely to use private employment agencies
than those not using public employment agencies. Therefore, it appears
that the private employment agency is not necessarily a substitute for
the public ES, at least not for the overall population of active job seek-
ers. 
The use of public ES services (and other search methods) varies by
the reason for unemployment. As shown in Table 1.3, job losers who
are not on layoff use the public employment agency more often than
other types of unemployed. Twenty-seven percent of job seekers in this
group used the public employment service, which is about 40 percent
more often than for the entire group of job seekers. New entrants into
the labor force, on the other hand, are the least likely to use the public
ES. 
These results might, at least in part, reflect the fact that the use of
public employment agencies also differs by the personal characteristics
of job seekers. Analysis of the CPS reveals that the public ES is used
more often by job seekers who are African Americans or Native Amer-
icans, 25 years or older (but not after 65), have a high school education
only, live in midsize cities, and are members of families with annual in-
comes of less than $15,000. Conversely, the ES is least likely to be used
by job seekers who are white or Asian, youth or over 65, have a BA or
higher or are high school dropouts, live in large metropolitan areas, and
are members of families with incomes over $60,000.12
Differences in the use of the ES by education level, along with in-
creases in the educational attainment of the labor force over time, also
might help to account for the apparent decline in the use of public em-
ployment agencies in the search process. For instance, Ports (1993)
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directly 65.7 61.4 65.2 59.0 57.3
Public employment
agency 27.1 21.3 19.1 12.9 10.6
Private employment
agency 12.2 10.3 9.2 5.4 4.0
Contacted friends and
relatives 20.2 16.4 12.7 12.8 12.4
Contacted school/univer-
sity emp. ctr. 2.4 2.2 2.4 3.4 2.3
Sent out resumes/filled 
out applications 54.5 43.6 51.0 50.9 52.2
Checked union/profes-
sional registers 3.6 4.3 1.8 1.1 0.6
Placed or answered ads 20.7 13.0 17.5 12.3 9.1
Used other active methods 8.4 7.3 7.5 5.7 3.7
NOTE: Percentages in the columns do not add up to 100 since job seekers can use more
than one search mode.  Percentages in each column are based on all unemployed 16
years or older looking for work, are not on layoff, and who reported  their reason for
being unemployed.  
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using the monthly files of the Current Population Sur-
vey, 2001. 
shows that more than 30 percent of unemployed job seekers used the
public ES in 1970, compared to 23 percent in 1992 and 19 percent in
2001 (as discussed above).
In sum, the data suggest that public employment agencies are not
among the most heavily used methods of search by the unemployed,
but that they are still used by a significant fraction of unemployed job
seekers, especially among those who lose their jobs involuntarily. 
Job Search by Employed Workers
Employed workers also actively search for jobs. According to the
CPS, 4.5 percent of the employed wage and salary workers, slightly
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over 5 million people, actively searched for different jobs in 1999. This
number is comparable in magnitude to the 5.6 million unemployed
workers who searched during the same time period. 
As stated earlier, employed workers may consider changing jobs in
order to receive higher compensation, better benefits, more flexibility,
better future job and career prospects, or simply a more enjoyable
working environment. Meisenheimer and Ilg (2000), using a special
supplement of the CPS, conducted research that supports these reasons.
They found that younger workers under the age of 25 were much more
likely to search for another job than older workers. Workers who were
not covered by health insurance and who were without retirement ben-
efits were also more likely to explore job options. In addition, salaried
workers with higher levels of education were more likely to look for
other jobs, while those with longer tenure were less likely to explore
job options. 
Unfortunately, the CPS supplement does not ask employed job
seekers to list the methods of search that they used. If one can draw par-
allels between both employed and unemployed job seekers by demo-
graphic characteristics, it appears that the larger portion of employed
job seekers may be less likely to use the public employment agency be-
cause employed job seekers are younger and have higher levels of edu-
cation. Unemployed job seekers with these characteristics were less
likely to use the public ES.  
In fact, data pertaining to the use of different search methods by all
recent job seekers—both employed and unemployed—are available
from a variety of other sources, but only for specific age groups (such
as youth) and/or in specific times and places.13 The general results on
search methods in these data differ somewhat from those presented
here for the unemployed (especially on the role of friends and relatives
in the search process).14 But they confirm that the ES is used by signif-
icant fractions of job seekers—for example, roughly 10–20 percent
among whites and 15–30 percent among minorities in the most recent
and representative of these samples (Falcon and Melendez 2001).
Job Search and the Internet
Within the past few years, use of the Internet to conduct business,
shop, and gather information has grown at an incredible pace. It has
also changed the way many people search for jobs. Today, there are
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more than 2,000 Internet job search sites in operation, offering job
seekers more convenient ways to access information about job postings
and to submit their resumes to prospective employers. 
Analysis of a supplement of the Current Population Survey in Sep-
tember 2001 reveals that 31.9 percent of the unemployed (those active-
ly looking for work) and 11.3 percent of employed workers used the In-
ternet to search for a job. For the unemployed job seeker overall, the
Internet was the third most popular job search method. Only two search
methods—checking with employers directly and sending out resumes
or filling out applications—were used more often. For unemployed job
seekers with access to the Internet, 56 percent used the Internet to
search for a job, which was the same frequency of use as reported for
sending out resumes or filling out applications. About a third of the un-
employed Internet users submitted resumes or applied on-line, three
quarters researched potential employers, and nearly everyone searched
on-line for job listings (Table 1.4). Unemployed job seekers who con-
tact the public employment agency are more likely to search for a job
on the Internet than those who do not use the public ES (69 percent ver-
sus 53 percent).
While the Internet has given job seekers more options for where
and how they search for jobs, access to the Internet varies by race and
ethnicity. For those in the workforce, a smaller proportion of blacks and
Hispanics have access to the Internet than whites—51 percent for
blacks and 38 percent for Hispanics compared with 68 percent for
whites. The difference is slightly more pronounced for the unemployed,
with only 40 percent of blacks and 31 percent of Hispanics able to ac-
cess the Internet compared with 61 percent for whites. However, when
Internet access is available, the gap between groups in using the Inter-
net to search for jobs narrows markedly. Fifty-one percent of blacks and
46 percent of Hispanics search on the Internet, compared with 57 per-
cent for whites. Interestingly, for those employed with Internet access,
a higher percentage of blacks and Hispanics use the Internet to search
for jobs than do whites. 
Effectiveness of the Public ES 
How effective are the various methods of finding a job, particularly
the public ES? To provide a definitive answer to this question, one
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Table 1.4  Use of the Internet for Job Search










All 120,000 94,121 90,417 3,402
56.5 66.3 66.9 56.7
Black 10,692 85,151 7,954 531
41.7 50.6 51.8 40.3
White 103,000 80,883 78,004 2,618
58.4 68.5 68.9 61.0
Hispanic 7,810 6,028 5,739 267
33.5 38.0 38.7 31.2








C. Search methods for those who have searched on the Internet
Search on-line job listings
Research potential employers
Submit resume or application on-line
Post resume on a job listing site on-line
Post resume on own Web site
Other methods on-line
SOURCE: Estimates derived from authors’ calculations of the September 2001 Current
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would need to specify the outcomes by which one is defining effective-
ness—these might include higher rates of gaining employment (or
shorter durations of search/unemployment), higher wages, and perhaps
lower turnover rates. Of course, exactly how one quantifies these “ben-
efits” of search, and especially how they might be compared to the
“costs” of search in time and money, might be problematic. 
Furthermore, to deal with the fact that individuals with different
unobserved characteristics select search methods differently, one
would also need to conduct a random assignment experiment to accu-
rately gauge the effects of search method use on outcomes. Such an
approach is difficult to administer, however, since the ES is mandated
to provide services to all those who request it, and thus it is not
possible to deny services to those who might be assigned to a con-
trol group. Short of that approach, most studies are based on com-
parison group methodologies that use statistical techniques to con-
trol for differences among those who use the ES and those who do 
not. Chapter 4 in this volume offers a detailed examination of the
various studies that have assessed the effectiveness of the various
functions of the ES. These studies in general provide evidence that 
the ES might be a cost-effective method of searching for jobs, particu-
larly because of its relatively low cost and its ability to place some
referrals into jobs. 
We set the stage for Chapter 4 by offering a broader perspective of
the effectiveness of the ES relative to the other search methods. We up-
date the study conducted by Bortnick and Ports (1992), which uses the
CPS to follow job seekers over time. We record the employment status
of job seekers one month after they reported searching for a job. We
then relate the job search method that they used to their employment
status in the following month.15
In 2001, 26.5 percent of the unemployed reported finding a job 
the next month. The success rate varied to some extent by method 
of search, as shown in Table 1.5. Those contacting employers direct-
ly had the greatest success in finding a job (28.9 percent), while those
using the public ES had the least success (24.3 percent). The dif-
ference, however, was relatively small—4.6 percentage points. This
difference could result from differences in demographic characteris-
tics among those who use various search modes. For instance, white
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job seekers have higher success rates than black job seekers (28.8
percent versus 19.6 percent), and men have slightly more success find-
ing jobs than women (27.3 percent versus 25.9 percent). In addi-
tion, younger job seekers are more likely to find jobs than older work-
ers. Since the employment service is more likely to serve those groups
who are less successful finding a job, it is understandable that the 
employment rates for the employment service is lower than other
modes.
When two search methods are considered in tandem, the ES fares
better. For example, when the ES is combined with answering ads and
filling out applications, it ranks second with a success rate of 31.5 per-
cent. This is close behind the combination of direct employer contact
and use of the private employment agency, which had a success rate of
32.6 percent (Table 1.6). It is also interesting that the success rate for
those using a private employment agency and answering ads is in last
place with a 5.6 percent success rate. The demographic composition of
those using these search methods undoubtedly plays a significant role
in the success rates. 
Results from other studies clearly indicate that the public ES ac-
counts for very small percentages of all jobs attained by job seekers—
indeed, usually well under 10 percent. This reflects the fact that the ES
is used less frequently than other methods, but also that it is less effec-
tive in generating employment when used.16
Furthermore, a wide range of studies shows that job seekers using
the public ES experienced worse employment outcomes along many di-
mensions, including lower wages and higher subsequent turnover
(Bishop and Abraham 1993; Holzer 1998). However, it is impossible to
infer anything about the productivity or cost-effectiveness of the search
method in these cases, because these results may be driven partially or
completely by the relatively weaker skills and personal characteristics
of those who choose to use this method. 
Indeed, the relevant question for the public ES is whether those
who use it have significantly better outcomes than they would have had
the service not been available, and how any such gains compare to the
public cost of providing the service. As we stated earlier, without a ran-
dom assignment evaluation (or something close to it), it is very difficult
to provide definitive answers to such questions.17
22Table 1.5  Employment Status of Job Seeker in Month after Reported Searching for a Job, by Mode 
of Search
Labor force status in second month (percent distribution)
Unemployed










Employer directly 13,465 100.0 28.9 45.8 1.5 23.8
Men 7,209 100.0 29.4 47.6 1.9 21.1
Women 6,256 100.0 28.3 43.9 0.9 26.9
Private agency 1,878 100.0 26.8 54.0 1.4 17.8
Men 1,007 100.0 26.2 56.6 2.0 15.2
Women 871 100.0 27.4 51.0 0.7 20.9
Other methods 12,937 100.0 25.7 49.4 1.3 23.6
Men 6,548 100.0 25.8 51.5 1.9 20.8
Women 6,389 100.0 25.6 47.2 0.8 26.4
Placed or answered ads 3,322 100.0 25.7 51.7 1.1 21.6
Men 1,675 100.0 26.6 53.6 1.4 18.5
Women 1,647 100.0 24.8 49.8 0.7 24.7
Friends and relatives 3,268 100.0 25.6 48.8 1.2 24.4
Men 1,855 100.0 26.4 50.6 1.8 21.2
Women 1,413 100.0 24.6 46.4 0.5 28.6
Public agency 4,499 100.0 24.3 55.0 1.5 19.2
Men 2,381 100.0 24.4 57.0 1.9 16.7




NOTE: Calculations are based on all unemployed 16 years or older looking for work, and are not on layoff.  Job seekers are
counted once for every job search method they reported in the first month.  Therefore, there is overlap among the different
search modes.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using the monthly files of the 2001 Current Population Survey.  
Total unemployed job seekers 22,055 100.0 26.6 46.0 1.4 26.0
Men 11,393 100.0 27.3 47.8 1.9 23.0
Women 10,662 100.0 25.9 44.2 0.9 29.1
24Table 1.6  Employment Status of Job Seeker in Month after Reported Searching for a Job, by Combinations of
Two Modes of Search
Labor force status in second month (percent distribution)
Unemployed










Employer/private agency 144 100.0 32.6 41.0 1.4 25.0
Ads/public agency 89 100.0 31.5 51.7 0.0 16.9
Employer/friend, relative 449 100.0 29.8 40.8 1.8 27.6
Employer/other 3,546 100.0 27.8 48.4 1.3 22.5
Other/ads 448 100.0 25.5 49.1 0.9 24.6
Employer/public agency 773 100.0 25.2 51.2 1.9 21.6
Private agency/other 178 100.0 24.7 52.3 2.8 20.2
Ads/friends, relative 68 100.0 23.5 47.1 1.5 27.9
Employer/ads 467 100.0 23.1 43.3 1.9 31.7
Private agency/public agency 94 100.0 21.3 55.3 1.1 22.3
Friends, relatives/public agency 86 100.0 20.9 53.5 1.2 24.4
Private agency/friends, relative 34 100.0 20.6 61.8 0.0 17.7
Other/public agency 559 100.0 19.5 60.5 2.5 17.5
Other/friends, relatives 373 100.0 19.3 50.7 1.3 28.7
Private agency/ads 18 100.0 5.6 55.6 0.0 38.9




Total unemployed job seekers 22,055 100.0 26.6 46.0 1.4 26.0
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HOW EMPLOYERS RECRUIT WORKERS
While employees consider the best methods to gain access to em-
ployers, employers must decide how best to locate and recruit qualified
workers and to assess their qualifications. Their choices, in turn, heavi-
ly influence the effectiveness of different methods that are available to
job-seeking individuals, and also where (i.e., in which sectors of the
economy) any such effectiveness is likely to be found.
Holzer has conducted several studies that examine the methods em-
ployers use to recruit and hire. This section borrows heavily from a
study that reports the results of the most recent survey, which was ad-
ministered in 1992 and 1994 to workers in four large metropolitan areas
(Holzer 1998). Holzer’s survey asks employers to list the methods that
they recently used to search, and which method generated their most re-
cent hire. The search options included in the survey are similar to those
included in the CPS for households, with a few exceptions.18
Not surprisingly, the results reveal several similarities in the way in
which workers and employers search.19 As is the case with job seekers,
direct contact is one of the most often used methods of recruiting and
screening workers. Seventy-two percent of the establishments surveyed
relied on direct walk-ins to find prospective workers. The most fre-
quently used method of recruiting workers was informal referral. Al-
most 90 percent of employers considered informal referrals when look-
ing to hire new workers. In contrast, only 30 percent of businesses
responded that they used state ES agencies to find worker prospects.
Adding community agencies raises the percentage to around 50 percent
of those businesses using public agencies to recruit workers.
The use of public employment agencies by businesses varies by the
size and type of business. Larger businesses (greater than 500 employ-
ees) are more likely than smaller businesses (1–20 employees) to re-
cruit workers from state employment agencies, by a factor greater than
two. Holzer’s survey shows that 56 percent of large businesses use the
state ES agency compared with 22 percent for small businesses. Indus-
try also matters with respect to using the public employment agency to
recruit workers. Interestingly, public-sector employers use state ES
agencies more frequently than do employers from any other sector, but
at the same time they also use informal referral methods more often
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than anyone else. Businesses in the retail trade industry, on the other
hand, are most likely to use informal referral to recruit workers. 
When businesses were asked which method they actually used in
recruiting their most recent hire, they reported that state ES agencies
generated very few hires. Only 2.6 percent of businesses reported that
state ES agencies generated their most recent hires. This percentage is
quite small compared with the most frequently used methods—infor-
mal referrals (40 percent) and newspaper ads (28 percent). Even private
employment agencies, which were not used as often in recruiting work-
ers, generated more hires than state employment agencies (6.4 percent
versus 2.6 percent). Among the different types of industries and jobs,
the public employment agency was most successful in generating hires
in white-collar jobs requiring no college education, for the largest es-
tablishments, and for the manufacturing sector. They were least effec-
tive for jobs requiring a college education, in small firms, and for pub-
lic-sector employers. 
The results of Holzer’s study are thus consistent with others that
have found that the public employment agency generates relatively few
hires overall. Studies have also shown that the role of the public em-
ployment agency has declined in recent years. One explanation has
been that employers perceive referrals from the employment service as
consisting of relatively low-skill workers and for those job seekers with
few options.20 Therefore, as the ES has focused more over the years on
providing labor exchange services for the economically disadvantaged,
it is difficult to disentangle the effectiveness of this source of referrals
and job search method from the customers that it seeks to serve.
CONCLUSION
During its 70-year history, the public ES has provided labor ex-
change services to a large and diverse number of people and to employ-
ers. Originally conceived as a provider of free services to anyone look-
ing for a job, it has undergone significant changes over the years in
response to economic and political demands. It has partnered in various
ways with other federal programs to direct resources to various sub-
groups of the population and to support different types of employment
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programs. Yet, despite these diversions, the public ES has not strayed
far from its core purpose of promoting an efficient job-matching sys-
tem. With the passage of the Workforce Investment Act, the public ES
has been firmly established, once again, as providing universal access
to labor exchange services.
Yet, the public ES faces several challenges. First, the use of the pub-
lic employment agency has declined over the past few decades. Today,
roughly 19 percent of the unemployed use the public employment
agency compared with 30 percent three decades before. The public ES
competes with private placement agencies and perhaps more important-
ly with the Internet and its countless number of job listing Web sites and
direct links to employers. Second, the public ES is seen by many em-
ployers and workers as the labor exchange for minorities, less-educated
workers, older workers, and displaced workers. This limits the extent to
which many on both sides of the labor market are interested in using it,
which could undermine its effectiveness. Third, fewer jobs are found
through the public ES than through other search methods, such as pri-
vate employment agencies and direct employer contacts. Also, wages
earned among those using public agencies are lower and subsequent
turnover rates higher than for those finding jobs through other methods.
These lagging measures of effectiveness, while not conclusive evidence
of the performance of the public ES, underscore how the three issues are
related. Lower placement rates, lower wages, and higher turnover may
be related to the average ability of those using the public ES to find and
hold higher-paying jobs, which in turn may explain the declining re-
liance over time on the public ES by both workers and employers. 
These findings raise questions about the future of the public ES and
how well it is positioned to face the challenges generated by the Work-
force Investment Act, the use of one-stop centers, the Internet technolo-
gies now available, and the implementation of remote UI claim pro-
cessing. Obviously, it is impossible to foresee perfectly what lies ahead
for the public ES. The following chapters in this book are intended to
provide more detailed information about the history, institutional
arrangements, and effectiveness of the public ES. By providing this in-
formation, it is our hope that practitioners and policymakers can more
clearly understand the factors affecting the public ES and become bet-
ter informed in their efforts to improve the reach and effectiveness of
labor exchange services in the United States. 
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Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful and insightful comments of David Bal-
ducchi and the excellent assistance of Wei-Jang Huang in analyzing the CPS files.
Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not those of the Upjohn
Institute or Georgetown University.
1. States must administer a basic labor exchange system that has the capacity to as-
sist job seekers in finding employment, assist employers in filling jobs, facilitate
the match between job seekers and employers, participate in a system of clearing
labor markets between states, meet the work test requirements of the state UI pro-
gram (20 CFR 652.3), and deliver services as part of the state one-stop delivery
system (section 7(e), Wagner-Peyser Act).
2. This section relies on Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz (1997) and Fay and Lippoldt
(1999).
3. These other dimensions of job search include the intensity with which individuals
seek new work (i.e., how many hours per week they spend searching) and their
lowest acceptable wages (known among economists as “reservation wages”).
4. Use of newspapers can be categorized either way, though placing ads (as opposed
to only checking and answering them) seems like a relatively more formal ac-
tivity.
5. The costs of search among the unemployed can also be affected by the availabili-
ty of other income from spouses or unemployment insurance. 
6. Interestingly, Latinos use informal networks more heavily than other whites or
blacks, despite the relatively low wages that these networks sometimes generate.
See Falcon and Melendez (2001). 
7. An additional group, those who are on temporary layoff awaiting recall to their
previous jobs, are also considered unemployed but generally are not in the cate-
gory of job seekers. 
8. The loss of training that is somewhat specific to that job, as well as lost “tenure”
(or seniority), account for much of the lost earnings that we observe. See, for ex-
ample, Jacobson LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
9. Those who quit can do so either before or after they have already located another
job. Afterward, they would fall into the category of employed rather than unem-
ployed job seekers.
10. We include those who are unemployed and looking for work but who are not on
layoff. 
11. But the temporary agencies’ role for some groups of disadvantaged workers, such
as welfare recipients, might be greater. See Autor and Houseman (2002).
12. Estimates (not shown) are by the authors using the 2001 monthly files of the CPS
and are available from the authors by request. 
13. For instance, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1979 cohort) included
questions on search methods used, as well as employment outcomes, in 1981 and
1982. Similar questions were used in the household surveys of the Multi-City
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Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) during the mid 1990s in Atlanta, Boston, De-
troit, and Los Angeles. Data from a survey of methods used by all job seekers can
also be found in the U.S. Department of Labor (1976). 
14. The papers by Holzer (1987, 1988) using the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth document much larger percentages of workers using friends and relatives
in the search process and also finding their jobs that way than does the CPS sam-
ple, as does an early analysis from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (Datch-
er 1983) and also one from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality sample (Fal-
con and Melendez 2001).  
15. We recognize that this method has several obvious drawbacks. First, as we have
demonstrated in the previous sections, the use of different search methods differ
by demographic characteristics and income, which are related to the likelihood of
finding employment. Therefore, it is difficult to compare employment outcomes
across different search modes. Second, job seekers use more than one mode dur-
ing their search efforts, as we also showed. Following Bortnick and Ports, we
counted job seekers once for every job search method they cited using in the first
month. However, the search methods overlap and the employment outcomes can-
not be attributed to only one specific outcome. 
16. For instance, the data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor (1976) indicated
that, while 27 percent of job seekers used the ES, only 6 percent of workers found
their jobs that way. Though no such data have been recently reported for job seek-
ers, the data discussed below from employers confirm that use of the employment
service generates fewer new employees per method used than do other search
methods.
17. An alternative, if the data were available, might be to use panel data on individu-
als who have been through at least two episodes of job search, and compare the
results obtained from using the employment service with those obtained from oth-
er methods. Of course, such an analysis would control for fixed personal charac-
teristics, but not those that might vary over time.
18. For instance, in addition to the state ES, the survey also asks whether businesses
used community agencies to recruit workers. 
19. In fact, for complete samples of jobs and job seekers, the results should be identi-
cal by definition.
20. This is also consistent with the evidence of lower wages paid in and higher
turnover out of jobs filled by the ES compared to other methods, e.g., Bishop and
Abraham (1993). 
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in Labor Exchange Policy
David E. Balducchi and Alison J. Pasternak
In 1933 the United States Employment Service was created—a co-
operative State and Federal enterprise. . . . The Federal–State co-
operation has been splendid.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
September 6, 1936
This chapter will describe noteworthy policy issues over the past
decade that affected federal–state relations in the delivery of labor ex-
change services funded under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. We will
explain how the intergovernmental structure of the public employment
service (ES) established under the Wagner-Peyser Act faced serious
challenges during the 1990s and ultimately was strengthened. This was
an era aptly described by Nathan and Gais (2000) as Second Order De-
volution—a type of federalism that extols the merits of local authority
and privatization of government services. While we will focus primari-
ly on labor exchange policy of the 1990s, we also will summarize labor
exchange policies from President Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s to
President Reagan’s New Federalism of the 1980s, and speculate on
President George W. Bush’s labor exchange policy.
The division of power between state and local control of workforce
development programs is a pivotal issue of workforce federalism. Since
the 1970s, a constant tension in workforce federalism has existed be-
tween state-administered labor exchange programs under the Wagner-
Peyser Act and local-administered job training programs under the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act (JTPA), and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
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The division of power between the Wagner-Peyser Act and job training
laws during three eras of New Federalism is the subject of this chapter.
Our policy lens will be focused primarily on federal policy making,
leading up to and following the enactment of WIA in 1998.
We aim to demystify some of the seeming contradictions of work-
force federalism during the era of New Democrat President Clinton that
paradoxically strengthened state control of labor exchange policy while
consolidating control of local workforce development services under
the one-stop delivery system. We will examine the relationships be-
tween the federal government and state and local authorities during a
decade marked by notable changes in national labor exchange policy. 
LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE
APPORTIONMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
More than 30 years ago, Richard H. Leach (1970, p. 57) wrote that
federalism was designed as a negative device to inhibit the use of pow-
er in the United States. The examination of federal–state relations in the
administration of a public ES requires study of federalism’s competing
ideologies during the last century: centralized government to meet the
economic crisis of the Great Depression; and its counterassault, decen-
tralized government dubbed New Federalism, which shifted power to
state and local authorities in order to reduce big government and deficit
spending.
The Federal–State Relationship
Under the U.S. Constitution, responsibility between the central
(i.e., federal) government and subgovernments (i.e., states) is divided.
A federal system limits the centralization of power by defining spheres
of authority. The Tenth Amendment specifies that those “powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple.” The term local government does not appear in the Constitution.
Throughout the Republic’s history, the division of authority between
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the federal government and the states has been contentious. Resulting
from that tension has been a remarkable elasticity in the relationship
between the levels of government. This relationship has sustained the
people’s general welfare and the capitalist market as authority has shift-
ed back and forth to meet political and economic circumstances.
Cooperative Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
By the early 20th century, nearly half the states and a small number
of local governments created public employment offices to address In-
dustrial Age dislocations resulting from economic downturns. In the
1930s, the mounting surge of unemployment incited a public demand
for a national labor exchange policy. After an attempt to create a na-
tional ES system failed in 1931, two years later President Roosevelt
signed into law the Wagner-Peyser Act.1
Under the Rooseveltian New Deal, federal programs to aid states
were implemented under a cooperative partnership. According to Vines
(1976, p. 13), cooperative federalism refers to cooperative procedures
to accomplish national policies established by the federal government;
state and local governments receive federal funds called grants-in-aid2
to administer public programs. During this period, direct federal inter-
vention in state labor exchange policy helped shore up the U.S. econo-
my through referral of unemployed workers by public employment of-
fices to public works projects and establishment of a national ES
system.
Under section 1 of the Wagner-Peyser Act, the U.S. Department of
Labor (USDOL) was charged with 1) establishing a national system of
public employment offices through a “confederation of permanent
State employment services operating in cooperation with the Federal
Government . . .” (Persons 1934), and 2) revitalizing the U.S. Employ-
ment Service (USES) by vesting responsibility for administration of the
federal–state ES system under its aegis. In essence, the Wagner-Peyser
Act set up a federal-directed, state-run system of public employment
offices.
The Wagner-Peyser Act was enacted as a federal–state grants-in-
aid3 program. States created ES agencies through legislation in order to
receive federal grants for administration of local ES offices. Except
during World War II, when state ES agencies were federalized to recruit
labor for industrial defense production, the ES has remained a feder-
al–state cooperative program. Preceding enactment of the Wagner-
Peyser Act and for the next three decades, policy debates on gover-
nance centered on whether the ES should be nationalized or whether
the federal–state structure should be maintained (Haber and Kruger
1964, p. 67). The federal–state arrangement was chosen over an entire-
ly federal scheme for several rea-
sons, among them was that state
control allowed greater flexibility
and efficiency in the management
of local ES offices (Persons 1934,
p. 4).4
Coordination of the UI and 
ES programs
The Social Security Act of
1935 required the payment of
unemployment benefits through
public employment offices or oth-
er offices approved by the Social
Security Board. The Social Secu-
rity Board designated only state
ES offices for the payment of ben-
efits. With the passage in 1938 of
UI laws in all states, the states
charged their ES offices with ad-
ministering the so-called work test whereby to qualify for benefits, UI
claimants must be able to work, be available for suitable work, and
must register for work (in most states).
According to some observers, this new responsibility brought a
mixed windfall. While it increased the number and diversity of workers
on file, over time it dulled the image of state ES offices through their re-
lationship with UI and identification as “unemployment offices”—
places that did not attract workers seeking first or better jobs. Despite
this, and due in part to postwar prosperity, from 1946 to 1962, when the
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) was enacted, state
ES agencies were viewed as employer oriented, as they were the sole
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State ES agencies administer public labor
exchange services without fee to job
seekers or employers.  Services for job
seekers include assessment, together with
interviewing, counseling, and testing; job
search workshops; and job placement.
Services for employers include job order
taking, recruitment, screening, and refer-
ral of job seekers.  Other services include
matching job seekers and employers, ad-
ministering work test requirements of
state unemployment insurance (UI) laws,
and producing and disseminating labor
market information.  Services under the
Wagner-Peyser Act do not include skill
training (section 7 of the Wagner-Peyser
Act).  Under Title I of WIA, adults and
dislocated workers receive, without eligi-
bility requirements, labor exchange ser-
vices as core services from public and
private service providers.
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public employment agency designed to meet employers’ production re-
quirements. The federal role in state labor exchange policy was mostly
passive, and no attempt was made to manipulate the labor market
(Johnson 1973, pp. 13–15).
Creative Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
By the late 1950s, America began to address the problems of pover-
ty, race, and class. Early job training programs were contained in the
Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 and the MDTA of 1962. State ES
agencies were assigned responsibility to designate areas of high unem-
ployment, analyze the local labor market to determine suitable occupa-
tions for training, and select and refer job seekers to training (Guttman
1990). In 1964, President Johnson declared an “unconditional war on
poverty” and signed the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) into law. To
this end, the federal government instituted job training programs, called
“manpower programs,” in local areas to aid disadvantaged workers.
Johnson referred to this period as Creative Federalism (Wright
1997, p. 583), in which grants established direct intergovernmental re-
lations at substate levels, often bypassing state or local governments.
According to Guttman (1990), an alternative workforce development
structure was created under EOA, in part because of concern that state
ES agencies might not be responsive to disadvantaged workers.5 Local-
ities administered most manpower programs through grants-in-aid, and
the job matching role of state ES agencies was deemphasized (Balduc-
chi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 408). The ES was tradition-bound and
slow in instituting active labor exchange policies to assist disadvan-
taged workers (Sundquist 1968, p. 68). State ES agencies played a sub-
ordinate role in the delivery of services to the disadvantaged.
New Federalism
During the 1970s, President Nixon reduced federal grants-in-aid
and replaced them with block grants to state and local governments,
with the intention of decentralizing welfare and workforce develop-
ment programs that provided services to localities. This approach be-
came known as New Federalism—a domestic policy framework that
exalts state and local control over federal control. The evolution of New
Federalism as it applies to labor exchange policy is examined during
three eras:
1) Permissive New Federalism (Vines 1976). Nixon’s decentral-
ized approach to workforce policies reduced grant-in-aid pro-
grams, instituted block grants, and established a federal–local
training delivery structure under CETA. 
2) Devolution New Federalism. Reagan’s devolutionary approach
to workforce policies revamped the federal–local training
structure and labeled it JTPA, expanded state control of ES ac-
tivities, joined state ES and local job training planning and
budgeting cycles, and nearly abdicated federal oversight of
state ES agencies.
3) Second Order Devolution New Federalism. Clinton’s third-
way approach to workforce policies gave preference to local
control of workforce policies, sought to incorporate market-
based principles into state one-stop delivery systems under
WIA, and, after considerable political agitation, strengthened
state control of labor exchange policy.
Permissive New Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
The seeds of Permissive New Federalism in workforce develop-
ment reform were sown when state ES agencies lost authority to feder-
al–local community action agencies established under EOA (Guttman
1990). In 1973, Nixon approved a job training bill called CETA. This
act provided job training funds through block grants to local govern-
ments, called prime sponsors. Prime sponsors were responsible for ad-
ministering the delivery of job training through public and private
agencies. According to Guttman (1990), it was recognized that services
such as testing, counseling, job referral, and job development under
CETA duplicated state ES services, so CETA contained provisions al-
lowing for subcontracting to state ES agencies and requiring coordina-
tion. Decisions about how to accomplish subcontracting and coordina-
tion were left to local areas with varied results. 
In 1978, as part of the renewal of CETA, President Carter support-
ed the Nixon decentralized, local control approach to job training. Un-
der Carter, prime sponsors were encouraged to establish private indus-
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try councils that included business representatives to oversee job train-
ing priorities and promote employment. During this period, the feder-
al–state structure of the Wagner-Peyser Act remained intact, and the
role of state ES agencies was not at the forefront of workforce policy.
Carter’s workforce development policy embraced Nixon’s New Feder-
alism, ratifying a bipartisan preference for permissive, decentralized
federalism.
Devolution New Federalism and Labor Exchange Policy
The goal of Reagan’s Devolution New Federalism6 was to devolve
the federal role in the design, finance, and operation of social programs.
Reagan was ideologically opposed not only to centralization of the
New Deal and Great Society programs, but also to the decentralization
of the Permissive New Federalism programs. Dissatisfaction with re-
peated allegations of fraud and abuse in CETA public service employ-
ment and training programs led to enactment in 1982 of JTPA, a
trimmed-back version of CETA job training. Under JTPA, state gover-
nors “were promoted from merely overseeing the rural ‘balance of
state’ [activities] to a dominant position in governing the program”
(Mangum 2000, p. 296). Local prime sponsors were reorganized as ser-
vice delivery areas and job training continued to be delivered by public
and private agencies (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001).
Incorporation of state ES agencies into job training reform under
JTPA was spurred by the politics of limited government. The Reagan
Administration and the 97th Congress agreed that to achieve authentic
coordination between state ES agencies and local job training agencies,
the New Deal era Wagner-Peyser Act required an overhaul. To conform
to Devolution New Federalism, Title V of JTPA included makeover
amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act. While the cooperative structure
was retained, the amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act shifted addi-
tional authority to states in three ways: 1) they allowed governors ex-
tensive discretion in the use of Wagner-Peyser Act funds to administer
state ES agencies; 2) they provided for joint planning between state ES
agencies and local job training agencies, and the review of both plans
by state JTPA councils (which included employers); and 3) they creat-
ed for the first time a needs-based state allocation formula based on la-
bor force size and unemployment rate. To the extent possible, federal
involvement in the planning and administration of job training and ES
programs was eliminated.
There is no legislative history explaining what Congress intended
when it expanded state authority in the administration of ES programs
(Guttman 1990). Perhaps the devolution of authority to states derived
from the deregulatory climate of the Reagan era. Ardent USDOL polit-
ical aides, whose policies reflected Reagan’s view of limited govern-
ment, developed the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations issued in Novem-
ber 1983, and in 1987 supported a bolder legislative attempt by the
Reagan Administration to devolve ES as part of the Trade, Employment
and Productivity Act. The bill7 called for further reduction of federal in-
volvement in the ES system and decentralizing to states ES planning,
financing, and administering authority. The 100th Congress did not
take action on the legislation. For the remainder of the decade and into
the early 1990s, Congress and USDOL had little interest in revisiting
the federal–state ES partnership or the role of ES agencies in labor ex-
change policy. 
Second Order Devolution New Federalism and Labor 
Exchange Policy8
Between 1994 and 1998, Congress considered three major work-
force development reform bills, each of which included the establish-
ment of a one-stop delivery system to consolidate delivery of workforce
development services. The first two bills failed to pass.
The first unsuccessful bill was the Reemployment Act of 1994. This
bill reflected the themes of Reinventing Government (Osborne and Gae-
bler 1992), which heavily influenced the early Clinton presidency. The
book’s thesis is that many public programs could be improved if they
competed in the marketplace. The idea of introducing competition into
Wagner-Peyser Act service delivery—a concept presented through a se-
ries of public consultation papers developed by Clinton policymakers in
late 1993 and early 1994—met resistance, with some states and labor
unions arguing that the proposal was defective. Among the proposal’s
defects, three were often mentioned: 1) private agencies were likely to
help only those customers who were easiest and most profitable to serve;
2) employer UI taxes were levied to support state ES agencies, not pri-
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vate agencies; and 3) competition created duplication of services. Oppo-
sition to competition in the delivery of ES services convinced Clinton to
modify the competitive model advocated by Osborne and the New Dem-
ocrats. The modified bill, unveiled in March 1994, ensured that the state
ES agency would be a preemptive deliverer of labor exchange services.
However, Clinton was unable to marshal broad support for the Reem-
ployment Act, due largely to a preoccupation with complex health care
reform. The 103rd Congress ended without decisive action on the bill,
and in December 1994 Clinton issued a renewed workforce policy pro-
posal called the G.I. Bill for America’s Workers.
In the 104th Congress, legislators passed two versions of workforce
development reform: the House version, called the Consolidated and
Reformed Education, Employment, and Rehabilitation Systems Act
(CAREERS Act), and the Senate version, called the Workforce Devel-
opment Act. Both bills reflected features of Clinton’s policy proposal;
however, the bills contained major differences in the division of federal
authority between the Secretaries of Labor and Education. The Senate
bill also amended section 1 of the Wagner-Peyser Act by deleting the
word “public” before “employment offices,” which could have resulted
in privatizing Wagner-Peyser Act service delivery.9 In May 1996, to aid
House and Senate deliberations, Clinton defined his views on work-
force federalism. In a letter to Congress, he endorsed local control of
job training programs, yet he declared that governors should remain re-
sponsible for federal grants-in-aid to administer a public ES and should
have approval authority over job training plans. Clinton’s letter went on
to assert that local one-stop centers should be administered by local
boards, and job training funds should be allocated to local communities
for adults, dislocated workers, and youth (Clinton 1996). The confer-
ence bill died when the Senate would not relinquish its view that state
governors should be given greater control (Fine 1996).
Finally, a revised bill, WIA (H.R. 1385), was introduced in the
105th Congress on April 17, 1997, and enacted August 7, 1998 (P.L.
105-220), culminating a five-year struggle to achieve workforce devel-
opment reform. The paramount feature of WIA is that workforce devel-
opment programs, including ES, must be delivered through local one-
stop centers. However, WIA did not change the supervision for the bulk
of one-stop services; supervision continues to be divided between state
and local governments. Under Title I of WIA, states distribute to local
boards federal job training funds for adults, dislocated workers and
youth, and local boards decide how these funds are to be spent. In con-
trast, state agencies retain responsibility for the administration of feder-
al grants-in-aid for ES and UI programs, and state merit-staff employ-
ees deliver ES and UI services.10
ONE-STOP DELIVERY SYSTEM AND WORKER PROFILING
AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
In the early 1990s, states began to consolidate the delivery of work-
force development programs. The National Performance Review’s
(NPR) policy recommendation in 1993 challenged the United States to
“(c)reate a system of competitive, one-stop, career development cen-
ters open to all Americans” (NPR 1993, p. 49), and in October 1994
USDOL launched the one-stop implementation grant initiative. In the
same month, a federal–state work group issued an ES revitalization
work plan advocating that state ES agencies be a gateway for workers
in the new one-stop system.11 Still, governors were allowed to select
the lead agency for the one-stop effort, and between 1994 and 2000,
each state received a one-stop implementation grant distributed over a
three-year period. The amount of the grant was based on need, and it in-
cluded no provision to cover ongoing costs. In most states, governors
selected their unified workforce development agencies to administer
the grants, with state JTPA policymakers often directing the projects.
In 1993, Congress amended the Social Security Act by requiring
states to establish a Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
(WPRS) system to identify UI claimants who are likely to exhaust ben-
efits and will need job search assistance and refer them to reemploy-
ment services so as to expedite their return to work. By 1996, all states
had implemented a WPRS system, with state ES agencies providing the
bulk of reemployment services to claimants.12 Meanwhile, USDOL’s
welfare-to-work grants, which supported job-finding and placement
services for welfare recipients, were directed to JTPA agencies.13 Yet,
state ES job search workshops grew as a result of the WPRS system,
and this growth had a distinct policy consequence: the WPRS system
bolstered the case of some USDOL program managers, who in 1997
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began advocating for an increase in annual Wagner-Peyser Act funds
for reemployment services.14 During fiscal years (FYs) 2001–2003,
USDOL’s annual appropriation included an additional $35 million in
Wagner-Peyser Act funds to provide reemployment services, enabling
more UI claimants to be served than would otherwise be possible.
ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE WAGNER-PEYSER ACT AND
THE PRIVATIZATION CHALLENGE
In configuring workforce development reform in the 1990s, Demo-
crat and Republican political leaders supported decentralized, local
control of state one-stop systems, but they were less certain how to con-
solidate the administration of ES and job training services. Under WIA,
the coexistence of the state ES system and local job training programs
has continued, but only after some state and local policymakers sought
to decentralize the authority of ES and to contest the delivery of Wag-
ner-Peyser Act services, thereby setting in opposition cooperative fed-
eralism and second order devolution. The framework of the original
Wagner-Peyser Act was the battleground.
Original Intent and Federalism
The original Wagner-Peyser Act framework as implemented by
USDOL consisted of five requirements for a state to become affiliated
with the national ES system: 1) establish a state ES agency to cooperate
with USES; 2) develop a plan of service; 3) institute a merit personnel
system; 4) appropriate matching funds;15 and 5) appoint an advisory
council.16 The Secretary of Labor was allowed discretion in developing
requirements for the receipt of grants. The first three requirements were
still in effect during the Clinton era, and debate about the fate 
of the Wagner-Peyser Act centered on the following three rootstock
requirements.
1) Establish a state ES agency. “State legislatures must accept the
provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act and designate or authorize the cre-
ation of a state agency to administer” the provisions of the Act (Persons
1934, p. 5). Congress envisioned a strong role for the state agency in
operating labor exchange policy. In fact, the Committee on Education
and Labor report that accompanied the Wagner-Peyser Act (S. 510)
stated:
We are of the opinion that it is essential that there be a centralized
employment service in each State and that it is highly important
that there be a coordinated service between the States. This bill
proposes a scheme of Federal leadership, with the placement work
done by the States, in cooperation with such leadership. (U.S.
Congress 1933, p. 4)
2) Develop a plan of service. “[A] plan for the operation of the
state ES must be submitted by the state agency and approved by USES”
(Persons 1934, p. 5). In 1937, a cooperative agreement between the
Secretary of Labor and the Social Security Board provided that USES
and the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation act as a single agency
in all matters affecting state operations, including development of joint
plans of service (U.S. Congress 1964, p. 270). Until the Wagner-Peyser
Act amendments of 1982, ES plans were developed with UI plans.
Since then, state ES plans have been developed in conjunction with job
training agencies. To some degree, this has resulted in a lack of atten-
tion to statewide labor exchange policies.
3) Institute a merit personnel system. “[In] the plan of service,
the state ES must have agreed to conform to the standards of USES re-
lating to personnel, premises, procedure, and to submit reports on ex-
penditures and operations as required” (Persons 1934, p. 5). Shortly af-
ter the Wagner-Peyser Act was enacted, USES adopted a requirement
that states must administer a merit personnel system in which appoint-
ments and promotions are based upon competence. This requirement
ensures that hiring is not affected by patronage, that the execution of
program services is impartial and nonpartisan, and that the delivery of
services is not affected by favoritism (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001, p.
159). According to Persons (1934), the requirement was a subject of
much discussion; yet to ensure the highest quality of state ES opera-
tions, USDOL concluded that state staff must be of superb quality and
politically impartial. It seemed to USDOL that a merit personnel sys-
tem—in which individuals are rated objectively on their experience, ed-
ucation, understanding of the job, and personality—was the most reli-
able means to ensure the highest quality of ES operations.
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In sum, the USDOL requirements for the Wagner-Peyser Act man-
date that a state agency administer the Wagner-Peyser Act, submit a
plan of service to USDOL for approval, utilize a merit personnel sys-
tem, and deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services using state agency em-
ployees. In due course, the market-based urges of New Democrats and
Republicans seeking workforce reform were tested against the potency
of these long-standing Wagner-Peyser Act requirements. Moreover, the
end-of-century march toward workforce development reform raised a
high order issue of federalism: whether the federal government has the
power to set and enforce requirements upon states in dispensing grants-
in-aid to administer programs of a national realm, namely the ES. The
federal–state disputes that advanced this issue are described below.
Privatization, State Control, and Labor Exchange Policy
Whether states may delegate the administrative functions of state
ES agencies to local boards and allow Wagner-Peyser Act services to be
delivered by employees of public or private agencies rather than of the
state ES agency (Lazerus et al. 1998, p. 17) became a policy controver-
sy that could have resulted in workforce reform deadlock. The states of
Massachusetts, Texas, Colorado, and Michigan introduced alternatives
to state ES agency delivery of labor exchange services before USDOL
had fully settled on a Wagner-Peyser Act policy of its own making.17
Massachusetts. In October 1994, Massachusetts received a federal
one-stop implementation grant. The grant authorized local boards to
contest the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act labor exchange and job train-
ing services, and allowed both public and private agencies to deliver
such services. The grant reflected views of USDOL policy officials who
sought market competition as a method to raise the quality of services.
In April 1998, during the Michigan compliance dispute (see below),
USDOL revisited the Massachusetts model and instructed the state to
restrict competitive delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services to four lo-
cal areas (Boston, Springfield, Cambridge, and Brockton) where it re-
mains.18
Texas. In January 1996, Texas sought to replicate the Massachu-
setts model through state legislation. In June, USDOL advised Texas
that it should not proceed until a federal policy review was completed.
Further, it warned Texas not to decentralize control of Wagner-Peyser
Act funds to local boards or contest the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act
services. At that juncture, USDOL began to weigh the legal and policy
merits of privatization as it applied to the Wagner-Peyser Act.
Colorado. In 1997, Colorado was granted permission to devolve
the delivery of state ES services to county governments under the au-
thority of its one-stop implementation grant and Wagner-Peyser Act
plan of service. In August 1999, Colorado was instructed to ensure that
county employees who deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services were pro-
tected by a merit personnel system consistent with federal merit staff
requirements. 
Michigan.19 Michigan began reorganizing its workforce develop-
ment structure in August 1997. The confusion caused by an inconsis-
tent federal policy allowing alternative ES delivery structures in Mas-
sachusetts and Colorado, contributed to a pitched brawl for
intergovernmental control between USDOL and Michigan on whether
Wagner-Peyser Act services may be privatized20 (see Appendix 2A). In
February 1998, Governor John Engler reorganized Michigan’s ES
agency by delegating responsibility for the delivery of public ES ser-
vices to local boards, which were required to administer labor exchange
services through competitive contracts with public or private agencies.
Further, job seekers and employers were directed to use computerized
self-services for most Wagner-Peyser Act services.
Michigan proceeded unilaterally to implement its reorganization21
despite notice from USDOL that it should not move forward without
approval of a modified Wagner-Peyser Act plan of service or it would
risk sanctions. Michigan argued that the Wagner-Peyser Act did not re-
quire a merit personnel system. In February, Secretary of Labor Alexis
Herman imposed sanctions on Michigan by placing a hold on its letter
of bank credit to draw Wagner-Peyser Act funds and putting it on a
cost-reimbursement payment system; USDOL also revoked Michigan’s
one-stop implementation grant. Despite the sanctions, USDOL enabled
services to job seekers and employers in Michigan to continue, but a
congressional inquiry was held on March 25 to examine USDOL’s ac-
tions.
The reorganization raised four marquee federal concerns. First,
Michigan’s reorganization permitted ES services to be delivered by
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public or private agencies. USDOL requires that merit-staff employees
of a state agency (working in local offices) deliver ES services. Second,
the reorganization restricted staff-assisted counseling, job search assis-
tance, and job referrals to veterans, disabled job seekers, and migrant
and seasonal farmworkers. Job seekers and employers would be able to
access self-services through Michigan’s computer job bank, which was
linked to America’s Job Bank (AJB). USDOL contended that such an
unbalanced service strategy would undercut the national purpose of the
Wagner-Peyser Act: to provide a full-range of Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices that include self-services and staff-assisted services. Third, under
Michigan’s proposed “self-services only” approach, it was not clear
how ES could identify a job opportunity for a specific UI claimant, re-
fer that UI claimant to a job, and determine the result of the referral.
The Wagner-Peyser Act requires state ES agencies to participate in the
administration of the UI work test, which often necessitates staff-assist-
ed services. Fourth, the reorganization was executed notwithstanding
repeated notice from USDOL that an approved modification of the
Wagner-Peyser Act plan of service was needed.
In response to federal sanctions, Michigan sued USDOL, and on
May 15, 1998, the U.S. District Court issued an opinion in State of
Michigan v. Alexis M. Herman (W. D. MI, Southern Div.) granting
USDOL’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that
USDOL’s long-standing construction of section 3(a) of the Wagner-
Peyser Act (and the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970) to re-
quire merit staffing22 is a reasonable and permissible interpretation of
the Act. Michigan filed an appeal and set in motion other intricate polit-
ical measures to support its case.23
On July 31, Herman and Engler announced agreement on a frame-
work for the administration of Michigan’s labor exchange program.24
USDOL consented to the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services by
public agencies other than a state agency, provided that such agencies
utilize a merit personnel system and that the provisions of the agree-
ment apply only to Michigan. Michigan agreed to consult with public
employee unions in implementing the agreement. As a final point,
Michigan agreed to withdraw its appeal of the lawsuit and not to press
for other legal, legislative or policy solutions (USDOL 1998). By Octo-
ber, USDOL approved Michigan’s modified Wagner-Peyser Act plan of
service, which incorporated the provisions of the agreement, and lifted
sanctions.
Florida. The first consequential post-WIA test of the Wagner-
Peyser Act interim regulations occurred in 1999 with legislative actions
in Florida. The Florida legislature took up several complicated legisla-
tive bills that decentralized responsibility for Wagner-Peyser Act funds
to local boards, allowed for competition in the delivery of labor ex-
change services, and split state responsibility for ES and UI programs
between two cabinet departments. During the state legislative process,
USDOL raised serious objections to privatization of labor exchange
services and, for the first time in the Clinton era, objected to legislative
attempts to bifurcate state agency responsibility for UI and ES pro-
grams.25 In 2000, Florida enacted the Workforce Innovation Act, creat-
ing a single, new state agency (the Agency for Workforce Innovation)
to administer WIA, UI, and ES programs without privatizing labor ex-
change services. 
Summary
Prior to WIA, USDOL exercised its administrative authority under
section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act to allow alternative service deliv-
ery approaches in three states: Colorado, Massachusetts, and Michi-
gan.26 USDOL is sponsoring a third-party evaluation of the three alter-
native delivery approaches. In each situation, USDOL is examining
different methods of Wagner-Peyser Act service delivery. In Colorado,
Wagner-Peyser Act services are delivered through county governments
using state and county employees. In Massachusetts, state ES employ-
ees deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services except in four local areas where
services are delivered by for-profit and nonprofit private and public
agencies. In Michigan, Wagner-Peyser Act services are delivered by
public employees limited to employees of state government, local units
of government, special purpose units of government, school districts,
intermediate school districts, public community colleges, and public
colleges and universities. Efforts to privatize Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices in Texas and Florida were averted, and in Florida the locus and
exercise of authority of the state ES agency were affirmed and the orga-
nizational proximity of UI and ES was sustained. 
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FEDERAL POLICY MAKING: WAGNER-PEYSER ACT
AMENDMENTS AND REGULATORY REVISIONS
Separate authorization and distinct funding for Wagner-Peyser Act
services were retained under WIA. Yet, Title III of WIA requires Wag-
ner-Peyser Act labor exchange services to be part of state one-stop de-
livery systems; UI claimants to receive Wagner-Peyser Act reemploy-
ment services; and state Wagner-Peyser Act plans to be integrated with
state WIA plans. In concert with the development of WIA regulations,
revisions to Wagner-Peyser Act regulations27 began earnestly in fall
1998. Interim regulations were issued in April 1999, and final regula-
tions were issued in August 2000.
Throughout the regulatory process, debate ensued over several mat-
ters affecting the intergovernmental balance of the federal–state ES
structure. These matters focused on the degree of supremacy of the state
agency in administering Wagner-Peyser Act funds and the delivery of
statewide services in the new, local one-stop delivery systems made up
of for-profit, nonprofit, and public service providers. The contenders in-
cluded New Democrats and Republicans eager to privatize government
services, and a dominant faction of federal policymakers attracted ideo-
logically to the federal–local job training structure established under
CETA and JTPA. Others were state Wagner-Peyser Act agencies and lo-
cal boards who vied for authority of Wagner-Peyser Act funds. Still oth-
ers were labor unions that wielded the clout of the ballot box to uphold
the supremacy of the state agency and protect their constituencies.
USDOL made an early tactical decision to make minimal changes to
the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations at 20 CFR 652, Subpart A, Employ-
ment Service Operations, and to place the rules that govern Wagner-
Peyser Act amendments contained in WIA in a new regulatory Subpart
C, Wagner-Peyser Act Services in a One-Stop Delivery System Environ-
ment. Policymakers, including an author of this chapter, reasoned that
Subpart A contained the long-standing requirements of the Wagner-
Peyser Act and to incorporate the new rules into it might place the vital
features of the ES program under regulatory scrutiny, especially from
those seeking to privatize the delivery of Wagner-Peyser Act services.
The tactic proved successful.
Six key federal–state subject areas illustrate new labor exchange
policies that arose from amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act and oth-
er federal actions. These labor exchange policies are examined, includ-
ing descriptions of the contentious issues and the federal policies ren-
dered. 
1) Role of the state Wagner-Peyser Act agency and merit-
staffing requirements. During the development of the Wagner-Peyser
Act regulations, the issues of whether only public employees would de-
liver Wagner-Peyser Act services and whether the employees would be
protected under a merit personnel system were not high-order con-
cerns. As policy matters, these issues were resolved in the Michigan
agreement, and USDOL crafted federal interim regulations to ensure
uniform application nationwide. 
Similar policy clarity was not easily attained with what became the
supreme issue of the regulatory process: which levels of subgovern-
ment (i.e., state, county, or city) were eligible to deliver Wagner-Peyser
Act services. During 1999 and 2000, the policy choice within USDOL
regarding eligible Wagner-Peyser Act service providers whipsawed
back and forth between state agencies or all public agencies. In the
Michigan agreement, Secretary Herman allowed merit-staff employees
of public agencies to delivery Wagner-Peyser Act services, but held that
the demonstration only applied to Michigan. However, interim regula-
tions authorized subgovernments to deliver Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices. Prominent labor unions assailed the policy. They viewed the de-
livery of Wagner-Peyser Act services by subgovernment employees as
severely weakening state agency authority. Labor unions charged that
allowing merit-staff employees of public agencies to dispense Wagner-
Peyser Act services would undermine the supremacy of the state ES
agency, and disrupt the statewide delivery of uniform, impartial labor
exchange services.28
Interim regulations on the merit-staff issue were crafted by
USDOL to serve several policy objectives. USDOL sought to meet the
perceived needs of local one-stop delivery systems by allowing multi-
ple public service providers to deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services
while preserving the merit personnel requirement. Labor unions pre-
cisely identified USDOL’s policy intention. They and others charged
that the result of this policy would be the unraveling of the single, ag-
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gregated state ES agency. To address stakeholders’ concerns, USDOL
officials met with various groups, including public employee unions
that sought meetings to convey their views on behalf of their members.
After heated debate, USDOL policymakers resolved that the secretary’s
declaration in the Michigan agreement that her decision applied exclu-
sively to Michigan meant just that. USDOL declared that employees of
a state agency must deliver Wagner-Peyser Act services. 
Federal policy. The final Wagner-Peyser Act regulations affirmed
that state ES agencies have exclusive authority to deliver Wagner-
Peyser Act services through state employees. The policy consequence
was nothing less than preservation of a single state agency under the
governor’s control to administer statewide labor exchange policy. 
2) Local ES offices in the one-stop delivery system. At the time
WIA was enacted in 1998, the national structure of federal–state ES
offices reached nearly 2,400 and each state operated a network of com-
puter job banks linked to AJB. To incorporate the delivery of Wagner-
Peyser Act services into local one-stop delivery systems, as required
by the amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act, interim federal regula-
tions stipulated that the state ES agency must make Wagner-Peyser 
Act services available in at least one comprehensive one-stop center 
in each local area, and that it may operate other ES offices in each lo-
cal area as affiliated sites or through electronically connected access
points.
This regulation raised inquiries about the nature of affiliated ES of-
fices. In one instance, some of North Carolina’s local ES offices were
not designated as one-stop centers. The North Carolina ES agency
questioned whether it was required to provide a full range of labor ex-
change services on a full-time basis in all one-stop centers, in addition
to its existing, affiliated local ES offices. The interim federal regula-
tions had not contemplated the state ES agency providing only partial
services or part-time staffing at comprehensive one-stop centers. Dur-
ing the approval process of North Carolina’s five-year WIA and Wag-
ner-Peyser Act plan, USDOL determined that for the one-stop delivery
system to be viable in each state, a full range of Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices must be provided on a full-time basis in a one-stop center in each
local area. 
Federal policy. The intent of federal policy was to require com-
plete consolidation of Wagner-Peyser Act services into the one-stop de-
livery system. Accordingly, final regulations do not allow states to
operate unaffiliated standalone ES offices, and a full range of Wagner-
Peyser Act services must be made available during normal and custom-
ary business hours in at least one comprehensive one-stop center in
each local area.29
3) Responsibility for Wagner-Peyser Act funds. Amendments to
the Wagner-Peyser Act under WIA require the state ES agency to par-
ticipate in the one-stop delivery system and be a member of the state
and local boards. The amendments did not alter the Wagner-Peyser Act
requirement that vested authority to the state agency designated by the
governor to administer Wagner-Peyser Act funds and deliver services.
Federal interim regulations reinforced the requirement that state ES
agencies retain responsibility for Wagner-Peyser Act funds. During the
regulatory comment period, the New York ES agency expressed con-
cern about a state legislature’s authority to determine the distribution of
Wagner-Peyser Act funds. During the period between issuance of inter-
im and final regulations, this concern made a valuable contribution by
helping define USDOL policy in addressing issues raised by the Flori-
da legislature.
During 1999 and 2000, the state of Florida proposed two distinct
legislative initiatives (see previous discussion) that attempted to local-
ize the authority of the Florida ES agency and abolish merit staffing.
Both legislative proposals conflicted with requirements of the Wagner-
Peyser Act and regulations. The proposed Florida legislative actions
focused USDOL policy. USDOL took a firm stance that the Florida ES
agency controlled the distribution of Wagner-Peyser Act funds and ad-
ministration of services. 
Federal policy. Final federal regulations clarified that the state
agency, under the direction of the governor, is responsible for the distri-
bution and oversight of Wagner-Peyser Act funds. However, USDOL
stated in the preamble to the regulations that state legislatures have the
authority to set priorities for uses of Wagner-Peyser Act funds.
4) Relationship between UI and ES. In the 1990s, WPRS legisla-
tion, WIA, and policy stances taken by USDOL strengthened the al-
liance between UI and ES programs first cultivated by the founders of
the federal–state employment security system. Under an amendment to
52 Balducchi and Pasternak
Federal–State Relations in Labor Exchange Policy 53
the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIA, state Wagner-Peyser Act agencies were
required to provide reemployment services to UI claimants. In crafting
regulations, USDOL anticipated that some state ES agencies might be
financially unable to provide reemployment services and included lan-
guage in the preamble to allow delivery of reemployment services by
other service providers. Also, compliance issues that arose in Michigan
regarding the delivery of staff-assisted services to UI claimants and the
administration of the UI work test prompted the strengthening of Wag-
ner-Peyser Act regulations in these areas. 
Federal policy. State ES agencies retain responsibility for the
delivery of reemployment services to UI claimants and administration
of the work test under state UI laws. In order to ensure that UI
claimants receive help to reenter the labor market, other one-stop part-
ners may provide services to them. Subsequently, USDOL policies to
promote the use of UI call centers and Internet claims filing may have
weakened the relationships between UI and ES, as well as other service
providers. 
5) Universal access to Wagner-Peyser Act services and methods
of service delivery. Since the inception of the Wagner-Peyser Act, a
condition of state agency delivery is that services be made available
statewide and universally to employers and job seekers eligible to work
in the United States. Under Title I of WIA, the requirement of universal
access to core (i.e., labor exchange) services was extended to programs
that fund services for adults and dislocated workers. During the regula-
tory process, several stakeholders questioned whether Wagner-Peyser
Act funds should provide most of the universal access to core services.
Through regulations, USDOL reinforced WIA language to ensure that
Wagner-Peyser Act funds would not be the sole support for core ser-
vices in one-stop centers. This strong federal stance was taken perhaps
in recognition of the historic paucity of state Wagner-Peyser Act funds,
and to affirm the promise of the one-stop solution.
Another federal issue that arose in the regulatory process was how
to integrate Wagner-Peyser Act services and WIA adult and dislocated
worker core services. Although WIA defines core and intensive ser-
vices, these services are neither defined nor referenced in the Wagner-
Peyser Act. In an effort to consolidate service delivery and increase the
availability of funds at one-stop centers, USDOL cross-referenced WIA
definitions of core and applicable intensive services in Wagner-Peyser
Act regulations.
While Title I of WIA defines two types of job finding services (i.e.,
core and intensive), the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations require services
to be available through three service delivery methods: 1) self-service,
2) facilitated self-help service, and 3) staff-assisted service. The three
service methods are closely aligned with WIA core and intensive ser-
vices. The genesis of the three Wagner-Peyser Act service methods
sprang from state Wagner-Peyser Act practices, technological advances
in job finding, recommendations of the ES Revitalization work group,
and compliance issues that arose in Michigan.
A key provision of the Michigan agreement surrounds the meaning
of staff-assisted services. During a meeting between USDOL and
Michigan officials on June 25, 1998, Michigan asserted that the re-
quirement of staff-assisted services was met by having “proctors” in
one-stop centers’ resource rooms to assist job seekers in the use of self-
service job finding software. In response, USDOL averred that Michi-
gan proctors were only providing “facilitated self-help” service and not
staff-assisted job finding and placement services. As a result, in the
Michigan agreement, USDOL required a Michigan service strategy that
included job search assistance and staff-assisted referrals to job open-
ings, in addition to a cadre of “proctors” providing facilitated self-help
services. Wagner-Peyser Act regulations were crafted to make a clear
distinction between facilitated self-help service and staff-assisted ser-
vice methods.
Federal policy. Regulations require state ES agencies to provide
three methods of service delivery (cited above) in at least one compre-
hensive one-stop center in each local area. Services must be available
statewide and their application should be described in state and local
WIA memoranda of understanding. Also, each one-stop partner in the
comprehensive one-stop center must make available the core services
of its program. It is USDOL’s contention that funding core and inten-
sive services under both WIA and the Wagner-Peyser Act enables state
and local boards to make choices that maximize the use of funds.
6) State plans. Prior to the Wagner-Peyser Act amendments of
1982, state UI and ES programs prepared joint, yearly planning docu-
ments to coordinate the delivery of services to job seekers, UI
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claimants, and employers. These plans, called the Program Budget
Plan, were submitted to USDOL to ensure compliance with federal re-
quirements and national policy priorities. Beginning in program year
1984, Wagner-Peyser Act requirements were revised to require state ES
plans to be developed jointly with JTPA programs. Over the years, an-
nual state ES plans30 became flat and pro forma.
Under WIA, states are required to submit five-year plans. During
the regulatory process, USDOL made two determinations that impacted
state Wagner-Peyser Act plans. The first decision was that Wagner-
Peyser Act plans must be functionally integrated within states’ strategic
WIA or unified plans. State governors are not permitted to submit their
statewide Wagner-Peyser Act plans as separate components of a joint
plan; instead they must be submitted as integrated documents. Second-
ly, integrated WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act plans are developed for five
years without annual updates, notwithstanding changes in the organiza-
tion of the states’ workforce structure or levels of performance. In our
view, these decisions have produced state WIA and Wagner-Peyser Act
plans that are compliance documents rather than strategic blueprints,
and states would be better served if five-year plans were required to be
updated annually.
Federal policy. To ensure a collaborative planning process be-
tween state boards and state ES agencies, federal regulations require
states to submit integrated plans encompassing Title I of WIA and Wag-
ner-Peyser Act programs. States may utilize either of two planning doc-
uments: 1) Strategic Five Year State Plan for Title I of WIA and the
Wagner-Peyser Act, or 2) State Unified Plan.
Regulatory Shifts in Workforce Federalism
During the initial two eras of New Federalism, USDOL abrogated
to states much policy and program control of Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vice delivery. Federal Wagner-Peyser Act regulations in 1983 devolved
authority of labor exchange policy to state control, and regulations
were intentionally silent on issues of national sovereignty (e.g., ser-
vices and merit standards). The federal–state ES program tilted toward
states in the spirit of New Federalism. Job training programs began to
dominate the workforce development scene, and funds shifted to local
job training agencies.
In 2000, USDOL failed to hardwire the vision of some New Dem-
ocrat and Republican policy makers at each level of government who
sought local control of Wagner-Peyser Act policy. Supporters of local
control argued that it is sensitive to labor markets, is innovative and
promotes stronger employer involvement. Backers of state control as-
serted that to ensure impartial and equitable service delivery statewide,
a state agency under the direction of the governor must administer
Wagner-Peyser Act policy.
The triumph of cooperative federalism over second order devolu-
tion thwarted attempts to push Wagner-Peyser Act authority through the
knothole31 of state government to local agencies. Revised Wagner-
Peyser Act regulations reversed 15 years of federal inaction in the over-
sight of labor exchange policy, and new regulatory provisions recog-
nized the exclusive authority of the state ES agency and prescribed
service and merit requirements that supported that authority. The re-
quirement of a merit personnel system ensures the solidarity of a single
state agency to administer labor exchange policy at the local level.
Without it, statewide labor exchange policy would likely be diffused
among local boards and lose its state composition. A single state Wag-
ner-Peyser Act agency provides state governors with the power to reach
down to their local communities to direct labor exchange policy. Work-
force federalism shifted labor exchange policy in four areas:
1) Rather than devolve state agencies’ authority over Wagner-Pey-
ser Act funds and services to the control of state and local WIA
boards, federal regulations strengthened the authority of state
ES agencies.
2) The Wagner-Peyser Act regulations of 1983 were silent on
many issues of state agency administration. Similarly, amend-
ments to the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIA did not include
changes to state authority, merit personnel protection, or coor-
dination with UI. However, challenges during the 1990s to US-
DOL’s authority to set conditions and enforce them on states
required the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations of 2000 to
strengthen the federal–state ES program in those areas.
3) Under Title I of WIA, the principle of universal access was ex-
panded beyond the Wagner-Peyser Act to include adult and dis-
located worker programs. In the Wagner-Peyser Act regula-
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tions of 2000, USDOL mandated that Wagner-Peyser Act ser-
vices include three distinct service delivery methods (i.e., self-
service, facilitated self-help, and staff-assisted services) to
meet the needs of a statewide labor exchange structure.
4) The state ES agency was not designated in WIA to administer
the one-stop delivery system, although it is required to be a
partner in the system and provide a full-range of Wagner-
Peyser Act services in at least one comprehensive one-stop
center in each local area.
LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY CHALLENGES 
An emerging federal issue in the reauthorization of WIA in 2003
indicates a new challenge for U.S. labor exchange policy. Some believe
that WIA failed to provide state governors with sufficient power to di-
rect state job training and economic development policies within states
because WIA funding formulas mandate that most job training funds go
to local areas. The ascendancy of governors in WIA may be an issue of
hefty political debate and thus could signal the twilight of second order
devolution and local control of workforce federalism.
On the other hand, the Bush Administration’s FY 2003 budget in-
cluded a far-reaching UI/ES reform proposal dubbed “New Balance.”
Introduced in September 2002, the New Balance bill (H.R. 5418) pro-
posed to add a new player to the federal–state–local relationships: the
state legislatures. Under the bill, the federal government would no
longer provide funds to administer services under the Wagner-Peyser
Act; instead, financing of ES and UI programs would be shifted to
states through a multiyear phase-out of 75 percent of the federal unem-
ployment tax paid by employers. The new player—the state legis-
latures—would have the potential to increase or reduce the funding 
of state ES programs by requiring governors to justify their funding
requirements. 
While the bill is a vestige of Reagan-era Devolution Federalism, it
is motivated by two decades of complaints by the states and employers
about inadequate funding of ES and UI administrative expenses. Con-
current to the underfunding of administrative expenses, employer UI
taxes have generated large balances in the UI Trust Fund. Further, some
employers have been effectively double taxed by states supplementing
ES and UI funds. In devolving the financing of ES and UI programs to
the states, the New Balance bill requires states to continue labor ex-
change services. However, it does not ensure that state legislatures
would authorize funds to maintain state labor exchange operations at
current levels. As of this writing, the New Balance bill was not reintro-
duced in the 108th Congress.
WIA Reauthorization
In its FY 2004 budget request, the Bush Administration continues
to press for fundamental changes in the administration of labor ex-
change policies. The authorization of WIA expires on September 30,
2003, and a provision in President Bush’s proposal32 to consolidate
Wagner-Peyser Act and WIA Adult and Dislocated Worker funding
streams is intended to integrate the majority of services at one-stop cen-
ters. To accomplish this, the Bush proposal would repeal the long-
standing Wagner-Peyser Act and incorporate some of its features into
WIA. The funding for core services of one-stop centers would be pro-
vided to states and local areas through one consolidated block grant.
Federal funds would be derived from general revenues appropriated by
Congress. If enacted, this provision would unravel the mutual funding
of UI and ES services through the UI trust fund. However, efforts in
Bush’s companion bill (H.R. 444, “Back to Work Incentive Act”) to
promote the use of Personal Reemployment Accounts to UI recipients
who need the most help in getting back to work may increase the use of
some labor exchange services, such as job placement.
Nonetheless, Bush’s proposal raises as a prime issue the distribution
of power between state governors and local leaders for control of labor
exchange policy. Currently, Wagner-Peyser Act funds are retained at
state levels under the purview of governors. Under the Bush proposal’s
consolidated funding approach, 50 percent of the combined adult fund-
ing stream must be sent to local areas according to statutory distribution.
Hence, in comparison to the Wagner-Peyser Act, state governors could
lose authority over the bulk of their labor exchange funds and, as a pos-
sible consequence, their ability to steer labor exchange policies state-
wide. This provision may be contested in the enactment process.
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While it is too early to predict the consequences of most provisions
in the Bush proposal, the provisions would clearly provide for greater
flexibility in the use of labor exchange funds by local areas. Converse-
ly, they would nullify the public charter of ES, allow private service
providers to deliver labor exchange services, and may hamper the coor-
dination of labor exchange and UI services.
SUMMARY
This chapter tracked federal–state relations in labor exchange poli-
cy throughout the life of the Wagner-Peyser Act. During the first 35
years of the act, efforts to shift the federal–state balance of power were
directed at “federalizing” the program; during the last 35 years, efforts
were directed at “localizing” it. Beginning in the 1970s and throughout
the three eras of New Federalism, weak federal stewardship of the Wag-
ner-Peyser Act was noticeable in reduced Wagner-Peyser Act grants-in-
aid, as well as in ambivalence and skepticism toward labor exchange
policy. At the same time, the role of local job training agencies was nur-
tured and training grants-in-aid were increased.
During these eras, there was a preference for local control of work-
force development programs. In 1978, Carter affirmed the primacy of
local control by embracing the Nixon federal–local job training
arrangement, and in 1996 Clinton reaffirmed it as a matter of public ap-
probation. Through the one-stop solution, Clinton devised a “third-
way” approach to workforce federalism that ultimately did not reappor-
tion political control of ES and job training programs. The role of
governors in administering labor exchange policy was strengthened,
and state ES agencies and local job training agencies were fastened to-
gether by local one-stop delivery systems. The effect of the third-way
approach on statewide labor exchange policy outcomes is as yet un-
known. As the new century beckons new approaches to labor exchange
policy, we make the following observations:
• Fragmented governance is the result of local workforce federal-
ism, and it appears to foster intrastate rivalries and fragmented
delivery of workforce services.
• Despite the federal–state character of ES programs, local work-
force federalism has sometimes precipitated uneven labor ex-
change services from one-stop center to one-stop center within
states and across states.
• Local control of workforce programs may have inhibited the
ability of state governors to connect economic development and
workforce development in local areas.
• At the end of the 20th century, federal–state conflicts in grants-
in-aid policy under the Wagner-Peyser Act established that states
do not have the right, absent federal approval, to subrogate to
subgovernments or private agencies funds for administration or
delivery of labor exchange services.
• Merit personnel requirements help ensure the continuity of a sin-
gle state Wagner-Peyser Act agency and the equitable delivery of
labor exchange services statewide.
The journey of the Bush presidency perhaps bids another turn of
federalism’s historic wheel as it applies to labor exchange policy. Pres-
ident Bush’s New Balance bill and WIA reauthorization proposal
would shift some workforce development control to state governors,
but would dismantle the New Deal era administrative structures of ES
and UI programs. As in the past, centralization, and decentralization33
will continue to pose splendid tensions in U.S. workforce federalism. 
Notes
The views expressed in this chapter do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of
the reviewers, the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, or the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor. The authors thank John R. Beverly III, Gerard F. Fiala, Carole Kitti, and
John S. Palmer Jr. for their comments.
1. The Great Depression, according to Humphrey (1970, p. 47), necessitated expan-
sion of the federal role through preventive measures (e.g., national employment
system) as well as other corrective interventions. Humphrey explains the federal
government’s new purpose during the 1930s by excerpting from Roosevelt’s Oc-
tober 1936 address at Worcester, Massachusetts, a quote from Lincoln: “The le-
gitimate object of government is to do for the people what needs to be done but
which they cannot by individual effort do at all, or do so well, for themselves.”
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2. While federal grants-in-aid mushroomed in the 20th century, the first grants to
states were under the Articles of Confederation, when in 1785 Congress ear-
marked a section of every township in the federal territory for the support of pub-
lic schools (Vines 1976, p. 14).
3. In 2003, grants are allotted to states by USDOL under a formula at section 6 of
the Wagner-Peyser Act that distributes 97 percent of the annual ES appropriation
according to each state’s relative share of the civilian labor force and number of
unemployed workers. USDOL distributes 3 percent of the total available ES funds
to states to assure maintenance of statewide ES systems. Ninety-seven percent of
state ES grants is derived from the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, an employer-
based tax, and 3 percent is derived from general tax receipts.
4. The adoption of a federal–state structure for the ES program in 1933 may have
helped sway politicians to select an identical arrangement in 1935 for the UI pro-
gram (Blaustein 1993, p.137). 
5. In 1966 the U.S. Senate passed a bill (S.2974) to reform the Wagner-Peyser Act
and make ES agencies the centerpiece of a comprehensive manpower system. The
House did not take up the bill because the bill mandated the separation of ES from
UI and increased the authority of the federal government in state ES activities
(Guttman 1990).
6. Barnow (1993, p. 94) and King (1999, p. 63) refer to workforce development af-
ter 1978 as “coercive federalism,” where the federal government offers states
greater authority but adds significant constraints. Labor exchange policy was es-
tablished during the period of cooperative federalism, and the basic requirements
of the Wagner-Peyser Act remain unchanged. Therefore, as labor exchange policy
applies to federalism, we do not refer to it as coercive.
7. Introduced in February 1987 by Representative Michael (H.R. 1155) and Senator
Dole (S.539), the bill at Title I, Subtitles F and G contained the Employment Se-
curity Financing Act of 1987 and the Employment Services Act of 1987, expand-
ing the role of governors and the private sector in ES activities. While the legisla-
tion garnered only 30 House cosponsors and 2 Senate cosponsors, it did spotlight
a political trend toward decentralized governance. 
8. This section draws from Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz (1997) and Balducchi and
Pasternak (2001). 
9. If enacted, the amendment may have raised serious accountability, equity, and
continuity of service issues in the statewide delivery of impartial labor exchange
services. However, the amendment did express the views of some policymakers at
each level of government who wanted USDOL to liberalize restrictions on the
uses of Wagner-Peyser Act funds.
10. Except in the cases of Colorado, Massachusetts, and Michigan, where demonstra-
tions of alternative delivery systems are under way.
11. The work group’s vision statement declared, “The ES is the Nation’s recog-
nized leader in providing labor exchange services and a universal gateway to
workforce development resources by professional, empowered employees”
(USDOL 1994).
12. In over two-thirds of states, ES was the major provider of reemployment services,
serving more than 75 percent of UI claimants (USDOL 1999, p. II-14).
13. Politicians viewed Temporary Assistance for Needy Families as a state program
and welfare-to-work as a local program. Mayors and county officials argued that
hard-to-serve welfare recipients reside in urban areas, and USDOL grants should
be under their control (Uhalde 2002). 
14. In October 1997, the Employment and Training Administration issued policy
guidance to state ES agencies to spur growth of reemployment services to UI
claimants (USDOL 1997).
15. A matching requirement was placed in the original act in some measure to take
advantage of state funds in 23 states that already operated ES offices. The re-
quirement was in effect until federalization of the ES in 1941 and not resumed
when Congress returned the ES to federal–state administration in 1946 (Haber
and Kruger 1964, pp. 27 and 35). In 1950, the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended to
eliminate the matching provision.
16. The original language of the Wagner-Peyser Act required states to appoint adviso-
ry councils composed of employers, workers, and the public to formulate labor
exchange policies. In 1939, through presidential order, USES and the Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation were merged in the Social Security Board to form
the Bureau of Employment Security, and the scope of federal and state advisory
councils was broadened to include the formulation of UI policies.
17. USDOL did have an initial policy position on competition in one-stop center op-
erations, and the Massachusetts model reflected the views of high-level White
House and USDOL officials. USDOL’s policy changed over time, and formal
ETA policy was established in the Wagner-Peyser Act regulations of 2000. 
18. Early results of the Massachusetts demonstration are varied. Drake Beam Morin,
a for-profit placement firm, dropped its contract to deliver services at the JobNet
Boston one-stop center when it could not select job seekers to serve and meet
profit expectations (Westat, Inc. 2001).
19. This section is drawn from Balducchi and Pasternak (2001).
20. Palmer (2002) asserts that the basis for Michigan’s reorganization was inade-
quate federal ES funding, the prospect of cost savings through competitive
selection of service providers, and expansion of service access points and tech-
nology.
21. According to Palmer (2002), Michigan proposed to exercise the flexibility it be-
lieved it had under existing federal law and policy to “utilize a combination of
state government, local government, and private entity-provided services to carry
out the Wagner-Peyser Act and meet employer and job seeker needs in accordance
with state needs and priorities.”
22. In 1935, USDOL suspended Missouri’s Wagner-Peyser Act grant for violation of
merit staffing under section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act. A USDOL letter dated
August 24, 1935, to Missouri (apparently based upon a USDOL solicitor’s opin-
ion of March 7, 1935, sent to Iowa) was included in USDOL’s court brief. Al-
though USDOL also argued that Michigan had violated section 5(b) of the Wag-
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ner-Peyser Act, the court ruling was based solely on section 3(a) as cited in the
Missouri precedent. As far as we know, the Michigan compliance dispute marked
only the second instance of sanctions under the Wagner-Peyser Act imposed upon
a state.
23. Congress advised USDOL to work out an agreement with Michigan. Both Michi-
gan and organized labor could have blocked Senate passage of the workforce de-
velopment bill (Uhalde 2002).
24. Engler and Herman met on July 23, 1998. Engler did not come to the meeting
with a compromise proposal; he recalls that the agreement was developed at the
meeting. Herman and Engler met alone in a small library adjacent to the Secre-
tary’s office (Engler 2002; Uhalde 2002).
25. USDOL did not raise a legal objection to Missouri’s 1999 reorganization that sep-
arated UI and ES agencies but did not privatize ES activities. The authors believe
in the importance of close linkages between UI and ES activities, and that such
linkages are generally achieved under the aegis of a single agency. In a letter to
Florida, USDOL (2000) stated, “ . . . (A)s a policy matter, the State should appre-
ciate the centrality to the One-Stop delivery system of the administrative relation-
ship between Wagner-Peyser Act services and UI services.”
26. USDOL permitted Massachusetts and Colorado to use alternative service delivery
approaches under the authority of their one-stop implementation grants, which
were distributed to states under Wagner-Peyser Act authorization. Prior to its one-
stop implementation grant, Colorado utilized limited county-based delivery of
services consistent with its Wagner-Peyser Act plan of service. Michigan received
permission to use alternative service delivery approaches through its Wagner-
Peyser Act plan of service. The statutory authority that allows for alternative de-
livery approaches is section 3(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act.
27. Administrative regulations at 20 CFR 652 are rules that implement Wagner-
Peyser Act provisions and establish federal requirements for receipt of Wagner-
Peyser Act funds. Policy directives are ETA program guidelines issued to state ES
agencies.
28. Public employee unions raised a residual concern over the degree of supervision
that private or other public one-stop operators could exercise over state Wagner-
Peyser Act employees. The Service Employees International Union (1998) stated,
“private supervision of the employment service creates an opportunity for the di-
version of public resources to further private interests.” Early in the process, fed-
eral policymakers determined that private or other public agency one-stop opera-
tors must dispense only guidance to state Wagner-Peyser Act employees in
administering labor exchange services. The term guidance was not defined in fed-
eral regulations or subsequent policy directives. 
29. One result of these decisions has been that in some local areas of a number of
states, one-stop centers and ES offices are located near each other, which might be
redundant. It would be interesting to know why in some instances customers pre-
fer to go to ES offices rather than nearby one-stop centers selected by local
boards, and in other instances the opposite.
30. USDOL’s appropriation laws for FYs 1996–98 contained language, incorporated
in WIA, which enabled states to seek waivers of ES plan requirements at section
8 of the Wagner-Peyser Act. Requests for waivers of the plan requirements at sec-
tion 8 and of the audit and reporting requirements at sections 9 and 10 were scant-
ily requested, as they were ministerial in nature or rendered moot by virtue of oth-
er federal requirements that prohibited granting of such waivers.
31. We refer to this as Knothole Federalism. A knothole is used as a metaphor to il-
lustrate this trend in federalism. In the case of WIA, state entities responsible for
job training programs act as wooden planks through which the federal govern-
ment punctures a knothole in state authority to pass federal policy and funds to lo-
cal boards and operating entities.
32. On March 13, 2003, Representatives McKeon (R-CA) and Boehner (R-OH) in-
troduced H.R. 1261, “Workforce Reinvestment and Adult Education Act.” H.R.
1261 was not the Bush Administration’s bill, but its provisions were substantially
similar to the Bush proposal.
33. Interestingly, Block (1993, p. 103) suggests that “. . . decentralization often has
the opposite effect of its intention” as each new self-ruling division begins recre-
ating within itself the ethos of the larger organization that was taken apart.
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Appendix 2A
Reorganization of the Michigan Jobs Commission:
Chronology & Anatomy of a Wagner-Peyser Act 
Compliance Dispute
DATE ACTIONS
8/6/97 John Engler, Governor of Michigan, issues Executive Order
1997-12, which sets in motion reorganization of the Michigan
Jobs Commission (MJC).
8/18/97 Letter from Melvin Howard, Acting ETA Regional Administrator,
to Douglas Stites, MJC Chief Operating Officer, raises questions
relating to federal requirements. 
9/12/97 Letter from USDOL to Douglas Rothwell, MJC Chief Executive
Officer, advising MJC to suspend implementation and submit
Wagner-Peyser Act plan and one-stop grant modification.
9/30/97 MJC shares draft Wagner-Peyser Act plan modification with
USDOL at Washington, DC, meeting. USDOL indicates that
merit-staffing requirements apply to Wagner-Peyser Act services.
10/6/97 Letter from USDOL to Rothwell regarding effects of
reorganization on UI program. USDOL sets forth Wagner-Peyser
Act requirements that include UI work test and reemployment
services provisions.
10/21/97 Letter from USDOL to Stites commenting on draft Wagner-
Peyser Act plan modification and requesting submission of One-
stop plan modification. USDOL describes areas of deficiencies
with MJC reorganization.
10/31/97 Letter from Stites to Raymond Uhalde, Acting ETA Assistant
Secretary, responding to October 6 letter and informing USDOL
that UI claimants will register for work via America’s Talent
Bank.
11/17/97 Engler issues Executive Order 1997-18, which completes the
MJC reorganization.
12/8/97 USDOL receives formal copy of Michigan’s Wagner-Peyser Act
modification, which is identical to draft modification. Letter from
Stites to Uhalde addresses Wagner-Peyser Act issues raised in
October 21 letter.
12/24/97 Letter from USDOL to Rothwell advising that the Wagner-Peyser
Act plan modification will not be approved, describing
deficiencies in the plan modification, and requesting its
withdrawal.
12/30/97 MJC withdraws its request for a Wagner-Peyser Act plan
modification. During this period, Alexis Herman, USDOL
Secretary, contacts Engler by telephone to discuss the MJC
reorganization. 
1/21/98 MJC officials attend meeting at USDOL to discuss major issues,
including merit staffing and over-reliance on computer self-
services. USDOL offers potential opportunity for sub-state pilots
of alternate delivery systems. MJC officials indicate that they will
apprise Engler and get back to USDOL. 
1/30/98 Herman contacts Engler by telephone to notify him that issues
remain unresolved.
1/30/98 Two letters from USDOL to MJC: 1) Uhalde to Rothwell stating
that unless ETA receives notification from MJC that
reorganization will be suspended on February 2, Wagner-Peyser
Act and one-stop grants will be adversely affected; 2) Howard to
Stites stating that Wagner-Peyser Act plan modification must be
approved prior to implementation of reorganization. USDOL
prepares to freeze MJC’s drawdown authority, provide
reimbursement for only approved Wagner-Peyser Act activities,
and terminate Michigan’s one-stop grant.
1/30/98 Letter from Stites to Uhalde resubmitting Wagner-Peyser Act
plan modification without changes required by USDOL. 
2/2/98 Stites informs Howard by telephone that MJC is going to execute
the reorganization plan. MJC files motion for temporary
restraining order and order to show cause in U.S. District Court.
2/3/98 Two letters from USDOL to MJC: 1) Howard to Stites to
withhold drawdown authority until modification to Wagner-
Peyser Act plan; 2) Janice Perry, ETA Grant Officer, to Stites
notifying MJC that (a) second year One-stop grant funds denied,
and (b) first year funds not available after February 2, 1998.
2/6/98 Preliminary hearing held in U.S. District Court in Grand Rapids,
MI, before Judge Robert Holmes Bell.
2/10/98 Bell denies MJC’s request for injunction against USDOL actions.
Sets April 15 to hear merit-staffing issue. (Hearing subsequently
postponed until May 1, 1998.)
2/27/98 Letter from Howard to Stites denying approval of January 30
Wagner-Peyser Act plan modification.
3/13/98 USDOL and MJC file briefs on merit staffing in U.S District
Court.
3/25/98 Uhalde testifies before Rep. Hoekstra’s (R-MI) Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation.
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3/26/98 Letter from Stites to Uhalde addressing issues raised in February
27 disapproval letter.
4/1/98 ETA officials meet with Stites and John Palmer, MJC ES
Director, in Washington, DC, to clarify issues and seek resolution
of concerns outside of the merit-staffing issue.
5/1/98 Bell holds a hearing on the merit-staffing issue.
5/15/98 Bell issues an opinion and an order granting USDOL’s motion for
summary judgment. The court upholds USDOL’s position on
merit staffing, indicating that it “is neither arbitrary or capricious
nor in excess of the Department’s authority.”
6/12/98 Letter from Byron Zuidema, ETA Regional Administrator, to
Stites denying Michigan’s PY 1998 Wagner-Peyser Act plan.
Issues unresolved: 1) merit staffing; 2) stakeholder input; 3) UI
work test; 4) universal access to computer self-services; 5)
program data reports; 6) staff-assisted job search assistance; and
7) VETS concerns. 
6/23/98 Letter from Palmer to Zuidema requesting reimbursement of $2.9
million for February 1998.
6/25/98 Stites and Palmer meet with Uhalde, John Beverly, USES
Director, and David Balducchi, USES Chief of Planning and
Review, in daylong dialogue to bring Michigan’s Wagner-Peyser
Act plan into compliance. 
7/23/98 Herman and Engler meet at USDOL to discuss the MJC issue.
7/31/98 Herman and Engler announce a resolution to the dispute and a
framework for the administration of Michigan’s ES program.
MJC agrees to drop judicial, legislative and policy actions.
8/12/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema submitting revised Wagner-Peyser
Act plan. 
8/20/98 Uhalde meets with Stites and stakeholders in Lansing, MI, to
discuss implementation issues and obtain stakeholder input.
9/2/98 Letter from Zuidema to Stites raising issues with revised Wagner-
Peyser Act plan.
9/10/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema addressing September 2 letter.
USDOL not satisfied with response.
9/13/98 Kitty Higgins, USDOL Deputy Secretary, meets with labor union
leaders from AFL-CIO, AFSCME, and SEIU regarding
implementation of the Michigan agreement. 
9/16/98 Letter from Zuidema to Stites requesting additional time (no later
than September 30, 1998) to resolve four outstanding issues: 1)
presence of at least one state merit-staffed employee in each
workforce area to perform UI work test; 2) accelerating
commencement of staff-assisted services; 3) content and
submission of transition plan; and 4) performance benchmarks.
Letter declares that MJC may treat this as a denial of plan
submitted August 12. Letter authorizes reimbursement of $2.9
million for February 1998 Wagner-Peyser Act costs.
9/18/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema addressing the four issues raised in
September 16 letter. USDOL not satisfied with response.
9/21/98 Conference call between Beverly, Balducchi, Stites and Palmer to
clarify the four issues raised in the September 16 letter. Achieve
potential resolution of issues regarding staff-assisted services,
transition plan, and performance benchmarks; however, no
resolution of UI work test issues.
9/25/98 Higgins meets again with union leaders (same participants as
September 13 meeting). Unions express dissatisfaction with
September 16 letter from USDOL to MJC (releasing funds) and
indicate that former state ES employees are not receiving an
opportunity to fairly compete for jobs. 
9/25/98 Herman calls Engler to relate that agreement has broken down
and MJC needs to be flexible. 
9/29/98 Uhalde and Beverly travel to Lansing, MI, to discuss terms of
agreement with MJC and union leaders.
10/13/98 Letter from Stites to Zuidema providing sufficient information to
resolve remaining four issues.
10/14/98 Letter from Barry Dale, ETA Regional Grant Officer, to Stites
indicating that October 13 letter fully resolves issues and
Michigan’s PY 1998 plan is approved. Letter removes
reimbursement provision on remaining PY 1996–97 Wagner-
Peyser Act expenditures and enables MJC to again draw down
Wagner-Peyser Act funds.
10/30/98 USDOL restarts Michigan’s one-stop grant for second and third
years.
11/3/98 MJC effectuates one-stop agreement.
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One of the most striking trends in the American labor market is the
explosive growth of intermediaries—organizations that match workers
with employers. In the 1990s, the number of temporary staffing agen-
cies multiplied rapidly, and they broadened their services to employers
in multiple sectors (Osterman 1999, p. 56). With increasing use of the
Internet, the number of on-line job banks that provide electronic match-
es between workers and employers grew from nearly zero at the begin-
ning of the decade to an estimated 3,000 at the end (Autor 2001, p. 26).
At the same time, new community-based intermediaries, such as the
Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership and Project Quest in Texas,
developed increasingly sophisticated relationships with employers in
targeted local industries.
The last two decades have also been a time of dramatic change for
the public Employment Service (ES), one of the oldest labor market in-
termediaries. Faced with declining federal funding and the potential of
information technology, states and the federal government provided an
array of new self-service options. Public job banks made their debut on
the Internet alongside Monster.com and other private job boards. These
new tools allowed individuals and employers to make their own job
matches, reducing the need for individualized assistance traditionally
provided by staff. With the expansion of self-directed services, ES staff
increasingly focused on providing group-oriented assistance rather than
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individualized services. Job search assistance for those with special
needs and dedicated funding for target groups, such as the economical-
ly disadvantaged and veterans, expanded dramatically during this peri-
od. Some states also developed new labor market information services
and explored other approaches to meeting employer needs.
Since the 1980s, the drive to “do more with less” prompted new
partnerships between the ES and other public programs, particularly
with the locally run employment and training programs that were es-
tablished in the 1970s. One-stop centers that pulled together staff and
resources from multiple programs first emerged in Wisconsin and a few
other states in the mid 1980s. Spurred on by federal investments and
later federal legislation, the one-stop concept spread to the rest of the
country during the 1990s.
The impact of new one-stop systems on the ES and its customers
has been substantial. One-stop partnerships, where successful, expand-
ed the range of labor exchange and other services available to cus-
tomers. Co-location of staff from multiple programs also led to in-
creased specialization as the ES took on key responsibilities for core
services delivered under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). The
ES’s flexible funding and focus on a universal customer base have been
crucial assets to the fledgling one-stop system.
Even as the ES strengthened linkages with a number of public pro-
grams, other trends strained the historically close relationship between
the ES and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. The implemen-
tation of automated claims filing systems in the 1990s pulled apart ES
and UI staff that had been co-located since the 1960s, creating new bar-
riers to service coordination. To overcome these challenges, some
states have begun to reinforce the ES/UI connection through technolog-
ical links and targeted services for UI claimants.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe these “sea changes” in the
public labor exchange and its relationships with other public programs.
The chapter is largely based on interviews with state administrators
with long service in workforce development. It also relies on the rela-
tively sparse recent literature on the public ES. The first section pro-
vides the historical background for shifts in ES administration and ser-
vice delivery. The next sections describe the shift from active job
matching to self-directed services, the changing mix of intensive labor
exchange services, the impact of one-stop partnerships on the ES, and
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the evolving relationship between ES and UI. The final section suggests
future directions for the public labor exchange based on the trends de-
scribed here.
FROM THE WAGNER-PEYSER ACT TO THE WORKFORCE
INVESTMENT ACT
In the late 19th century, a number of states began to operate em-
ployment agencies that provided placement services, primarily to poor
individuals (Bendick 1989, p. 89). The Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 es-
tablished for the first time a federal–state ES and asserted a strong fed-
eral role in assisting the unemployed. A few years later, the Social Se-
curity Act of 1935 instituted a system of unemployment insurance,
combined new ES and UI programs in a network of state employment
security agencies (SESAs), and made registration with ES a condition
for receiving UI benefits. 
During the next fifty years, the federal government largely set the
terms of the federal–state partnership. State ES agencies were put under
federal control during World War II, serving as the recruitment arm of
the war effort. Federal rules largely governed state administration, ser-
vices, and even the look of local offices. As late as the 1970s, an ob-
server could note that the interior of an ES office in Alaska closely re-
sembled that of an office in New York or San Francisco, even though
the offices were located in different labor markets and run by different
state agencies (Lazerus et al. 1998, p. 5). 
From CETA to JTPA
In the 1970s, a third player was added to the federal–state partner-
ship. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of
1973 introduced local government as a new power center in employ-
ment and training programs. Under CETA, local elected officials
received direct allocations of federal funds, using them to create an in-
dependent network of employment and training services for disadvan-
taged individuals. In addition, CETA did not clearly define the role of
the ES in the newly established employment and training system (Bal-
ducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 469). As a result, competition and
conflicts arose between state agencies and local governments with their
service providers. These tensions were partly relieved by the massive
infusion of funds for public service employment after 1975. Many state
ES offices received local allocations that were used to add staff to orga-
nize public service employment activities.
The replacement of CETA with the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) in 1982 reinforced local control of employment and training
services for disadvantaged individuals and displaced workers. JTPA
firmly established Private Industry Councils (PICs), local committees
composed of a majority of business representatives, service providers,
and other community partners. PICs became responsible for overseeing
and administering a battery of services that often operated independent-
ly of the local ES operation.
JTPA also contained amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act that
gave state agencies new flexibility to manage ES programs. These poli-
cy changes provided states with authority to use federal special purpose
block grants to tailor labor exchange programs to state and local needs
(Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 469). At the same time, federal
oversight and technical assistance diminished as a result of budget cuts
and staff reductions at the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL). Nearly
10 years after the passage of JTPA, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(USGAO) could observe that the Labor Department was taking a
“hands-off” approach to helping states manage their ES programs 
(USGAO 1991).
From JTPA to WIA
By the early 1990s, policymakers had begun to express concerns
about fragmentation and duplication of workforce services. A series of
USGAO reports pointed to a patchwork of JTPA, ES, and other pub-
licly funded programs that were “bewildering and frightening to
clients.” The programs also seemed inefficient since they funded simi-
lar services to individuals with similar needs (USGAO 1994, p. 1).
In response to this criticism, Congress and the president enacted
the WIA of 1998 to strengthen the links among federal workforce pro-
grams. A central purpose of the legislation was to establish a frame-
work for organizing public programs designed to build the nation’s
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workforce. WIA establishes a governance structure composed of state
and local boards (called workforce investment boards) to provide lead-
ership and oversight for workforce programs. It also authorizes one-
stop centers that bring together services from 17 federal programs (in-
cluding ES). One-stop centers must provide any adult citizen with basic
services, such as information on jobs and careers and job search assis-
tance. In addition, one-stop centers provide certain eligible individuals
with opportunities for intensive services, such as case management and
training services. As a result of WIA, a range of federal programs, in-
cluding the ES, are expected to become components of a more coordi-
nated and efficient “system” of workforce development.
THE SPREAD OF SELF-SERVICE TOOLS
Only a decade or two before WIA was enacted, job seekers had to
trudge to “unemployment offices” to find public labor exchange ser-
vices. There, they would probably sit down with an ES interviewer to
discuss available job openings in the local area. Today, however, job
seekers can find jobs themselves by using Internet-based Web sites that
list vacancies across the United States. Alternatively, they can use pub-
licly funded resource rooms in one-stop centers where they can prepare
a resume on a computer and e-mail or fax it to an employer. The spread
of self-service options is the most visible and probably the most signif-
icant innovation in labor exchange services in recent times.
Shift to Self-Service and New Paradigm of Service Delivery
For many years, the core function of the public employment service
was active job matching—collecting job orders from employers, and
screening and referring applicants to firms for suitable positions. Since
the mid 1980s, there has been a gradual but marked shift from active
matching to self-directed services, spurred by three factors. First, limit-
ed federal funding for Wagner-Peyser Act services placed tight con-
straints on staffing in many states and local areas. After plunging in the
early 1980s, state ES grants stabilized in the late 1980s and remained
mostly flat during the 1990s, leading to a decline in real or (inflation-
adjusted) terms. Second, the spread of computer technology and Inter-
net access facilitated development of automated job-matching systems.
Third, economic and cultural changes emphasized individual responsi-
bility for charting job and career transitions.
The shift toward self-directed services is reflected in a new para-
digm of service delivery. Although the terminology varies from place to
place, most states and local areas have adopted a three-tiered structure
for delivery of labor exchange services. At the first level is self-service,
which includes computer-based tools such as Internet-based job banks
and skills-assessment tools. Self-service is available to the broadest
possible group of potential customers. The next level of assistance fea-
tures facilitated self-service, which involves access to resource rooms
stocked with computers and staffed with knowledgeable employees.
The third level consists of staff-assisted services, such as individualized
screening and job matching as well as counseling. A similar tiered ser-
vice structure is available for employers.
Self-Service Tools
In the past, access to state job banks was limited to individuals who
visited public employment offices. Since the mid 1980s, nearly all
states have built automated job banks that greatly expand the reach of
public labor exchange services. In the early 1990s, Wisconsin devel-
oped and launched JobNet, drawing on a combination of Wagner-
Peyser Act, ES automation, and federal one-stop implementation grant
funds. The current version of JobNet allows job seekers to search for
job openings by county, job title, employer, and occupation. Jobs from
neighboring states are also searchable. Employers can enter job post-
ings through a specialized and secure Web site. Access to JobNet is
widely available through easy-to-use, touch screen terminals located in
all of the state’s one-stop centers or through the Wisconsin agency’s
Web site.
States have developed other tools to complement job banks. Michi-
gan was one of the first states to implement a Talent Bank, an on-line
repository for resumes. Job seekers can post resumes to a Web site and
employers can search the resumes by keyword, education level, salary,
and location. As of July 2002, the Talent Bank held nearly 600,000 re-
sumes on a daily basis. Meanwhile, Oregon is developing (and prepar-
ing to launch) an Internet-based iMATCH enrollment and job place-
78 Ridley and Tracy
State and Local Labor Exchange Services 79
ment system that targets job seekers’ skills, not simply their qualifica-
tions or work experience. Using the O-NET coding system, the
iMATCH system allows job seekers to identify the type and level of
skills they possess. It also allows employers to identify the qualifica-
tions and skills needed by prospective employees.
The federal government has made similar investments in auto-
mated job-matching systems. In 1979, the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) created the Interstate Job Bank, a national database contain-
ing state job openings from employers who requested nationwide list-
ings. In the mid 1990s, the Interstate Job Bank was renamed America’s
Job Bank (AJB) and was connected to the Internet. AJB became an
electronic network that combines vacancies submitted daily from state
job banks. In addition, employers can post jobs directly to the Web site
and job seekers can submit resumes. Between 1995 and 2000, AJB ex-
perienced dramatic growth, attaining an average stock of 1.5 million
job openings that represent most occupations from professional to blue
collar (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001, p. 148).
Since the introduction of the national job bank, the capabilities of
AJB have expanded. Job seekers can build resumes and search current
job openings by location, job title, occupational codes, and key words.
Employers can search resumes by occupation, key words, resume num-
ber, or military code. A feature called Job Scout and Resume Scout al-
lows users to rerun previously saved searches, store any new matches
that are found, and receive an e-mail notification of new resumes or job
listings.
In addition to AJB, USDOL invested in a suite of complementary
tools. America’s Talent Bank, a repository of on-line resumes piloted
by several states, was launched as a separate tool and later integrated
with AJB. Three additional electronic tools are now accessible through
www.careeronestop.org:
• America’s Career InfoNet combines federal and state data 
to provide information on occupations, employment and wage
trends and state economic profiles.
• America’s Service Locator connects job seekers to local one-
stop centers in their area.
• O*NET Online, the Occupational Information Network, con-
tains information on the knowledge, skills and abilities required
for specific occupations.
Impact of Automated Systems
The spread of automated job-matching systems and self-help tools
has provided easy access to services previously limited to what was
available at local offices. Following AJB’s launch, the number of “hits”
by users jumped astronomically, rising from only 15,000 in early 1995
to 8.5 million only a year and half later (USDOL data on usage). The
more popular state job banks have broadened the customer base for la-
bor exchange services. An internal state analysis conducted by Wiscon-
sin in the late 1990s found that the computerized job bank contained a
range of jobs that represented the key industries in the state’s economy
and a spectrum of job seekers that was highly representative of the
state’s citizens. 
The spread of automated systems, combined with declining staff
capacity, has altered the traditional role of the ES in screening candi-
dates sought by employers. In the past, the ES stood between the job
seeker and the employer, screening applicants, and referring only suit-
able ones to the employer. States are increasingly offering employers
the option to submit open or unsuppressed job orders that allow candi-
dates to contact firms directly or at least to provide sufficient informa-
tion for the employer to contact promising candidates. 
Still, the use of open job orders varies widely. A few states, such as
Georgia, continue to maintain mostly suppressed job orders that require
screening. Some states, such as Utah, are just beginning to offer em-
ployers the option of open job orders. Other states have shifted largely
to unsuppressed job orders. After experiencing initial staff resistance,
Wisconsin now operates with over 90 percent unsuppressed job orders.
Screening services are now limited to assistance with writing job orders
and assessing their legality.
Resource Rooms
Like computerized self-service tools, resource rooms have trans-
formed customers’ interaction with the public labor exchange. Usually
located in local one-stop centers, they are designed to be attractive and
welcoming to customers. They generally contain a wide range of self-
help information and services. Every one-stop center in Utah, for ex-
ample, contains a Job Connection room that provides access to labor
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market information, resume and cover letter preparation tools, career
exploration software, and an orientation to soft skills required in the
workplace. There are also fax machines and phones to facilitate the job
search. Some one-stop centers, such as the Anoka workforce center in
Minnesota, are well stocked with libraries of pamphlets, books, and
videos that provide guidance to job seekers. 
Resource rooms also require trained staff. Many first-time cus-
tomers need assistance with using self-service tools and finding infor-
mation that matches their needs. Staff assistance is particularly critical
for those customers who lack work or job search experience. In addi-
tion, staff members carry out a “triage” function, identifying job seek-
ers that may have barriers to employment and referring them to inten-
sive or more specialized services (Social Policy Research Associates
1999, p. VII-7).
Resource rooms for employers are less common. Where they exist,
these rooms generally contain information and other materials useful to
employers, such as guides to employment law and tax credits (Social
Policy Research Associates 2001, p. V-27).
CHANGING MIX OF STAFF-ASSISTED SERVICES
During the last decade or so, the scope of intensive, staff-assisted
services has narrowed, largely driven by declining federal funding, the
spread of information technology, and the shift to self-help services.
Traditionally, individuals visiting public employment offices would re-
ceive a range of staff-assisted services, such as counseling, testing, and
direct job referrals. Since the mid 1980s, however, staff-assisted ser-
vices for individuals have become increasingly focused on those who
have trouble using self-service systems or who require considerable as-
sistance in navigating the labor market.
Staff-Assisted Services for Individuals
In the past, state agencies retained full-time, certified counselors
who were available to advise individual job seekers on career planning
and career decision making. During the 1960s, a time of peak funding
for the ES, over 20 percent of new applicants met with a counselor
(Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 463). During the last decade or
so, the counseling function has weakened, and has even disappeared in
some places, as states have shifted limited resources to infrastructure,
information technology, and other functions. ES counselors no longer
exist in Oregon, and the number of designated ES counselors in Florida
and Wisconsin has dwindled markedly over the last 20 years. National-
ly, only 3 to 4 percent of ES registrants currently receive employment
counseling (Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 463).
Testing has declined along with counseling. Traditionally, ES coun-
selors would administer a variety of aptitude and interest tests, such as
the General Aptitude Test Battery, to help young people decide on ca-
reers and to determine the qualifications of adult job seekers. During
the 1960s, about 20–25 percent of all applicants underwent testing. By
contrast, only 2 to 3 percent of ES applicants currently receive testing
services (Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 463).
As individualized counseling and assessment services have de-
clined, other group-oriented services have become more significant.
Some local one-stop centers employ Wagner-Peyser Act–funded staff
to run workshops geared toward groups of job seekers. Although work-
shops tend to vary widely in availability and in the types of groups tar-
geted, they generally tend to provide guidance on the job search pro-
cess, resume building skills, interviewing skills, the hidden job market,
and similar topics. At some one-stop centers, workshops specifically
target UI claimants or certain occupational groups. Many one-stop cen-
ters, on the other hand, offer regularly scheduled workshops that are
open to all job seekers. 
Another group service available to some job seekers is a job club or
job search network. Although not available everywhere, job clubs bring
together groups of unemployed individuals who meet to support one
another and share job-finding tips. ES staff typically facilitate the meet-
ings.
Wagner-Peyser Act–funded staff still provide individualized assis-
tance with job search and placement. In the past, active placement of
individuals into jobs was the dominant role of local staff. With the in-
troduction of self-service technology and the general decline in staffing
capacity, active matching for most has given way to active matching 
for a few. Staff now tend to reserve individualized assistance for cus-
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tomers who struggle with using self-service technology and for target-
ed groups of customers, such as UI claimants, veterans, people with
disabilities, and individuals eligible for case-managed programs.
Some states provide placement services to targeted groups of job
seekers as a result of interagency agreements or contracts, which sup-
plement ES funding. For example, in Iowa, the Department of Human
Services contracts with the Department of Workforce Development to
operate the Promise Jobs placement program for welfare recipients. ES
staff provide a range of services, including assessment, development of
an employment plan, job search assistance, administration of job clubs,
and job fairs with local businesses (Lazerus et al. 1998, p. 75). Ver-
mont’s Department of Employment and Training has a similar arrange-
ment with the state human services agency to find jobs for welfare re-
cipients and people with disabilities.
Although most states have cut back staff-assisted services in the
face of limited federal funding, some states have maintained such ser-
vices by supplementing their federal ES grants with state funds. A few
states, such as Oregon, have established reserve funds with a special as-
sessment on employers through the UI tax system. Interest drawn from
the reserve is commonly used to support ES and UI administration, in-
cluding labor exchange services. Other states, such as Colorado and
Georgia, have instituted special assessments that are regularly collected
from employers through the UI tax system to support delivery of labor
exchange services and UI administration1 (USDOL 2002, p. 2.32–
2.34).
Staff-Assisted and Specialized Services for Employers
Staff-assisted services for employers, like those for job seekers in
many states, have become more targeted to specific groups of cus-
tomers. These services generally entail developing job orders, referring
applicants that match job requirements, and providing information on
tax credits and government regulations. Other services may include us-
ing local one-stop centers for interviewing and recruitment and assist-
ing with layoffs. As a result of a decline in staffing capacity, local ES
staff in many states tend to focus on providing staff-intensive assistance
to firms in specific industries or with specific characteristics (such as
high-wage jobs or jobs with benefits).
Throughout most of its history, the ES emphasized services to job
seekers. During the 1990s, however, some states and local one-stop
centers began to develop more specialized services for employers
(OECD 1999, p. 97). For example, field offices in Georgia have assist-
ed new businesses with screening applicants and conducting large-scale
recruitment for new businesses moving into local communities
(Lazerus et al. 1998, p. 39). In one case, a field office screened about
50,000 applications for a brewery that was opening in the area. Such
initiatives have promoted economic development and increased em-
ployer awareness and use of public labor exchange services, according
to state officials.
Another example is Montana’s deployment of “business advo-
cates” to provide specialized services to employers. Beginning in the
1990s, every local ES office designated a staff person to be the “busi-
ness advocate”—charged with identifying and meeting the needs of
local business customers. These staff members are expected to be pro-
active. They provide economic information, prepare employee hand-
books, and perform other tasks requested by local employers.
States have also increasingly marketed labor market information as
a service to business.2 In 1995, Oregon hired 16 regional labor market
information specialists by converting positions from ES field opera-
tions. Based in local offices, these specialists help employers keep up to
date with changing labor market trends, and help increase awareness of
the public labor exchange. The specialists also serve as a resource for
public partners and local workforce boards. Wisconsin is using Wag-
ner-Peyser Act discretionary funds reserved for the governor to place
seven labor market economists in local one-stop centers.3 Like the spe-
cialists in Oregon, the economists in Wisconsin provide customized in-
formation to employers, partners, and local boards.
A few states still rely on Job Service Employer Committees to in-
crease input from employers on the types of labor exchange services
they need. Employer committees serve primarily as a “sounding board”
to provide feedback on services to the business community. Moreover,
they are sometimes involved in suggesting and implementing new
products or services. The contribution of such committees varies wide-
ly. They have disappeared entirely in most states, but still retain a
strong presence in certain states or in certain regions within states. For
example, both Georgia and Montana have maintained a state-level em-
84 Ridley and Tracy
State and Local Labor Exchange Services 85
ployer committee alongside local employer committees attached to
field offices.
THE GROWTH OF ONE-STOP PARTNERSHIPS
The spread of self-service tools and a new mix of staff-assisted ser-
vices are the most visible changes in the provision of labor exchange ser-
vices. Less visible, but equally important, is the growth of partnerships
that bring together a range of publicly funded workforce programs.
These partnerships have expanded in response to declining federal fund-
ing, limited staff capacity and concerns about efficiency of services.
Establishment of One-Stop Centers and New 
Consolidated Agencies
Beginning in the 1980s, states created one-stop centers that brought
together services from a range of workforce programs. Some of the first
one-stop centers emerged in rural parts of Wisconsin when ES and
JTPA staff agreed to share resources in an effort to keep local offices
open (Lazerus et al. 1998, p 143). Indiana required collaboration
between ES and JTPA staff during the 1980s and later enacted state leg-
islation establishing one-stop centers (or workforce development cen-
ters) as the primary approach to service delivery. New York, Pennsylva-
nia, and Massachusetts also launched early pilots of community
one-stop centers. The ES was a major player in nearly all of the 
experimental one-stop initiatives, contributing leadership, staff, and
resources.
States also strengthened links among programs by reorganizing
agencies. Indiana became one of the first states to consolidate ES, UI,
JTPA, and a variety of other programs in a new Department of Work-
force Development. Colorado merged JTPA with ES in a new unit with-
in the Department of Labor and Employment. As a result of that action,
ES and JTPA staff reported to a single director and took a team ap-
proach to joint planning and decision making.4
A few states created “super-agencies” with a broad array of work-
force, welfare, and social services programs. In one of the most sweep-
ing overhauls, Utah in 1997 established the Department of Workforce
Services by combining ES, JTPA, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), Food Stamps, and other programs. The merger led to
the creation of a new identity for the agency. State officials replaced the
old Job Service Bureau and other program divisions with a field opera-
tions unit with staff funded by multiple programs. Staff shifted from
managing services for a single program to administering a number of
programs through a network of local offices.
Federal One-Stop Center Initiative and Transition to WIA
Building on state efforts to coordinate workforce programs,
USDOL launched the One-Stop Center initiative in 1994. Between
1994 and 2000, every state received a three-year implementation grant
ranging from $3 million to $24 million. ES was generally a core partner
in emerging one-stop center systems. In fact, a condition of the federal
grants was inclusion of the ES (with JTPA and other USDOL-funded
programs) in the development of state plans. Most states used federal
grant funds to establish or renovate physical sites and build the commu-
nications and information systems needed to link disparate public pro-
grams (Lazerus et al. 1998, p. 6).
By the time WIA was enacted in 1998, many states had begun to
establish one-stop centers as the front end to a range of publicly funded
programs. The passage of WIA had three significant consequences for
the ES. First, the legislation authorized provision of core services, such
as job search and placement assistance, which were similar to the labor
exchange services funded by the Wagner-Peyser Act. States and local
areas were expected to coordinate closely to avoid duplication of ser-
vices.
Second, WIA included ES as one of 17 mandatory partner pro-
grams that were required to make services available through the local
one-stop system. Services must be accessible through at least one phys-
ical center in each local area. They can also be accessible through affil-
iated sites that bring together one or more partner programs and
through a local network of partner programs.
Third, the WIA altered the roles of state agencies and the local
boards that replaced PICs. During the federal one-stop grant period,
state agencies generally oversaw planning and implementation of one-
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stop centers as well as Wagner-Peyser Act services. WIA shifted re-
sponsibility for selection and oversight of one-stop centers to business-
led local boards. However, control of Wagner-Peyser Act staff and
funding remained with state agencies.
The Impact of One-Stop Partnerships on Labor 
Exchange Services
The growth of one-stop partnerships since the 1980s has changed
the management and delivery of labor exchange services. Increasingly,
Wagner-Peyser Act staff and funds contribute to a comprehensive range
of services available to all citizens through local networks of one-stop
centers.
Co-location of Partners in One-Stop Centers
Since the federal grant period, most states and local areas have
adopted a similar approach to implementing one-stop centers. A set of
core partners from public programs comes together to select a physical
site for the one-stop center—either one of the partners’ existing offices,
a complex of existing offices, or a new site. The core partners then
agree to co-locate staff—either full-time or part-time—at the chosen
site. Additional partners are connected to the one-stop center through
electronic linkages and a system of referrals.
Although implementation tends to follow a common pattern, the
composition of partnerships varies widely. According to the USGAO,
ES and WIA are the only two mandatory partners that have consis-
tently supported operations of one-stop centers across the sites that
USGAO visited (USGAO 2001, p. 19). Participation by other partners
is more varied. Some states, such as Florida, require participation of the
TANF program in every local one-stop center system. By comparison,
some local areas have broadened partnerships to include community-
based organizations and employer organizations. 
Just as the mix of partners tends to reflect state and local needs, so
the extent of co-location among core partners varies from state to state
and even from site to site. Three dominant patterns have emerged. The
first pattern is found in many small, rural states. Old SESA offices that
housed ES and UI programs have been converted to full-service one-
stop centers and ES staff are then co-located with other partners at
every site.
A second group of states requires co-location of ES with other part-
ners at nearly all comprehensive one-stop centers. These sites include a
wide range of sites from new facilities to renovated grocery stores or
bowling alleys to upgraded public offices. Stand-alone SESA offices
housing only ES and UI staff have disappeared.
A third group of states has adopted a more flexible approach to co-
locating core partners. These states encourage co-location of ES with
other partners at selected comprehensive one-stop centers. In addition,
a number of old SESA offices housing ES and UI staff are allowed to
continue as affiliate sites within local one-stop systems. Full co-loca-
tion of ES staff in comprehensive one-stop centers is typically ham-
pered by limited funding, overextended staff, and the constraints of
long-term leases on existing facilities (USGAO 2002, p. 19).
Different Approaches to Managing ES in Local 
One-Stop Centers
States have also adopted different models for managing Wagner-
Peyser Act staff and funds in local one-stop center systems. The most
common model is dual state and local management of personnel in one-
stop centers. In Wisconsin, for example, the Department of Workforce
Development oversees and manages ES staff and funds assigned to
one-stop centers, while the local workforce board, the county, or other
entity is responsible for WIA and other program staff. In many centers,
state and local staff are represented on management teams that oversee
operations. In some instances, the partners appoint a site manager to
help coordinate services and make day-to-day operational decisions.
However, final decisions about resources and personnel are the respon-
sibility of on-site or off-site ES administrators. 
A second model—common in small states with a single workforce
area—features centralized administration of ES, WIA, and other work-
force programs. In 1983, North Dakota unified JTPA and ES service
delivery by charging the ES with administration and delivery of JTPA
services. Since then, this model has spread to other states that are single
state local areas. For example, Vermont has established 12 Career Re-
source Centers that bring together state staff from ES, UI, and WIA. In
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Vermont, Utah, and other “state-administered” jurisdictions, decision
making about funding and staffing for these programs is highly central-
ized.
A third model emphasizes decentralized oversight and responsibil-
ity for ES staff and funds. Indiana was one of the first states to attempt
such a transfer. In 1982, the state issued “The State of Indiana Policy
for Vocational Education, Training, and Employment,” a plan for ced-
ing administration of local ES services to local PICs. However, court
challenges by state ES workers and their unions blocked the proposed
plan and reasserted the role of state merit system employees in per-
forming Wagner-Peyser Act functions.
Although Indiana’s attempt failed, other states have succeeded in
decentralizing ES functions. In the late 1990s, Colorado became one of
three states that can allow nonstate merit system staff to provide Wag-
ner-Peyser Act services. The state is gradually devolving responsibility
for maintaining a public labor exchange to local workforce regions. As
state ES positions become vacant through attrition or retirement, the
funds tied to that position are transferred to the local board. Boards can
then employ county merit system staff instead of state staff in the one-
stop centers. Until the transfer of positions takes place, the counties
work with regional ES managers (who are not on-site) to supervise the
local ES staff. At the same time, several rural local workforce regions
have opted not to accept responsibility for ES functions and have
turned over administration of their one-stop centers to the state Depart-
ment of Labor and Employment. In those regions, state managers su-
pervise state ES staff and also oversee delivery of WIA services. Col-
orado’s unique state–local agreement has thus led to decentralized
decision making for multiple programs in most parts of the state and,
conversely, has increased centralization in several regions.
Massachusetts illustrates another variation of decentralized man-
agement of ES functions. In 1995 the Boston PIC chartered three one-
stop centers, which were intended to compete with one another for cus-
tomers. One of the centers is operated by the state employment service,
the second is managed by a partnership of three community-based or-
ganizations, and the third is administered by a partnership of the City of
Boston and a community-based organization. Each of the centers re-
ceives an allocation of Wagner-Peyser Act funds and is required to de-
liver a fully integrated set of public labor exchange services.
The Role of Labor Exchange in One-Stop Partnerships
As one-stop partnerships have expanded, the ES has continued to
perform its traditional function of providing labor exchange services.
What has changed is that Wagner-Peyser Act staff and funds have be-
come part of a comprehensive battery of services available through local
one-stop center systems (Social Policy Research Associates 2001, V–5).
The ES has played a central role in successful one-stop partner-
ships because its flexible funding can be used to provide services to a
universal customer base. In many sites, ES staff and funds tend to be
the sole or primary support for operation of resource rooms and other
core services under WIA (Social Policy Research Associates 2001,
V–7). Co-location of staff from other programs has allowed ES staff to
specialize in staffing the resource room or providing other core ser-
vices. The use of flexible Wagner-Peyser Act funds for core services al-
lows WIA, TANF, and other more targeted program funds to be target-
ed for more intensive services.
In other successful centers, the ES is simply one of several pro-
grams that contribute to delivery of high-volume labor exchange ser-
vices. For example, at the Kenosha County Job Center in Wisconsin,
staff from different agencies provide services in Employment Central,
the resource room that provides self-service and facilitated self-service
to the general public and businesses (Heldrich Center for Workforce
Development 2002). Other sites support core services by combining
multiple funding streams, including ES, WIA, and others (Social Poli-
cy Research Associates 2001, V–7). The result is an expansion of the
level and range of labor exchange services available to customers.
Some successful one-stop centers also have formed integrated em-
ployer service teams composed of representatives of multiple partners,
including the ES. For example, the Golden Crescent Workforce Center
in Victoria, Texas, has a multiprogram employer services unit that per-
forms a high level of recruitment and prescreening at no cost to the em-
ployer (Heldrich Center for Workforce Development 2002). Many inte-
grated teams designate account representatives, organized by location,
industry, or other method, to conduct outreach and serve as a single
point of contact for designated firms. In other sites, by contrast, the ES
has taken the lead responsibility for managing employer services. How-
ever organized, ES staff and funds have begun to contribute to a richer
and more diverse mix of services for business customers.
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CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT SERVICE AND
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
While the one-stop movement was strengthening linkages among
workforce development programs, other trends were contributing to a
“disconnect” between ES and UI. The operations of these two pro-
grams were closely linked as a result of the Social Security Act of 1935,
which made registration with ES a condition for receiving UI benefits.
UI staff took claims from applicants, verified information, and issued
benefit checks. ES staff in most states registered claimants for work, re-
ferred applicants to suitable job openings, and informed UI staff when
claimants did not meet work requirements (Balducchi, Johnson, and
Gritz 1997, p. 466). Beginning in the late 1950s, UI and ES staff were
typically co-located in local SESA offices and sometimes cross-trained
to perform similar duties.
The close relationship between ES and UI programs forged over
time has been tested in the 1990s. Beginning with Colorado in 1991, a
growing number of states have adopted automated systems that allow
applicants to file claims by telephone and, most recently, by the Inter-
net. As of 2002, nearly all states are either planning or implementing
systems to take telephone and Internet-based initial claims (Informa-
tion Technology Support Center 2003). Implementation in most states
has led to the transfer of UI staff from local offices to centralized call
centers and adjudication offices. As a result, ES and UI staff in many
states have become physically separated, creating new barriers to com-
munication and coordination.
To address this challenge, some states are establishing technologi-
cal linkages between ES and UI services. Colorado, the first state to im-
plement telephone-based claims-taking, recently developed an online
work registration Web site that is tied to the UI Web site. Customers can
move easily from filing a UI claim to registering for employment ser-
vices. Utah is also linking the ES and UI databases through the
UWORKS Web site, thus allowing customers to file an electronic claim
and then begin a self-directed job search.
States are also targeting UI claimants and providing enhanced
reemployment services. In some states, the ES participates in the eligi-
bility review process, which is used to determine continued eligibility
of selected UI recipients and evaluate the progress of the job search. In
Florida, for example, teams of ES and UI staff members conduct eligi-
bility reviews at six-week intervals. Staff members interview selected
groups of UI recipients, verify their eligibility, and provide guidance on
getting back to work quickly.
Another linkage is the use of “profiling” under the Worker Profiling
and Reemployment Services System. Enacted in 1993, this system re-
quires all states to identify claimants who are likely to exhaust their UI
benefits and refer them to reemployment services, such as job search
assistance and training. In Wisconsin (as in a number of states), ES staff
are responsible for providing reemployment services to individuals
who have been “profiled” and referred by UI staff. 
Since fiscal year 2000, Congress has authorized reemployment ser-
vices grants under the Wagner-Peyser Act to increase targeted services
for UI claimants. With funding from that grant, Oregon has established
an “enhanced enrollment” process for UI claimants. ES staff conduct
interviews, provide labor market information and job referrals, and de-
velop a plan for UI claimants before they reach their eighth week of in-
sured unemployment. In Colorado, the reemployment services grant
has supported case management and specialized job search workshops
for selected groups of UI claimants.
Although many states have struggled to maintain the traditional
linkages between ES and UI in the 1990s, Georgia has reinforced them.
In 1995, the state developed the Reemployment Units Program (REU), a
unique combination of intensive services for a large pool of unemployed
individuals. Services were geared for three groups of individuals:
1) UI claimants who are eligible for at least 14 weeks of benefits,
2) dislocated workers, and
3) other UI claimants who have been profiled and determined to
be likely to face difficulty in finding employment.
Program participants begin with an assessment and then enter a re-
quired three-to-four-hour job search workshop with a group of other
claimants. Participants must also attend subsequent one-hour eligibility
review program workshops in which they receive job search advice and
undergo a review of their UI eligibility. In addition to the required
workshops, the REU program offers optional workshops on financial
and stress management, individual counseling, and a variety of infor-
mational resources (Lazerus et al. 1998, pp. 32–35).
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KEY TRENDS IN ADMINISTRATION AND DELIVERY OF
PUBLIC LABOR EXCHANGE SERVICES
This chapter has described the “sea change” in the administration
and delivery of public labor exchange services during the last two de-
cades. Beginning in the 1980s, states implemented job banks, resource
rooms, and other self-service options that transformed customers’ expe-
rience with the public labor exchange. At the same time, the mix of
staff-assisted services shifted, as counseling and testing declined and
individualized job matching became more focused on targeted individ-
uals and employers.
Another major trend was the growth of partnerships among public
programs in response to limited funding and growing criticism of the
performance and efficiency of public institutions. New consolidated
agencies in some states combined the ES with job training and other
services. At the local level, one-stop centers established by WIA
brought together ES and a range of state and local partners, expanding
the mix of services available to labor exchange customers.
While the one-stop movement tended to deepen partnerships be-
tween ES and other public programs, other trends beginning in the
1990s weakened the historically close relationship between ES and UI.
Implementation of telephone and Internet-based claims-filing systems
led to the physical separation of ES and UI staff, hampering communi-
cation and coordination of services.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC 
LABOR EXCHANGE
As the public Employment Service enters its 70th year, it faces se-
rious challenges. Limited funding will constrain the ability of states to
maintain and upgrade new technology and services. The aging of state
workforces and a looming retirement “bubble” among state and local
government personnel will limit the supply of trained staff needed to
provide effective services. In addition, the complex issues that arise
from co-location of multiple programs in one-stop centers and joint
delivery of services create difficulties for both the ES and other part-
ners.
A more fundamental challenge is the need to remain relevant in a
labor market characterized by a plethora of new options for job seekers
and employers. The role of the ES in the labor market of the future re-
mains an open question. Will the public labor exchange continue its tra-
ditional role of job matching when new technology permits active job
matching through the Internet? Will the ES need to maintain a public
access job bank when there is a proliferation of private and nonprofit
job banks tailored to different niches in the labor market? Will new la-
bor market intermediaries reduce or even eliminate the need for a pub-
lic labor exchange?
In our view, the public labor exchange must play a continuing role
to support economic security and the healthy functioning of the Ameri-
can labor market. However, its role is likely to change to keep pace with
an increasingly “wired” labor market (Autor 2001). Below, we lay out
six potential options for the public labor exchange.
1) Ensure access to information tools. A key role for the public
labor exchange is to become the information backbone for the labor
market by ensuring easy and equitable access to a wide array of infor-
mation tools. One of the most important tools is labor market informa-
tion, the collection and dissemination of data on the economy and oc-
cupations. Other tools include public and private job and talent banks,
corporate Web sites containing on-line applications as well as comput-
erized career guidance software.
Although self-help and information tools will become more effec-
tive and widely used, staff-assisted services will be essential. Trained
staff members are needed to assist job seekers who are unable to use
advanced information tools and who need referrals to intensive and
specialized services. They also provide a much needed “human touch”
(Social Policy Research Associates 1999, p. VII–7). In the future, staff
will need to be accessible not only in person through one-stop centers,
but also on-line as “help desk” representatives and counselors. 
2) Create paths to new intermediaries. In the last two decades,
new intermediaries have emerged to mediate between employers and
individuals in the on-line world and in local labor markets. These inter-
mediaries include
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• private temporary and staffing agencies that provide “temp to
perm” routes to employment,
• cluster-based organizations that provide networking opportuni-
ties for firms and employees within a regional cluster, and
• community-based organizations such as Project Quest that pre-
pare low-income individuals for jobs in targeted industries.
Because many individuals and employers may not have access to such
organizations, a role for the public labor exchange is to provide direct
access to the new intermediaries. In other words, the ES can become a
navigator or “concierge” for an array of intermediaries. By taking on
this new role, the ES can transition from its traditional role as a broker
between individual job seekers and employers to become a facilitator of
an expanding number of transactions in the broad labor market.
3) Collaborate, don’t compete, with private agencies. Helping
job seekers navigate the labor market will require strong collaboration,
not competition, with private labor exchange agencies. Some states are
using the public labor exchange to connect individuals with a wide ar-
ray of options for finding jobs and building careers. For example, the
Utah Department of Workforce Services Web site—www.jobs.utah.
gov—incorporates links to public job banks as well as corporate human
resources sites and private job boards. In Portland, Oregon, the local
workforce board and one-stop system worked with EmployOn, a
Cleveland-based on-line employment matching service, to launch a
Web site that provides access to employment opportunities in the semi-
conductor, teaching, health care, and other local industries. This joint
venture brings a high-quality job finding site to local job seekers inter-
ested in high-demand fields.
What is needed in the future is a more systematic and energetic
approach to public–private collaboration. The agreement between
USDOL and Monster Board to share transaction data and jointly use
SOC codes is a first step in this direction. A more ambitious goal is to
promote a common architecture for the public–private labor exchange
(Sheets 2002, p. 44). USDOL, working with state and private sector
partners, could help develop a common language and protocol for the
electronic labor exchange. As a neutral party, the government could ne-
gotiate the necessary agreements on standardization and confidentiality
of private records. Such a common architecture would facilitate access
to both public and private databases and transfers of information among
them. O-NET provides an excellent framework and taxonomy upon
which to build such collaboration. The robust array of career informa-
tion and guidance embedded in O-NET would provide a foundation of
career management for workers at all skill levels.
4) Upgrade services for employers. Building strong public–private
partnerships and joint ventures will be essential to improving services to
employers. At the Racine County Workforce Development Center in
Wisconsin, public partners invited the Chamber of Commerce and Eco-
nomic Development Corporation to provide services to local employers
through the one-stop center. These two organizations brought instant
recognition and credibility with the business community.
Upgrading services for employers will also require strong partner-
ships among public programs. Many successful one-stop centers have
organized integrated teams to maximize the level and variety of ser-
vices to employers. These teams are composed of representatives from
multiple partners, including ES, WIA, and other programs. In the fu-
ture, the public labor exchange must contribute to a robust array of ser-
vices that are valued by employers, such as recruitment, screening, cus-
tomized training, and other human resource functions.
5) Reconnect UI with reemployment services. Another important
goal for the future is to reconnect UI with the public labor exchange.
Reestablishing the relationship is important for both individual cus-
tomers and employers. Evaluations demonstrate that UI claimants who
receive job search assistance and other services shortly after or even be-
fore job loss find new jobs faster, shortening the length of unemploy-
ment for workers and reducing the costs of UI for employers.
Some states have begun to explore creative solutions for bridging
UI and reemployment services. For example, Missouri’s new Auto-
Match System speeds up the referral of UI claimants to job openings
available through the state’s one-stop center system. Shortly after a UI
claim is filed, information is extracted to match the UI claimant with
job openings and is shared with one-stop centers. Missouri’s system is
simply one example of many promising technological and other solu-
tions that are needed to reestablish the historically close connection be-
tween UI and the public labor exchange.
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6) Clarify administrative structures at the state and local levels.
As this chapter has discussed, three approaches to administration of
workforce programs have emerged during the last two decades:
1) joint state administration of ES, WIA, and other workforce pro-
grams (most common in small states with a single workforce
area),
2) divided administration with state-driven ES and locally driven
WIA programs (most common in most medium and large
states), and
3) devolved oversight of Wagner-Peyser Act staff and/or re-
sources to local authorities.
Few, if any, evaluations have established any relationship between ad-
ministrative structure and overall performance. Nevertheless, case stud-
ies and other qualitative research suggest that divided oversight of staff
in local one-stop centers tends to create inefficiencies and perpetuate
barriers to smooth coordination of services for customers. To improve
public partnerships in one-stop centers, states and their local partners
should have flexibility to pilot and promote models of unified manage-
ment of multiple workforce programs.
All of these options suggest future directions for a public institu-
tion that has experienced dramatic change over the last few decades. A
powerful combination of flexibility, creativity, and commitment to re-
form are needed if the public labor exchange is to remain relevant in the
competitive new marketplace for employment services.
Notes
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not reflect those of
the organizations with which they are affiliated. The authors express their appreciation
for the advice and information provided by the following people: Tom Ivory, Nina Hol-
land and Elise Lowe-Vaughn, Colorado Department of Labor and Employment; Helen
Parker, Georgia Department of Labor; Markley J. Perrett, Oregon Department of Em-
ployment; Bob Ware and Dave Copeland, Vermont Department of Employment and
Training; Ron Hunt, Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development; and Kathleen
Cashen and Bob Simoneau, National Association of State Workforce Agencies. How-
ever, all facts and views expressed in the chapter are the responsibility of the authors
alone.
1. As of 2002, at least 28 states collected surtaxes through UI and used them for UI
administration, ES administration, and training. At least five states had established
reserve funds to pay for ES and UI administration and training.
2. Labor market information is the compilation and dissemination of data showing
trends in the economy, labor market and occupations. The Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics prepares national data, and units within each state workforce agency prepare
state reports.
3. Governors can reserve 10 percent of the Wagner-Peyser Act state allocation to pro-
vide performance incentives, services for groups with special needs, and exempla-
ry models of service delivery, including labor market information tools.
4. At least 33 states have combined most USDOL-funded programs (such as ES, UI,
WIA, veterans, and the Trade Act) in a single agency.
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In program year (PY) 2002, the Employment and Training Admin-
istration (ETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) implement-
ed a new outcomes-based performance measurement system for the
public labor exchange. This came during a period that saw the federal
government place renewed emphasis on performance measurement of
federally funded programs in general and workforce development pro-
grams in particular. Policymakers embraced performance measurement
both for its potential as a management tool and as a means of informing
the federal budget process. The enactment of the Government Perfor-
mance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and the Workforce Investment
Act of 1998 (WIA) exemplify the federal emphasis on performance
measurement. Both emphasized the measurement of programmatic out-
comes and greatly influenced the development of the labor exchange
performance measurement system.
Since the early 1980s and until only recently, the public labor ex-
change operated during a period in which the federal role in perfor-
mance measurement had been rather limited. During that time, ETA re-
quired state employment security agencies (SESAs) to collect and
report summary statistics on labor exchange activities; however, little
emphasis was placed on using this information to assess program per-
formance across states, such as through the use of performance indica-
tors or the establishment of performance targets or standards. This had
partly been a result of the management and administrative authority for
labor exchange programs having been devolved to the states under the
1982 amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act that were included in the
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Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). In the present one-stop delivery
system environment, states still are afforded wide latitude in the admin-
istration and management of labor exchange service delivery as part of
state one-stop delivery systems. For example, each state may offer a
different mix of services and draw upon a range of funding streams in
providing labor exchange services.1 However, the new labor exchange
performance measurement system requires SESAs to use common per-
formance indicators to assess their performance in delivering labor ex-
change services under the Wagner-Peyser Act. 
This chapter examines the performance measurement practices of
the public labor exchange during an era where increased scrutiny is
being placed on the accountability of government programs. It de-
scribes efforts to develop a comprehensive system to measure and ac-
count for the delivery of labor exchange services under the federal–
state Employment Service (ES) program authorized under the Wagner-
Peyser Act and which operates as part of state one-stop delivery sys-
tems as required under WIA. The chapter also describes how labor ex-
change performance measurement has been influenced by WIA and
GPRA.
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
We begin with a brief overview of performance measurement in
general and how it applies to government programs. Performance mea-
surement can be viewed as the process of assessing the operation of a
program for purposes of providing program managers, policymakers,
and the public with relevant information about whether the program is
accomplishing its intended purpose. The National Performance Review
(NPR 1997, p. 6) has defined performance measurement as:
A process of assessing progress toward achieving predetermined
goals, including information on the efficiency with which re-
sources are transformed into goods and services (outputs), the
quality of those outputs (how well they are delivered to clients and
the extent to which clients are satisfied) and outcomes (the results
of a program activity compared to its intended purpose), and the
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effectiveness of government operations in terms of their specific
contributions to program objectives.
Performance indicators may be used to assess progress toward achiev-
ing overarching goals. Again, the NPR (1997, p. 6) has defined a per-
formance measure as, “a quantitative or qualitative characterization of
performance.” Performance measures also commonly are referred to as
performance indicators.
A performance measurement system typically consists of a number
of broad performance goals, performance indicators, associated stan-
dards to measure progress toward the achievement of those goals, and a
means of reporting on that progress. Information obtained through pro-
gram evaluation may be used to enhance a performance measurement
system. For example, information from net impact estimates, which
measure the added value attributable to a program, may be used to help
establish benchmarks or performance standards.2
Performance measurement requirements for federal programs gen-
erally can be traced to either of two sources: the program’s enabling leg-
islation or governmentwide mandates. The former might require or au-
thorize the use of performance indicators; for instance, in monitoring
aspects of program operations across states or for purposes of providing
awards or imposing sanctions based on program performance in relation
to performance standards. States or grantees exhibiting strong perfor-
mance according to designated performance indicators might be provid-
ed with additional funding or might be authorized to distribute a portion
of the funds they receive according to criteria based on performance. If
awards or sanctions are to be based on performance measurement infor-
mation, however, care must be taken to apply awards or sanctions based
on program effectiveness, rather than raw or unadjusted outcomes.
Governmentwide mandates generally require agencies to measure
and report on the performance of the programs they administer as a
means of informing the federal budget process or to account for the use
of federal funds. The executive branch and Congress might view pro-
grams that demonstrate sound performance according to established
performance criteria as being effective in serving their intended pur-
pose and worthy of continued or increased funding. Conversely, those
demonstrating poor performance might receive decreased funding or be
targeted for elimination.
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PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AS ADMINISTERED
UNDER THE WAGNER-PEYSER ACT
From the early 1980s, when the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended
under JTPA, until only recently, ETA has acted under the Secretary’s
authority to exercise only a limited role in ES labor exchange perfor-
mance measurement and offered minimal guidance. SESAs, mean-
while, were left to their own to develop techniques for performance
measurement. Many SESAs were innovative in developing their own
performance measurement systems which provided them with valuable
information for management purposes. It has only been since the ES la-
bor exchange began operating alongside other workforce development
programs as part of state one-stop delivery systems that ETA has again
made labor exchange performance measurement a federal priority. In
doing so, ETA has been keen to work in partnership with SESAs as it
has begun reestablishing a federal role in labor exchange performance
measurement. This section provides a brief history of labor exchange
performance measurement.
Performance-Based Funding
Prior to the 1982 amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act, the secre-
tary of labor was authorized to consider performance measurement in-
formation in determining the allocation of funds to states. In the 1970s,
for instance, annual grants to states were based on funding formulas
that were weighted according to a number of performance-based crite-
ria. The Balanced Placement Formula (BPF) was used in 1975 and
1976 to determine states’ funding allocations based on a combination
of performance factors, including individuals placed per staff year,
placement transactions, placements of target group members, and job
market penetration, with the greatest weight applied to the first of these
factors (USDOL 1977, p. 184). Basing states’ grant allocations on per-
formance-based criteria proved effective in focusing SESAs’ attention
on the secretary’s priorities, which at the time had included job place-
ments within the labor exchange function.3 In 1977, the BPF was su-
perseded by a slightly revised performance-based funding formula, the
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Resource Allocation Formula (RAF), which used similar performance
factors, as well as other criteria, in determining states’ funding alloca-
tions.
However, allocating state grants according to performance criteria
resulted in some unintended consequences, most notably providing in-
adequate services to hard-to-serve clients. In many cases, local office
staff became so focused on placements that they concentrated their ef-
forts on placing the most job-ready of applicants at the expense of those
with greater needs. This often is referred to as “cream skimming” or
“creaming.” In labor market programs, the occurrence of creaming rais-
es concerns about social equity and also about the efficient use of pub-
lic resources. If only the most able are served, those with the most
pressing needs might be denied adequate service, and the benefit to so-
ciety may not be maximized.4 Ultimately, some of these practices
raised concerns about ES’s compliance with Titles VI and VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (USGAO 1980). To address these concerns,
ETA proceeded to make further modifications to its funding formula
and to develop new procedures for performance measurement. 
In 1980, an advisory committee and a technical working group
comprised of representatives from SESAs, public interest groups, and
the national and regional offices convened to develop and make recom-
mendations on performance standards for the labor exchange (USDOL
1981). Based on the working group’s recommendations, ETA planned
to implement a single performance indicator on a test basis for fiscal
year (FY) 1983: the number of individuals placed in jobs. As part of the
Program and Budget Planning process, a performance standard would
be developed for each state through the use of an analytic model. The
model would adjust the performance standard based on eight local fac-
tors using data for the preceding seven years (USDOL 1982).5 During
the initial test year, ETA would not apply any awards or sanctions. 
Wagner-Peyser Act Funding and Performance Measurement in
the JTPA Era
In 1982 the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended under JTPA to pro-
vide for state grant allocations to be based on each state’s proportionate
share of the civilian labor force and unemployed individuals, rather
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than on performance-based criteria.6 The secretary’s authority over per-
formance measurement also was enhanced, although specific perfor-
mance indicators were not mandated. Rather, the Wagner-Peyser Act
provides the secretary with authority to establish performance stan-
dards for the activities carried out under the Wagner-Peyser Act.7 It also
requires the reservation of 10 percent of the funds granted to each state
for use by the governor, among other purposes, to provide performance
incentives consistent with the performance standards established by the
secretary.8
While the 1982 amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act had added
language authorizing the secretary to develop performance standards
for the delivery of labor exchange services, performance standards
were not implemented in a timely fashion. Some observers have
charged that ETA’s failure to implement a labor exchange performance
measurement system may have been a contributing factor to the de-
cline in funding provided for state ES administration. Others suggest
that reductions in funding would have occurred even had ETA imple-
mented a labor exchange performance measurement system due to a
favoring of job training programs over job search assistance programs
by policymakers, and due to competing national priorities, such as fed-
eral debt reduction. Nonetheless, there seems to be some recognition
that institutionalizing performance measurement might have supported
the case of those who advocated for increased Wagner-Peyser Act
funding. 
Since FY 1984 and the implementation of JTPA, federal Wagner-
Peyser Act funding for state ES administration of labor exchange ser-
vice delivery has remained fairly constant at approximately three-quar-
ters of a billion dollars, rising above that amount for only a few years in
the early 1990s. Adjusting for inflation,9 over the 19-year period
through FY 2003, this represents a real decline of 33.9 percent in fund-
ing (see Figure 4.1).
States have used a variety of strategies to respond to diminishing
federal Wagner-Peyser Act grants. Some have attempted to offset the
relative decline in federal grants by enacting additional taxes or tax sur-
charges on employers through diversions of unemployment insurance
(UI) tax contributions. Others have attempted to achieve cost savings
by decreasing their reliance on costly staff-assisted services and in-
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Figure 4.1  Wagner-Peyser Act Funding for State ES Administration 
(FY 1984–FY 2002)






creasingly relying on automated or electronic self-services to meet the
needs of job seekers and employers. A few have been forced to close lo-
cal offices and cut services.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(USGAO) issued a number of reports to Congress critical of labor ex-
change performance measurement practices (USGAO 1983, 1989a,
1989b, 1991). These reports stimulated a number of initiatives to bring
improved performance measurement to the labor exchange. In large
part, however, the task of bringing performance measurement to the la-
bor exchange has not been slowed by an aversion to performance mea-
surement in principle. Rather, it appears that the challenges of develop-
ing and agreeing to appropriate indicators and of achieving an
acceptable balance between federal authority and state autonomy in
managing the federal–state labor exchange system have been more sub-
stantial stumbling blocks. 
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Labor Exchange Reporting
As already noted, for much of the past two decades, the public la-
bor exchange has operated without a comprehensive national system of
performance measurement (i.e., one consisting of performance goals,
performance indicators and standards, and regular reports, common
across all states). However, SESAs have been required to submit quar-
terly reports to ETA with summary information on labor exchange ac-
tivities, both for applicants seeking employment and job vacancies list-
ed. Prior to 1985, SESA reported performance information in a uniform
manner to ETA through the Employment Security Automated Report-
ing System. After July 1, 1985, however, ETA stopped requir-
ing all states to use the same standardized automated reporting system,
and through the end of the 1990s, SESAs provided ETA with data on
labor exchange services through the Public Employment Reporting
System.
The primary structure for reporting performance information has
been the ETA 9002 quarterly report (financial information is reported
separately on SF 269 Reports). The ETA 9002 reports have provided
ETA regional and national office staff with an array of data on job seek-
ers who registered with the labor exchange in each state. These data in-
clude their demographic characteristics; the number who received vari-
ous types of labor exchange services; and outcome information, such as
the number who were placed into jobs, or who obtained employment on
their own. The reports also have provided ETA with summary informa-
tion on jobs listed with the labor exchange according to occupation and
industry. ETA has used this basic information for purposes such as
monitoring the operation of the labor exchange in each state and for
justifying budget requests. 
During the period when ETA received ETA 9002 reports from the
SESAs through PERS, however, a number of concerns were raised
about the validity and reliability of the data being reported. A 1996 re-
view by USDOL’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found at least
eighteen different reporting systems being used by the states to compile
the information reported on the ETA 9002. In its review, OIG found
that
ETA accepts the ES performance data from these offices at face
value, and does not test or verify the source data for the USES an-
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nual performance statement, prior to its publication in the annual
DOL report. ETA national office and regional office staff state 
also that they do not conduct monitoring activities which would
provide reasonable assurance of the accuracy and reliability of re-
ported ES data on a statistically valid basis. (USDOL 1996a, p. 14)
In part as a result of the OIG’s findings, ETA has engaged in an
agencywide data validation project to ensure that the data reported for
performance measurement of all ETA administered programs are of suf-
ficient reliability for its performance measurement purposes. Also, ETA
is implementing a new agencywide reporting system called the Enter-
prise Information Management System, which will integrate the report-
ing of performance and financial information. The ES labor exchange is
part of ETA’s data validation project. ETA recently released guidance on
the reporting of labor exchange performance measurement information,
which includes data validation procedures (USDOL 2002c).
Through the 1990s, the ETA 9002 reports have provided ETA with
an array of data about the operation of the labor exchange, nearly all of
which has been in the form of basic summary information for each state.
This has sufficed for indicating counts of a range of service outputs and
a limited number of outcomes. ETA has used this information to report
on performance indicators included in its annual performance plans re-
quired under GPRA. However, these plans have not been clearly linked
to performance requirements applicable at the state agency level.
Selected data from ETA 9002 reports are presented in Figure 4.2.
The data indicate that over the most recent seven years for which data
are available—PY 1995 through PY 2001—the number of job openings
employers listed with the labor exchange trended upward. The number
of job seekers registering with the labor exchange increased in PY 2001
after a period of decline in the late 1990s. Approximately two-thirds of
these job seekers received reportable services beyond registering with
the labor exchange.10 During this period, the number of job seekers re-
ported as entering employment has increased from year to year, except
for a slight dip in PY 1998. The data also reveal a striking change in the
role of the labor exchange in assisting job seekers enter employment.
Whereas more than two-thirds of those reported as entering employ-
ment in PY 1995 did so by being placed into jobs by ES staff, by PY
2001 less than one-third were placed into jobs. The proportion of those
reported as entering employment after being served by the labor ex-
110 Smole
change, but not being placed into jobs (i.e., obtaining employment), has
increased precipitously.
It is difficult to interpret these trends because over the time period
for which data are presented, a number of states began registering and
recording employment outcomes for job seekers who only received la-
bor exchange services through the self-service mode (and hence would
not have been placed into a job). Many states also began verifying entry
into employment through the use of UI wage record matching, whereas
previously this was done primarily by staff follow-up. Thus, it is unclear
whether there is a shift in the relative proportion of job seekers obtaining
employment as opposed to being placed into jobs, or if a greater propor-
tion of job seekers who registered with the labor exchange have been
counted as obtaining employment due to the increased use of UI wage
record matching. Issues such as these suggest that a comprehensive per-
formance measurement system, with the capacity for making adjust-
ments based on various factors is needed to assess the performance of
the labor exchange with any degree of confidence.
INITIATIVES TO DESIGN A LABOR EXCHANGE
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
Following USGAO’s reports to Congress critical of labor exchange
performance measurement practices, many in the labor exchange com-
munity, both within and outside of ETA, sought to develop a perfor-
mance measurement system for the labor exchange. Several efforts dur-
ing the 1990s resulted in a number of proposals that included a wide
array of performance indicators. 
In 1992, state ES directors, under the coordination of the Interstate
Conference of Employment Security Agencies (ICESA), proposed a
performance measurement strategy for the state employment services
that consisted of performance indicators for employer-oriented activi-
ties and job-seeker activities, cost-effectiveness indicators, and the use
of customer satisfaction surveys (ICESA 1992). The proposal was de-
veloped around parameters that called for consistent measurement of
basic ES functions across states, the preservation of a degree of state
flexibility in service delivery, and the prospect for increased funding,
particularly for high performance. 
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Figure 4.2  Selected ES Labor Exchange Program Data, PY 1995 to 
PY 2001
SOURCES: USDOL (1996b, 1997, 1999, 2000b, 2001c, 2002d, 2003). 
In embarking on this initiative, ICESA recognized that the labor
exchange could not continue to function effectively without challeng-
ing performance measurement requirements. ICESA and its members
also perceived advantages to seizing the initiative in developing perfor-
mance measurement requirements themselves. These included the be-
lief that ETA and Congress might favorably consider their recommen-
dations for implementation, given that they had the backing of the
states, and that in the absence of state action, performance measure-
ment requirements would be mandated by the federal government. 
Following ICESA’s proposal, ETA contracted with Social Policy
Research Associates (SPRA) to explore the prospects for implementing
ES performance requirements (USDOL 1992). SPRA analyzed the
availability of data that could support a range of performance indica-
tors, including many of those proposed by ICESA. Primary sources of
data identified were the ETA 9002 reports, data collected by SESA but
not reported to ETA, and UI wage records. SPRA also examined the re-
lationship between different potential performance indicators and po-
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tential procedures for setting performance standards based on a statisti-
cal model. Ultimately, however, this did not lead to the implementation
of a performance measurement system. 
In 1998, the Workforce Development Performance Measures Ini-
tiative (WDPMI), organized under ETA stewardship, led to a proposal
for a system of performance indicators organized around the one-stop
delivery system (USDOL 1998b). The WDPMI’s guidance for develop-
ing a system of performance indicators was twofold: first, to establish a
“core” of system indicators that would allow for comparisons across
states and localities, and which could be compiled at the state or na-
tional levels; and second, to develop other indicators that could be ap-
plied in a more flexible manner across states with different service
strategies. The WDPMI proposal consisted of nine core performance
indicators, nine noncore performance indicators, and six developmental
indicators. As a component of the one-stop delivery system, perfor-
mance of the labor exchange would be measured using the WDPMI
performance indicators.
At approximately the same time as WDPMI, a federal–state work-
group was organized to develop performance indicators for labor ex-
change services provided under the Wagner-Peyser Act. The workgroup
developed and recommended a series of labor exchange performance
indicators to ETA that were primarily organized around the three
modes for delivering labor exchange services: self-help services, facili-
tated self-help services, and staff-assisted services. The proposed self-
service indicators were counts of services provided through the Ameri-
ca’s Job Bank (AJB) system. Indicators proposed for facilitated
self-help services included a count of customers served and a measure
of customer satisfaction, which could be determined by each state. A
series of more rigorous indicators were proposed for staff-assisted ser-
vices to job seekers and employers. Finally, two systemwide indicators
were proposed: cost per entered employment, and a measure of the im-
pact of staff-assisted services on the duration of UI benefits provided to
UI claimants. Just prior to WIA being enacted into law, ETA published
the proposed performance indicators in the Federal Register for public
comment (USDOL 1998a).
In large part due to the uncertainty surrounding the implementation
of WIA, action on these performance indicators proceeded little beyond
the analysis of the comments received. After the enactment of WIA,
ETA became focused on implementation issues, to include the drafting
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of regulations to implement WIA and the amended Wagner-Peyser Act,
and the development of a performance measurement system for WIA
Title I-B programs. Once again, performance measurement of the labor
exchange ceased to be a top priority for ETA. 
However, upon the enactment of WIA, ETA did not abandon labor
exchange performance measurement entirely. For instance, it funded a
study by Westat, Inc. of the feasibility of developing performance indi-
cators that would express the value of the staff-assisted labor exchange
services provided to clients (Jacobson and Petta 2000). This study of
the effects of referrals and placements on the duration of unemploy-
ment of job seekers in the states of Oregon and Washington revealed
potential for developing performance indicators for the labor exchange
that could be used to monitor net impacts. ETA may consider referring
to this study should it seek to develop measures of the net impact of the
labor exchange. Based on data from the two states, Westat’s analysis re-
vealed that the benefits of providing job seekers with placements out-
weighed the costs by a ratio of 1.8:1. 
In 2000, ETA would engage in yet another initiative aimed at de-
veloping a performance measurement system for the public labor ex-
change. This initiative would have the benefit of learning from all that
had preceded it over the past two decades. It also would operate in an
environment where the performance measurement requirements of oth-
er federal legislation could not be ignored. In partnership with the
SESAs, ETA would develop a new performance measurement system
for the public labor exchange and begin its implementation in PY 2002.
Before discussing the new performance measurement system in detail,
however, it is first useful to discuss briefly the performance accounta-
bility requirements of WIA, for they would have a significant influence
on the development of a system of performance measurement for the
labor exchange.
WIA AND ITS INFLUENCE ON LABOR EXCHANGE
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
In 1998, WIA supplanted JTPA as the primary federally funded
employment and training program administered by ETA. Under WIA,
the delivery of federally funded workforce development programs (in-
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cluding labor exchange services provided under the Wagner-Peyser
Act) is coordinated through state one-stop delivery systems. Title I-B
of WIA authorizes funding for employment and training programs
targeted to adults, dislocated workers, and youth. WIA also establishes
a performance accountability system for Title I-B programs. Many
characteristics of the WIA performance accountability system would
prove influential as ETA developed a performance measurement sys-
tem for labor exchange services provided under the Wagner-Peyser
Act.
The WIA Title I-B performance accountability system specifies
performance measurement requirements for the program at both the
state and local levels. Statutory performance measurement require-
ments for each state include core indicators of performance and cus-
tomer satisfaction indicators, and the establishment of performance
standards for each indicator. It also provides that states may develop ad-
ditional indicators on their own. Under WIA, states were required to in-
clude in their five-year plans the targeted levels of performance they
had established for each of the specified performance indicators for the
first three years that they would administer WIA programs.11 WIA re-
quires states to modify their five-year plans to include performance tar-
gets for the fourth and fifth years of operation prior to the beginning of
the fourth year of the plan. 
ETA has interpreted WIA to require 17 separate performance indi-
cators, although several of these indicators are similarly defined, differ-
ing primarily in the program to which they apply. Several characteris-
tics of the WIA performance accountability system, including the
performance indicators themselves, are relevant for this discussion of
labor exchange performance measurement. 
First, the WIA indicators are applied to programs with respect to in-
dividuals who have completed receiving the services provided under the
relevant program (with the exception of follow-up services). Here, it is
important to note that individuals may receive services under WIA Title
I-B for periods ranging from a number of months to a number of years.
Second, WIA requires that UI wage records be the primary source of
employment and wage information for the core performance indicators.
Third, as mentioned earlier, states are required to include performance
targets for each of the WIA performance indicators in their five-year
strategic or unified plans. Finally, in implementing the performance ac-
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countability system, ETA has provided states with flexibility in develop-
ing their own policies over when participants are to be included in the
measurement pool for performance accountability purposes. Often,
states base this on the level of service participants receive. 
The WIA core performance indicators for the adult, dislocated
worker, and youth (age 19–21) programs are the entered employment
rate, the employment retention rate at six months following entry into
employment, earnings change (or replacement, for dislocated workers),
and a measure of credential attainment. The customer satisfaction indi-
cators apply across programs for individuals served under WIA Title 
I-B. Customer satisfaction of employers is measured with regard to the
services they receive through the one-stop delivery system, regardless
of funding stream.
States are required to prepare annual performance reports, which
must contain information on the core and customer satisfaction indica-
tors, as well as additional longer-term indicators. States also are to in-
clude in their reports information on evaluations that they may conduct
on the operation of the WIA employment and training programs. Final-
ly, WIA also contains other performance measurement and reporting
requirements beyond those described here, such as fiscal and manage-
ment accountability.12
The WIA performance accountability requirements only apply to
those programs funded under Title I-B of WIA, with distinct perfor-
mance indicators for each of the adult, dislocated worker, and youth
funding streams. While these performance indicators are designed to
measure the outcomes of individuals served by each Title I-B funding
stream, they do not account for the extent to which services received
through other one-stop partner programs (e.g., job search assistance
provided under the Wagner-Peyser Act) also have an effect on the out-
comes being measured. Thus, the WIA performance measurement sys-
tem falls short of providing a clear account of the services provided by
and the outcomes jointly attributable to the many one-stop partner pro-
grams serving job seekers in a seamless fashion. In contrast, a compre-
hensive and unified performance measurement system that encom-
passed users of all one-stop partner programs potentially would provide
a far better indication of the extent to which the various components of
the one-stop system contributed to employment outcomes being mea-
sured.
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LABOR EXCHANGE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN
THE 21ST CENTURY
As ETA completed the initial stages of developing and implement-
ing the WIA performance accountability system, it began focusing on
designing and implementing a performance measurement system for
the labor exchange. In early 2000, ETA in partnership with ICESA,13
formed a working group comprised of staff from SESAs, ETA, and the
Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS)14 to develop a
performance measurement system for the labor exchange. The working
group had three tasks: 1) develop a set of performance indicators, 2) re-
vise ETA’s reporting structure to support data collection on labor ex-
change activities for performance measurement, and 3) develop proce-
dures for setting performance standards. The labor exchange
performance measurement and reporting requirements effective for PY
2002 are the product of the working group’s recommendations. Proce-
dures are not yet in place for the establishment of state performance
standards.
Labor Exchange Performance Indicators
At present, ETA’s labor exchange performance measurement sys-
tem consists of four performance indicators and a series of quarterly re-
ports. There are two outcome indicators—the job seeker entered em-
ployment rate, and the job seeker employment retention rate at six
months; and two customer satisfaction indicators—one for job seekers
and one for employers.15 These indicators are substantially similar to
those required under WIA. The labor exchange performance indicators
are presented in Table 4.1.
The entered employment rate measures the percentage of individu-
als registered with the labor exchange who become employed with a
new employer in either of the two quarters following the quarter in
which they registered with the labor exchange. For job seekers with re-
cent employment histories, a new employer is defined as any employer
other than one who employed the job seeker in the quarter prior to the
registration quarter. This indicator is designed to show the success of
the labor exchange both in assisting unemployed workers and those
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new to the labor market find new jobs, and in assisting currently em-
ployed workers find different jobs.
The employment retention rate measures the percentage of job
seekers counted as having entered employment according to the entered
employment rate indicator, who also are employed in the second quar-
ter after they first were counted as having entered employment. Accord-
ing to the indicator, job seekers need not remain employed with the
same employer to be counted as having retained employment, but
rather may be employed by any employer in the time periods specified
in the indicator. This indicator is designed to measure longer-term out-
comes of the labor exchange. Such outcomes might be the result of a
good initial job match, a series of job matches, or a job seeker success-
fully applying job search skills enhanced by the receipt of labor ex-
change services. 
Both the entered employment rate and the employment retention
rate indicators rely on the use of UI wage records to indicate the attain-
ment of the desired employment outcome. For both indicators, in order
for the outcome being measured to be counted, a job seeker’s UI wage
records must contain earnings greater than zero for the appropriate
quarter(s). UI wage records are discussed in further detail below.
To measure customer satisfaction with labor exchange services,
ETA has adopted the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI)
methodology that it requires states to use in measuring satisfaction with
WIA services. In these telephone surveys, job seekers and employers
are asked a series of three questions about their perception of the ser-
vices they received through the one-stop system. The survey is admin-
istered to job seekers 60–90 days after registering with the labor ex-
change; employers are surveyed 30–60 days after listing a job opening.
The job seeker customer satisfaction indicator mirrors the WIA partici-
pant customer satisfaction indicator, with the survey questions being
slightly modified to refer to labor exchange services, rather than those
provided under WIA. As ETA has instructed states to measure employ-
ers’ satisfaction with the services they receive through state one-stop
delivery systems without regard to funding stream, it has decided sim-
ply to use the WIA employer customer satisfaction score as an indicator
of employer satisfaction with labor exchange services. 
ETA has issued a handbook (ET Handbook No. 406) to aid states in
implementing the new labor exchange performance measurement sys-
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Table 4.1  Labor Exchange Performance Indicators
Job Seeker Entered Employment Rate (JSEER):
JSEER = 
Number entered employment with a new employer
[Number new registered job seekers – Number employed or
reemployed with same employer]
Job Seeker Employment Retention Rate at Six Months (JSERR):
JSERR =
Number retained employment two quarters after entered 
employment with a new employer (age 19 and over)
Number entered employment with a new employer 
(age 19 and over)
Job Seeker Customer Satisfaction Score:
Scaled score of the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) survey
administered to job seekers registered with the labor exchange.
Employer Customer Satisfaction Score:
Scaled score of the ACSI survey administered to employers who use one-stop
services.
ETA has encouraged states to report the results of the WIA employer cus-
tomer satisfaction survey for this indicator, as the WIA employer survey
measures employer satisfaction with one-stop services in general, regard-
less of funding stream (e.g., services funded under WIA, the Wagner-
Peyser Act, etc.).
SOURCE: USDOL (2002b, pp. 12–18).
tem. The handbook contains detailed specifications for calculating the
performance indicators and for preparing ETA 9002 quarterly re-
ports—the mechanism for reporting labor exchange performance infor-
mation. Both the handbook and the reports have been completely re-
vised to support the new labor exchange performance measurement
system and are products of ETA’s agencywide data validation project. 
Labor Exchange Performance Measurement 119
Scope of Measurement
Despite developing standardized definitions for each of the perfor-
mance indicators and the data elements for the ETA 9002 quarterly re-
ports, a key characteristic of the labor exchange performance measure-
ment system allows each state to measure services and outcomes
somewhat differently. This is the determination of whom to include in
the population that is counted for performance measurement purposes.
For the performance indicators and the general reporting requirements
applicable to job seekers, ETA has defined the measurement population
as registered job seekers. According to ETA’s ET Handbook No. 406,
registered job seekers are:
Job seekers who complete registration or receive a service with the
labor exchange during a reporting period consisting of four con-
secutive calendar quarters. 
Job seekers may be registered upon contacting the labor ex-
change through the one-stop delivery system or as required by state
law or policy; however, job seekers receiving staff-assisted services
funded under the Wagner-Peyser Act must be registered. Job seek-
ers who use self-services or facilitated self-help services also may
be registered, but this is not required. (USDOL 2002b, p. 8)
Thus, whereas one state might register (and hence count for perfor-
mance measurement purposes), only those job seekers who receive
staff-assisted services funded under the Wagner-Peyser Act, another
state might count all job seekers who receive labor exchange services,
regardless of the method of delivery (e.g., self-services, facilitated self-
help services, or staff-assisted services) or the funding stream under
which they are provided (e.g., Wagner-Peyser Act, WIA Title I-B, Title
38, state funding, etc.). With more job seekers using automated labor
exchange services, however, ETA and the SESAs may wish to reexam-
ine this registration policy and further explore ways to encourage and
facilitate the registration of self-service users. 
ETA has provided similar flexibility to states with respect to the re-
porting of job openings received. Again, according to the ET Handbook
No. 406:
Job openings listed through staff funded under the Wagner-Peyser
Act must be included in the count of job openings. Job openings
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listed through staff of other partner programs may be included
[emphasis in original] in the count of job openings in accordance
with state policy. Job openings initially listed with America’s Job
Bank and imported into the state job bank may be included in the
state’s count of job openings. (USDOL 2002b, p. 9)
This parallels the policy ETA adopted in implementing the WIA
performance accountability system and provides states a degree of flex-
ibility in how they deliver and account for labor exchange services.
However, it also limits ETA’s ability to make comparisons across states
or to compile statistical information at the national level. To make such
comparisons requires taking into account the many differences between
states in how they deliver labor exchange services. 
Unlike for the WIA Title I-B programs, where ETA has interpreted
the statute as requiring performance indicators specific to each funding
stream, for the labor exchange, ETA adopted a policy of using a single
indicator to account for the performance of labor exchange activities
funded under multiple funding streams. Thus, while ETA administers
the labor exchange performance measurement system under authority
of the Wagner-Peyser Act, it does not require states to separately mea-
sure and account for labor exchange services provided to job seekers
with Wagner-Peyser Act funding and services provided under other
funding streams (e.g., WIA Title I-B, Title 38, U.S.C. or state funding). 
This policy limits the suitability of information from the perfor-
mance indicators for use in making comparisons across states or com-
piling into national totals, unless procedures are instituted for account-
ing for these differences across states. It does, however, support the
concept of measuring the performance of the labor exchange as a sys-
tem, rather than a program-specific funding stream. There is some indi-
cation that policymakers desire a system measurement approach that is
supportive of coordinated service delivery across one-stop partner pro-
grams. For example, USGAO has identified a need for system indica-
tors “to gauge the effectiveness of the entire one-stop system” in a re-
port to Congress on WIA performance measurement (USGAO 2002,
p. 28). Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao also has called for systemwide
performance indicators for the one-stop system (USDOL 2002e). Fi-
nally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is considering the
development of crosscutting “common measures” for job training and
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employment programs as part of the President’s Management Agenda
(OMB 2002).
UI Wage Records
To determine whether the employment outcomes necessary to cal-
culate the entered employment rate and employment retention rate indi-
cators have occurred, ETA has adopted a policy of using UI wage
records, similar to that of the WIA performance accountability system.
UI wage records exist for all individuals employed by a firm that is cov-
ered by a state’s UI system. They contain an individual’s social securi-
ty number, total quarterly earnings, and the employer’s identification
number. In many states, information also is provided on hours or weeks
worked. While most employment is covered by the UI system, there are
a number of notable exceptions. These include self-employed individu-
als, military personnel, federal government employees, railroad em-
ployees, and independent contractors. 
The use of UI wage records as a primary source of data for identi-
fying employment outcomes has a number of advantages over individ-
ual follow-up, previously one of the primary means of identifying entry
into employment for individuals receiving employment and training
services. For example, Kornfeld and Bloom (1999, p. 193), using data
from the National JTPA study, found that in estimating program im-
pacts for specific individuals, information obtained from individual fol-
low-up surveys and UI wage records produced similar results. Employ-
ment outcome information also can be obtained much more efficiently
and at less expense from UI wage records than from surveys.
However, using UI wage records to obtain employment outcome
information presents a number of challenges. For instance, there is a
considerable delay between when wages are earned and when UI wage
records become available. This is due to the time allotted for employers
to submit their wage records to the state UI agency and the time it takes
the UI agency to compile the information into its wage record database.
This, combined with the time allotted in the performance indicators for
the employment outcomes to occur, results in performance information
not being available for between one and one and a half years after a job
seeker registers with the labor exchange. This makes it impossible to
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use performance information derived from UI wage records to inform
management decisions and short-term planning. Rather, this informa-
tion may be more useful for long-term planning and in providing infor-
mation for program evaluation.
Another drawback of using wage records is that they are main-
tained separately by each state, which makes it difficult to obtain infor-
mation on individuals who may have crossed state lines in their job
search. To facilitate states’ use of wage records for performance mea-
surement under WIA and the Wagner-Peyser Act, ETA has funded the
development and implementation of the Wage Record Interchange Sys-
tem. WRIS provides states with an efficient means of requesting wage
record data from other states for performance measurement purposes.
A final concern with wage record data is that as administrative data,
they are subject to reporting and recordkeeping errors. Still, the benefits
of using wage records appear to outweigh the costs. The increasing de-
mand for large volumes of employment outcome information makes it
likely that the use of wage records for performance measurement will
continue to grow.
Reporting
ETA requires SESAs to submit quarterly reports (e.g., five ETA
9002 quarterly reports), which contain an array of information about
the performance of the labor exchange. The ETA 9002 A quarterly re-
port contains summary information on the demographic characteristics
of job seekers registered with the labor exchange and the types of ser-
vices provided them. The ETA 9002 B quarterly report contains similar
information for veterans served by the labor exchange.16 Both of these
reports capture information on the number of job seekers served and the
services they have received during a period consisting of four calendar
quarters. 
Information on the entered employment rate, the employment re-
tention rate, and the two customer satisfaction indicators is reported on
the ETA 9002 C quarterly report. This is reported only for the total of
job seekers. More limited outcome information (e.g., the number of job
seekers that entered employment, but not expressed as rates), is report-
ed for job seekers according to a variety of demographic characteris-
tics.17 Performance measurement information on services to veterans is
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reported on the ETA 9002 D quarterly report. This includes the three
performance indicators for services to veterans: 1) the entered employ-
ment rate, 2) the employment retention rate at six months, and 3) the
entered employment rate following receipt of staff-assisted services.
Information from these performance indicators must be reported for
several categories of veterans. 
The employment outcome information reported on the ETA 9002 C
and D reports is derived from UI wage records and customer satisfac-
tion surveys. Because this outcome information cannot be collected un-
til some time after job seekers register with the labor exchange and re-
ceive services, and because of the delays inherent in the use of UI wage
records, the ETA 9002 C and D reports cannot be completed in as time-
ly a fashion as the ETA 9002 A and B reports. In order to receive the
most current data available, ETA has created a reporting schedule under
which SESAs are to complete their reports with the most recent infor-
mation available. As such, the differing reports will contain information
for different cohorts of job seekers. Over time, performance informa-
tion may be analyzed more comprehensively by matching reports ac-
cording to job seeker cohorts.
The ETA 9002 E quarterly report contains information on the types
of job openings listed with the labor exchange. Information on job
openings is displayed in a tabular format and indicates the total number
of jobs listed according to the occupation of each job opening and the
industry of the employer that posted it. Job openings are classified by
occupation using the O*NET-SOC classification system, and are cross-
tabulated according to the North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem industry code of the employer posting the job listing. The ETA
9002 E quarterly report arrays job openings received according to 23
major occupation groups and 20 major industry groups.
LABOR EXCHANGE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
UNDER GPRA
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) re-
quires federal government agencies to set goals, measure performance,
and report on the extent of their success in meeting those goals for the
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programs they operate. Key requirements of GPRA are that agencies
prepare five-year strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual
performance reports. Five-year strategic plans consist of an agency’s
mission statement, its long-term strategic goals, and the means through
which it intends to achieve those goals. Strategic plans are the product
of a strategic planning process, which must include input from stake-
holders. In their strategic plans, agencies are expected to outline exter-
nal factors that might impact the achievement of their goals and to de-
scribe any program evaluations that were used to assist in establishing
their goals. 
Annual performance plans link agencies’ operation and manage-
ment of programs with their strategic plans. As part of their annual per-
formance plans, agencies are required to develop performance goals to
use in gauging their success in meeting their strategic goals. Progress
toward meeting performance goals is assessed with performance indi-
cators. Agencies are required to submit their performance plans to the
OMB, which consolidates them into an overall governmentwide perfor-
mance plan that is submitted to Congress with the president’s budget.
Agencies prepare annual performance reports for the president and
Congress on their success in meeting the goals outlined in their annual
performance plans. Performance reports contain information on the
current year and the three previous years (USGAO 1997, pp. 39–41).
The performance of programs as reported in annual performance re-
ports can be a considerable factor in influencing the budget and appro-
priations processes.
The planning and reporting requirements imposed on federal agen-
cies under GPRA are not insignificant, and agencies must consider how
they might be supported under their own performance measurement
systems. This is especially true in federal grant programs in which fed-
erally funded services are provided by grantees (e.g., the delivery of
employment and training services under WIA Title I-B and the Wagner-
Peyser Act, or aid to disadvantaged students under Title I-A of the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act), rather than directly by federal
agencies themselves (e.g., the provision of social security benefits by
the Social Security Administration). Thus, when agencies that oversee
federal grant programs develop their performance plans and establish
performance goals, they need to consider fully how differences in the
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way grantees provide services might impact performance measurement
at the federal level. 
Establishing agency performance goals based on information col-
lected from a diverse array of grantees can prove challenging. One ap-
proach some agencies have taken is to set a goal of a certain number of
grantees (e.g., states) meeting or exceeding the performance goals that
they have established for themselves based on federal guidelines. As an
example, the U.S. Department of Education has included the following
performance objective as part of its five-year strategic plan: improve
math and science achievement for all students (U.S. Department of Edu-
cation 2002, pp. 44–49). For this objective, it has established perfor-
mance targets for math and science for a variety of demographic groups.
The targets are expressed as the number of states meeting the eighth-
grade achievement targets that the states have set for math and science
for each student group.18 This approach provides states flexibility in al-
lowing them to set their own goals within federal constraints based on
factors such as the mix of resources provided from federal, state, and lo-
cal sources; the rigor of state standards and assessments; and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of student populations. Given considerable differ-
ences between states for each of these factors, the Department of
Education found it more reasonable to measure the number of states
meeting the goals they have established for themselves than attempt to
compile diverse state measurement information into a national measure. 
ETA has established agency performance goals, performance indi-
cators, and performance targets for a number of the employment and
training programs that are administered through grantees. ETA’s perfor-
mance targets for the WIA Title I-B programs are the weighted average
of the statewide performance goals negotiated between the states and
ETA. States include these in their five-year strategic or unified plans
(USDOL 2002a, p. 7). Thus, in its annual performance reports, ETA’s
performance in administering WIA Title I-B is a direct reflection of the
performance of the states as a whole.
For labor exchange services provided under the Wagner-Peyser
Act, ETA was challenged by having to establish agency performance
goals before states did the same. In its FY 2003 annual performance
plan, ETA states its aspirations for the labor exchange as Goal 1.1C:
Improve the outcomes for job seekers and employers who receive pub-
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lic labor exchange services. ETA uses six indicators to measure perfor-
mance toward meeting this goal (Table 4.2).
Absent state performance standards, however, ETA’s agency targets
can be based neither on a certain number of states meeting the standards
they have set for themselves, nor a weighted average of statewide stan-
dards. Rather, ETA has had to establish agency performance targets that
are based on projections or estimates of state labor exchange perfor-
mance. Under this scenario, ETA has set a standard against which to
hold itself accountable, but does not expect the same of the states.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ETA and the states have made great strides toward establishing a
performance measurement system for the public labor exchange. Still,
however, the task is not complete. As this chapter noted earlier, perfor-
mance measurement involves the assessment of the operation of a pro-
gram in order to determine its effectiveness in achieving its intended
purpose and in meeting predetermined performance standards. Absent
clear and defined performance standards, however, measurement and
reporting lack significance. 
Surely ETA and the states will work to finalize the labor exchange
performance measurement system by developing procedures for estab-
lishing clearly defined performance standards against which the deliv-
ery of labor exchange services can be measured. As ETA and the states
do this, they also might consider the following:
• Develop means of adjusting for demographic and economic con-
ditions, as well as differences in state program administration
(e.g., registration policy, state funding levels, coordination
across one-stop partner programs, etc.) to use both in establish-
ing performance standards and for gauging success in meeting
them. Doing so would make for fairer comparisons across states
and also would counteract tendencies for creaming in service de-
livery.
• Develop additional performance indicators for services to em-
ployers, such as the market penetration rate.19
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Table 4.2  Wagner-Peyser Act and America’s Job Bank Performance and Goals
Indicator
Targeted
population Program PY 2003 goal
Job seekers registered with the public labor exchange
will enter employment with a new employer by the
end of the second quarter following registration
Job seekers Wagner-Peyser Act 58%
Job seekers registered with the public labor exchange
will continue to be employed two quarters after
initial entry into employment with a new employer
Job seekers Wagner-Peyser Act 72%
Increase in the total number of job openings listed







Increase in the number of employers that register
with AJB
Employers AJB 286,000
Increase the number of job searches conducted from
AJB by 5% a year
Job seekers AJB 195.4 mil 
(+5%)
Increase the number of resume search conducted
from AJB by 5% a year
Employers AJB 9.45 mil 
(+5%)
SOURCE: USDOL (2002a, p. 14).
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• Reconsider how loosely defined registration procedures should
be, both for the receipt of labor exchange service and within the
one-stop delivery system as a whole.
• Develop performance indicators that apply across the one-stop
delivery system.
• Develop methodologies for linking program benefits to costs to
demonstrate the added value attributable to the operation of the
program.
• Link more closely the performance measurement procedures ap-
plicable to state grantees under the Wagner-Peyser Act and to
ETA under GPRA.
Like the WIA performance measures, the labor exchange perfor-
mance indicators merely capture the outcomes that occur following a
job seeker’s registration with the labor exchange. They do not directly
express the value added by labor exchange services. A registered job
seeker may enter employment and remain employed as a direct result of
using the labor exchange or despite it. Without applying techniques
such as comparison group design in the evaluation of labor exchange
services, the degree to which the public labor exchange improves the
job-matching process remains uncertain. Thus, performance indicators
should not be used in isolation but should be part of a broader strategy
used to monitor and assess the delivery of labor exchange services.
Nonetheless, when properly employed, performance measurement is a
valuable tool for effective program administration and management. 
Notes
Special thanks go to Lou Jacobson, Chris O’Leary, David Balducchi, and Ann Lorde-
man for their helpful comments. The opinions expressed here are those of the author
and should not be construed to represent the position of the Congressional Research
Service, the U.S. Department of Labor, or the W.E. Upjohn Institute. The author is re-
sponsible for all errors and omissions.
1. The Wagner-Peyser Act was amended under WIA (P.L. 105-220) to require labor
exchange services to be provided as part of state one-stop delivery systems. The
WIA also requires states to coordinate the delivery of services provided under
partner programs in their one-stop delivery systems. 
2. O’Leary, Nesporova, and Samorodov (2001, pp. 59–61) provide a cogent summa-
ry of the distinction between performance measurement (or performance moni-
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toring), typically used to track gross outcomes of programs, and net impact esti-
mation, typically used to assess the added value attributable to a program.
3. Previously, the employment service primarily had been engaged in human re-
source development and was focused on serving large numbers of individuals
who were not fully job-ready.
4. A useful discussion of creaming and some of the concerns it raises for perfor-
mance measurement may be found in O’Leary, Nesporova, and Samorodov
(2001, p. 77).
5. The eight local factors were: staff years paid (based on the funding allocation for
the budget year), unemployed individuals (projected for the budget year), unem-
ployed individuals (prior year), youth applicants (prior year), UI claimant appli-
cants (prior year), population, population density, and employment in service oc-
cupations (estimated for the budget year).
6. Sec. 6 of the Wagner-Peyser Act provides that after awarding funds to Guam and
the Virgin Islands, two-thirds of each state’s allocation shall be based on its pro-
portionate share of the total civilian labor force and one-third shall be based on its
proportionate share of unemployed individuals. A hold-harmless of 90 percent of
the prior year allocation and a small-state minimum of 0.28 percent of the total al-
lotment also apply. 
7. Secs. 3(a) and 13(a) of the Wagner-Peyser Act.
8. Sec. 7(b) of the Wagner-Peyser Act; secs. 7(b) and 13(a) were incorporated into
the Wagner-Peyser Act in 1982 by amendment under JTPA (P.L. 97-300). 
9. Real funding adjusted according to GDP (chained) price index, Office of Man-
agement and Budget.
10. Reportable services include referral to jobs and testing, and any service requiring
expenditure of staff time even though not required to be reported (see USDOL
1996b, p. I-1).
11. Among the other requirements of WIA are that states prepare five-year plans for
the implementation and operation of programs authorized under WIA Title I-B
and the Wagner-Peyser Act; or unified five-year plans for programs authorized un-
der WIA Title I-B, the Wagner-Peyser Act, and at least one other one-stop partner
program. 
12. For a more complete description of WIA performance accountability require-
ments, see USDOL (2000a, 2001a).
13. ICESA subsequently has redesignated itself as the National Association of State
Workforce Agencies (NASWA).
14. VETS’s responsibilities include ensuring that veterans are served according to 
the requirements specified under Title 38 of the United States Code (U.S.C.).
VETS administers funding provided under Title 38, U.S.C. for services to veter-
ans to include services provided by Local Veterans’ Employment Representatives
and Disabled Veterans Outreach Program representatives. In addition, veterans
also are required to be given priority for services provided under the Wagner-
Peyser Act. 
15. An additional performance indicator applies only to veterans—the entered em-
ployment rate following receipt of staff-assisted services. While it is used to mea-
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sure outcomes associated with labor exchange services provided under the Wag-
ner-Peyser Act, ETA does not identify it as one of the labor exchange perfor-
mance indicators in ET Handbook No. 406. This indicator was developed by
VETS, and ETA collects information on the indicator to meet the requirements of
Title 38, U.S.C.
16. ETA worked in partnership with VETS to develop the ETA 9002 quarterly re-
ports. Some of the information collected on the reports is reported to ETA in or-
der to document services that are required to be provided to veterans under Title
38, U.S.C.
17. In addition, the entered employment and employment retention rates are reported
for eligible UI claimants. The employment retention rate also is reported for per-
sons with disabilities, migrant and seasonal farmworkers, and dislocated workers.
The number of individuals entering employment (but not rates) is reported for job
seekers according to a number of demographic characteristics, including race,
ethnicity, educational attainment, and age. 
18. The Department of Education has similar goals for reading, high school students,
etc. For other programs, the department sets goals based on nationwide perfor-
mance rather than on state success in meeting state goals. 
19. The market penetration rate would be useful in indicating the number of jobs
listed with public labor exchange as a proportion of total job openings in the
economy. ETA and NASWA explored the viability of the market penetration rate
when developing the current labor exchange performance measurement sys-
tem, but opted not to proceed further until after implementation of the current
system.
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Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Labor Exchange Services
Christopher J. O’Leary
The fundamental goal of public employment programs is to pro-
mote nonsubsidized employment and earnings among participants.
Evaluations of a wide range of active labor market programs across a
variety of countries have produced three essential findings in this re-
gard: 1) job search assistance programs are the most cost-effective; 2)
large-scale public service employment programs are the least effective
and most costly; and 3) job training programs and employment subsi-
dies fall somewhere in between, with the degree of cost-effectiveness
dependent on proper targeting of assistance (Schwanse 2001, p. 22). 
A sizeable share of the research supporting these conclusions was
undertaken in the United States (Martin and Grubb 2001). However, ev-
idence from recent evaluations in Europe are consistent with American
studies, suggesting a broad applicability of lessons learned (Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith 1999, p. 1868). 
With confidence bolstered by robust labor markets in the late 20th
century, and guided partly by evidence from evaluation research, many
nations moved their employment policies in the active direction (Thuy,
Hansen and Price 2001, p. 35). A popular initiative has been to increase
the level of job search activity expected for continued unemployment
compensation eligibility. 
This chapter examines evidence from U.S. evaluations of labor ex-
change activities. To set the context for this discussion, the next two
sections review the elements of the labor exchange function and the
composition of public labor exchange customers. This is followed by a
brief overview of methodologies for labor exchange program evalua-
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tion. The next three sections provide summaries of evaluation research
grouped into the main themes of studies which have been done: job in-
terview referrals, job search assistance, and targeted job search assis-
tance. The final section offers a summary and some conclusions.1
THE LABOR EXCHANGE FUNCTION OF THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
Public employment services around the world have four main func-
tions: 1) labor exchange; 2) administration of unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits; 3) management of active labor market programs; and 4)
labor market information (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001, p. 27). The
first of these is the main function of the federal–state Employment Ser-
vice (ES) in the United States. A crucial role of the ES in UI adminis-
tration is testing the continued job readiness of beneficiaries. 
Public labor exchange services in the United States are delivered
through a network of local offices that operate within a federal–state
system. The federal partner, the U.S. Employment Service (USES), co-
operates with 54 state ES agencies to oversee the system. In addition to
the 50 states, the network includes the District of Columbia, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of Guam and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. 
The ES provides information to both the supply and demand sides
of the job market, which can increase the speed of matches between
qualified job seekers and employers wanting to fill specific job vacan-
cies. By bridging the information gap, and speeding matches, the level
of economic activity and employment can expand faster than otherwise
possible. 
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 required the ES to be a part-
ner in one-stop centers for public employment services in each work-
force investment area around the country. There are currently about 600
workforce investment areas in operation. In addition to the ES, each
one-stop center must provide access to programs for UI; disadvantaged,
dislocated worker, and youth training; welfare-to-work; veterans em-
ployment and training; adult education; postsecondary vocational edu-
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cation; vocational rehabilitation; Title V of the Older Americans Act;
and Trade Adjustment Assistance. 
Services offered at one-stop centers are divided into three levels:
core, intensive, and training. Services within each level are character-
ized by the amount of staff involvement and the extent to which cus-
tomers can access the service independently. Core services typically
have the broadest access and the least staff involvement of the three cat-
egories. Intensive services require a greater level of staff involvement,
and consequently, access is generally more limited than for core ser-
vices. Training services involve the highest level of service intensity
and are open to customers only through referrals.
The core services are the least costly to deliver and include most ES
services; many are accessible on a self-serve basis. Table 5.1 provides
an overview of ES service use during the 1999 program year, which ex-
tended from July 1999 through June 2000. In that 12-month period at
the end of the 1990s business expansion, 16.7 million people applied
for public labor exchange services in the United States. Among those
Table 5.1  Public Labor Exchange Data for the United States PY 1999 
(July 1, 1999–June 30, 2000)











Referred to skills training 395,589 173,779
Entered employment 3,601,620 1,116,840
Placed 1,771,107 359,366
Obtained employment 2,029,411 822,906
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001).
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who applied, 65.5 percent received some reportable service; many oth-
ers availed themselves of self-service activities, which go unrecorded. 
The four categories of reportable services tracked by the USES
(and their percentage use among applicants receiving some reportable
service in program year 1999) are: 1) referred to employment—sent to
a job interview with an employer who listed a job vacancy opening
(61.5 percent); 2) received job search activities—resume preparation
assistance, job search workshops, job finding clubs, provision of specif-
ic labor market information, and development of a job search plan (61.3
percent); 3) assessment services provided—assessment interview, em-
ployment counseling or testing (16.2 percent); and 4) referred to skills
training—referred to any federal, state, or locally funded job skills
training program (3.6 percent).
In nearly all states, UI claimants must register for job search with
the ES in order to establish and/or maintain eligibility for weekly bene-
fits. This linkage between the UI and ES programs is part of what is
called the “work test” in UI, and it has been a key area of labor ex-
change evaluation research. Interventions which speed return to work
by UI beneficiaries can generate significant savings in UI benefit pay-
ment expenditures. 
Table 5.1 shows that in program year 1999, UI claimants made 
up 36.9 percent of ES customers. Column 3 of the table displays the
number of UI claimants using various reportable employment services.
Compared to all ES applicants, a smaller fraction of UI claimants actual-
ly received some reportable service. Among UI claimants, 71.1 percent
with some reportable service received job search assistance (JSA), com-
pared to 61.3 percent among all ES applicants. 
The higher JSA usage rate may be due in part to the Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems that began op-
eration in all states in 1995. WPRS identifies UI claimants who are 
not job attached and who are likely to exhaust their UI benefit en-
titlement, and quickly refers them to job search orientation and assis-
tance. Benefit payments are suspended for those profiled and referred
who fail to report for job search. This targeted job search assistance 
is one of the evaluated program innovations discussed later in this
chapter. 
The bottom rows of Table 5.1 are a type of gross outcome perfor-
mance monitoring data. The outcome definitions are specific to the ES.
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“Entered employment” is the number of UI claimants who become em-
ployed after having received a “reportable service.” A “job placement”
occurs when someone begins employment after being referred for a job
interview. Those who “obtained employment” had received some re-
portable service other than direct referral to a job opening. When inter-
preting these results, it should be noted that most employers who solic-
it job seeker referrals from the ES require that more than one candidate
be sent for an interview. In the absence of such employer requests, the
placement rate would probably be higher. 
Establishing UI benefit entitlement requires a significant level of
recent employment and earnings. It means that UI beneficiaries have a
higher degree of prior labor force attachment than other ES applicants.
These two factors might explain the higher obtained employment rate
and lower placement rate among claimants compared to nonclaimants.
Employer attachment may make new job offers less attractive, and ob-
tained employment counts probably include return to prior employers
even after receiving some reportable service. 
However, such interpretation of gross outcomes is mere specula-
tion. The focus of this chapter is on comparison group design evalua-
tions. As stated in the introduction, the bulk of comparison group stud-
ies of labor exchange services have been in three areas: job interview
referrals, job search assistance, and targeted job search assistance. The
latter two of these have focused on UI claimants but are believed to
have broad applicability. 
CUSTOMERS OF THE LABOR EXCHANGE
The labor exchange serves both sides of the job market: job seekers
looking for work and employers looking to hire. This balanced cus-
tomer view is evidenced in the layout of the Internet-based public labor
exchange—America’s Job Bank (www.ajb.org). America’s Job Bank
(AJB) offers both job seeker and employer services customized for
each state and local labor market. 
AJB services available to the supply side of the labor market (job
seekers) include: searching a database of around one million jobs na-
tionwide, creating and posting a resume online, and setting up an auto-
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mated job search (or job scout). AJB services offered to the demand
side of the labor market (employers) include searching an extensive re-
sume database, posting available job openings, getting advice on writ-
ing job vacancy announcements, and conducting an automated search
for potential employees (a resume scout). In late August 2002, the Web
site listed the following inventory:
• Number of new jobs today: 28,566 
• Number of new resumes today: 270 
• Total jobs available: 938,611 
• Total available resumes: 408,790 
On the supply side of the labor market, labor exchange customers
can be divided into three distinct groups: 1) UI claimants who are re-
ferred to WPRS; 2) other UI claimants; 3) and ES applicants not eligi-
ble for UI. A summary of the background characteristics of ES appli-
cants during program year (PY) 1999 (July 1999 to June 2000) is given
in Table 5.2. This table contrasts PY 1999 ES customers with all unem-
ployed during calendar year 2000 in terms of demographic characteris-
tics. By gender and race, ES registration for job search occurs at rates
similar to the group proportions among all unemployed. However,
compared to their share among all unemployed, youth are a smaller
share of ES customers, while the less educated are a greater share of job
seeking customers. 
Labor exchange customers on the demand side of the labor market
are employers. About one-third of all U.S. employers use the ES for re-
cruiting employees (Holzer 1998, pp. 9–10). The distribution by indus-
try of the nearly 7.5 million job openings listed with the ES in program
year 1999 can be seen in Table 5.3. The table shows that industry shares
of job listings differ from industry shares of employment. There are ap-
preciably larger shares of job listings than employment for three partic-
ular industry groups: 1) agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 2) services;
and 3) public administration. Public administration probably has a high
listing rate because of government requirements for publicly posting
job vacancies. High usage rates for the first two industries listed may be
partly explained by high employee turnover rates in these industries,
but much of the differences across industries may be attributable to the
occupational mix of employment within industries. 
Employers in industries which tend to employ higher cost labor
may be more willing to incur direct monetary costs for job matching
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Table 5.2  Characteristics of Applicants for Employment Service
Programs, PY 1999 and Annual Average Monthly
Unemployed, 2000
ES applicants All unemployed
Number Percent Number Percent
Age—Youth (under 22) 2,305,938 13.8 1,303,000 23.0
Age—Older (over 54) 1,367,086 8.2 478,000 8.5
Gender—Female 7,710,699 46.1 2,701,000 47.8
Race—Black 3,588,649 21.5 1,269,000 22.4
Race—Hispanic 2,116,289 12.7 876,000 15.5
Education—Less than high
school
3,220,905 19.3 771,000 13.6
Education—Post–high school
degree/certificate
2,344,471 14.0 854,000 15.1
Total 16,708,228 100.0 100.0
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001) and <http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm>.
5,655,000
Table 5.3  ES Job Openings Listed by Industry, PY 1999 Average
Monthly Employment by Industry, 2000
Job openings Employment
Industry categories Listed Share Number Share
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 356,158 4.9 2,017,000 1.5
Mining 22,112 0.3 567,000 0.4
Construction 344,512 4.8 9,581,000 7.2
Manufacturing 964,456 13.3 18,970,000 14.2
Transportation and utilities 429,565 5.9 9,738,000 7.3
Wholesale trade 234,081 3.2 5,102,000 3.8
Retail trade 964,970 13.3 22,571,000 16.9
Finance, insurance, and real estate 223,802 3.1 8,797,000 6.6
Services 3,168,768 43.8 50,345,000 37.6
Public administration 524,800 7.3 6,125,000 4.6
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001) and <http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm>.
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services, because the costs associated with a poor match would be
greater for an employer paying higher wages. Similarly, job seekers in
higher-wage labor markets may believe that paying agency fees will
buy them access to preferred job opportunities. Low-paying jobs neces-
sarily trade in a market where transactions costs are low. Services of the
public labor exchange are provided for free. Because the ES provides
job-matching services free of charge, they may also be used by em-
ployers who can quickly and adequately assess qualifications objective-
ly through means like a resume, professional certification, licenses, or a
standardized test score. 
The occupational mix of job vacancies listed and filled by the ES in
PY 1999 are reported in Table 5.4. Job listings span the range of occu-
pations; however, the fill rates differ across occupations. The ES was
successful in filling more than 40 percent of job vacancy listings in
three occupational groups: domestic services, processing, and materials
handling. These figures square with the industry mix information. Do-
mestic services, other services, and package and materials handling are
all main occupations in the services industry. Processing occupations
are a major employment component of the manufacturing industry,
which is also a good customer of the public labor exchange. 
EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS
Performance measurement of labor exchange activities, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 of this volume, concerns methods for tracking out-
comes experienced by program participants. Such data on gross pro-
gram outcomes are gathered in a consistent manner across all localities
on a regular basis. This information is the foundation for management
systems driven by objectives. Such information can help in program
planning and management.
In contrast to performance management systems, the evaluation
studies examined in this chapter all involve a comparison group design
which permits estimation of the incremental effect of an intervention.
The methodology, called net impact estimation, contrasts postprogram
labor market outcomes of participants against an appropriately chosen
counterfactual.
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Table 5.4  Job Opening Listings by Occupation Received and Filled by
the U.S. Employment Service, PY 1999
Job openings
Occupation categories Received Filled
Percent
filled
Professional, technical, and managerial 1,120,430 136,235 12.2
Clerical 1,479,820 312,961 21.1
Sales 585,145 100,511 17.2
Domestic services 50,643 23,227 45.9
Other services 1,194,364 269,169 22.5
Farming, forestry, and fishing 297,151 98,311 33.1
Processing 344,807 158,593 46.0
Machine trades 341,424 107,074 31.4
Bench work 387,940 142,793 36.8
Structural 604,813 178,433 29.5
Motor freight 206,861 55,249 26.7
Transportation 108,201 19,881 18.4
Package and materials handling 666,534 282,719 42.4
Other 64,541 15,814 24.5
Total 7,452,674 1,900,970 25.5
SOURCE: U.S. Employment Service (2001).
For evaluating labor exchange programs, this means that personal
and labor market characteristics enabling success are roughly equiva-
lent in the two groups. Appropriate comparison group specification can
be achieved by proper sample selection or through statistical means;
that is, either by classical field experiments involving random assign-
ment or by quasi-experimental statistical methods. 
Classically designed experiments are the ideal for net impact esti-
mation. If random assignment is achieved, modeling of behavior and
complex econometric methods are not needed to obtain estimates.2
With large samples randomly assigned to treatment and control groups,
observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups should
not differ on average, so that any difference in outcomes may be attrib-
uted to the program. Program impacts may be measured as the simple
difference between the means of the samples of program participants
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and of control group members on measures of outcomes. Because this
process is easy to understand, impact estimates computed this way can
be very influential in informing policy.
When there is nonrandom assignment to either a program partici-
pant group or the comparison group, then to estimate the net impact of
a program properly, statistical methods of correction must be used to
offset selection bias. Such quasi-experimental evaluations are done be-
cause they are cheaper and can be done more quickly than classical ex-
periments. They can often be performed using existing administrative
data, which helps control evaluation costs. 
The main challenge in quasi-experimental net impact evaluations
concerns adequately dealing with the problem of selection bias. A pop-
ular approach to dealing with this problem was proposed by Heckman
(1976), who characterized selection as an unobservable variable distin-
guishing program participants from nonparticipants. Other approaches
involve strategically selecting a comparison group by matching charac-
teristics of program participants with nonparticipants who appear to be
otherwise similar. Such matching may be done on a set of characteris-
tics or on a single summary measure of several characteristics (Heck-
man, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). 
While performance monitoring of gross outcomes is a basis for
program management, net impact estimation is a basis for policy devel-
opment. Policy decisions concerning questions of whether to continue,
expand, curtail, or cancel government employment programs require
information about the return on government spending—the return on
investment. Such cost–benefit analysis of programs requires measure-
ment of net impacts. 
Net impact evaluations are not without potential problems, even if
the evaluation is done under the ideal conditions of a field experiment.
The first type of potential pitfall is called internal validity problems. In
the context of an experiment, internal validity problems include errors
in conducting random assignment to treatment and control groups, and
inconsistent experimental conditions. The first of these can lead to lack
of homogeneity across groups; the second means that the same treat-
ment was not applied in all cases. One problem of this type is called
dropout bias, wherein a customer believed to be provided an experi-
mental treatment in fact did not receive the service. The converse prob-
lem is called substitution bias, wherein a control group member actual-
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ly receives the treatment, but through an unobserved channel (Heckman
et al. 2000). 
The second type of evaluation pitfall is called external validity
problems. These affect the ability to transfer estimates from the evalua-
tion context to the actual policy context. Time horizon effects can occur
when treatment subjects understand that the experimental service is
only temporary rather than permanent. Learning effects can take place
within a community during the course of an evaluation whereby the
first enrollees act differently from those enrolled some time after the
evaluation begins. Entry effects not observed during an evaluation can
emerge when an appealing service becomes generally available to a
customer population. Hawthorne effects are responses to treatments
simply due to the special attention,3 not to the content of service. Dis-
placement effects, which may be the most critical external validity con-
cern, occur, for example, when participants in an evaluation improve
their outcome at the expense of others who are not part of the evalua-
tion.4
EFFECTIVENESS OF JOB INTERVIEW REFERRALS
The main activity of the public labor exchange in the United States
is job interview referrals. In PY 1999, 61.5 percent of customers na-
tionwide receiving an ES service were given a job interview referral.
About half of those customers were identified as subsequently entering
employment. However, such gross outcome assessments do not indi-
cate the value added by job interview referrals from the ES. 
In the past 20 years, three major studies of the ES in the United
States have estimated the additional value provided by job interview re-
ferrals from the public labor exchange (Johnson et al. 1983; Katz 1991;
Jacobson and Petta 2000). A summary of the designs, samples used,
and main findings from each of these studies is provided in Table 5.5.
Each of the three studies framed the question of job referral effec-
tiveness differently, but all three used a quasi-experimental approach.
Random trial evaluations were ruled out because job interview referrals
are a right to all ES applicants and cannot be denied simply to create a
control group for experimental measurement. In reviewing these stud-
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Table 5.5  Studies on the Effectiveness of Job Interview Referrals
Author/title Design Sample Findings
Johnson et al. (1983) A National 
Evaluation of the Impact of the 
United States Employment 
Service
P1: ES job referral 
P2: Early ES job 
referrral 




30 offices in 27 
states
July 1980 to 
May 1981 
8,000 ES applicants
P1: 23**% earnings gain for all 
women, UI claimants, and non-
claimants.  Nil impacts for men.
P2: Large earnings gains for women,
modest earnings gains for men.  
Among men, bigger effects for 
men over 45 and in urban areas. 
Comments: Displacement effects 
possible.  Results not affected by 
selectivity bias correction. Com-
parison group somewhat 
advantaged.  
Katz (1991) The Length of Job-
lessness and the ES: With 
Special Reference to Phila-
delphia and Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania 1979–1987.
P1: ES placements 
P2: ES job referral 
C: No ES services
Pennsylvania:
1979–1987
5% sample of UI 
recipients, 16,470 
jobless spells 
P1: Reductions in duration of job-
lessness increased with time delay 
in applying for ES.  Up to –23.7** 
weeks.
P2: Reductions in duration of job-
lessness increased with time delay 
in applying for ES.  Up to –20.5** 
weeks. 
Similar impacts in combination with 
JSA. Comments: Must control for 
delay in application, ES as a back-
stop, JSA most effective early.
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Jacobson and Petta (2000) Mea-
suring the Effect of Public 
Labor Exchange (PLX) Refer-
rals and Placements in Wash-
ington and Oregon.
P1: Job placements 
C1: Job referrals 
P2: Job referrals 
C2: Not referred
Washington: survey 
of 587 early 1998,
administrative 
data on 328,815 
spells, 1987 to 
mid-1995
Oregon: administra-




P1: Strong work record –7.2 weeks,
weak work record –3.8 weeks 
Washington administrative data:
P1: –7.7 weeks.  P2: –2.1 weeks
Oregon administrative data:
P1: –4.6 weeks.  P2: –1.1 weeks.
NOTE: P: participant group; C: comparison group. 
** Statistically significant at the 95 percent level in a two-tailed test.
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ies and their findings, we see how research has informed employment
policy in the United States. 
A National Evaluation of the ES in the United States
In the early 1980s, the U.S. Department of Labor sponsored a ma-
jor nation-wide evaluation of the effectiveness of the ES (Johnson et al.
1983; Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985). Baseline interviews were
conducted with 8,000 new applicants in 30 ES offices nation-wide (in
27 states) between July 1980 and May 1981. To measure outcomes,
personal in-home follow-up interviews were conducted six to nine
months later.
Because not all ES registrants receive a reportable service, a natural
contrast for evaluation existed. Those who received ES services (partic-
ularly job referrals) were compared to those who did not receive re-
portable ES services. The latter group may have perused job vacancy
listings or done some other self-service activity. Success was measured
on two labor market outcomes: earnings and the time from ES applica-
tion to first job. 
Statistical tests for differences in observable characteristics be-
tween service recipients and non-recipients showed the two groups to
be quite similar. In fact, those not receiving ES services appeared to be
somewhat more job ready than service recipients. The researchers as-
serted that the slightly more advantaged comparison group imparted a
downward bias on estimated ES impacts. Estimates were computed
controlling for a long list of observable characteristics commonly mea-
sured for ES customers, and three additional variables were constructed
from responses to special quizzes administered for the evaluation proj-
ect. There was also an attempt to apply a Heckman (1976) type selec-
tivity bias correction; however, no suitable ES participation instruments
were found. That is, no variables adequately explained ES program use
independent of predicting subsequent labor market outcomes. After es-
timating impacts using a variety of sample definitions and statistical
techniques, the authors assert the estimates presented to be robust to a
wide range of alternative assumptions. 
Overall job interview referrals were found to be effective by in-
creasing earnings and reducing the time until return to work. However,
the bulk of these benefits were found to be concentrated among female
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Labor Exchange Services 149
users of ES services. A 23 percent increase in earnings was estimated
for female service users, who returned to work nearly three weeks
sooner than women not using ES services. The impacts for women
were similar regardless of whether or not they were UI beneficiaries.
The estimated impacts for men were nil.
A finer distinction in the treatment was also investigated. When the
job referral is soon after ES application, impacts are still large for wo-
men and become somewhat positive for men. For this early ES inter-
vention, two particular subgroups among men had larger impacts: those
over 45 and those in urban areas. There were no differences for men
who were union or job attached. Subgroup analysis revealed no differ-
ential effects between groups of women. About the effects for women,
the authors speculate that “[p]art of the reason may be that women have
less labor market experience and less access to the traditional network
of job finding methods and that an ES referral constitutes more of a ser-
vice for women” (Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985 p. 136). In con-
cluding, the study authors cautioned that their analysis focused on only
partial equilibrium impact estimates and did not consider possible labor
market displacement effects or other general equilibrium aspects of im-
pact estimation. 
Effectiveness of the ES for Dislocated Workers in Pennsylvania
The National Commission for Employment Policy sponsored re-
search that exploited an uncommon feature of UI to estimate the effec-
tiveness of ES for dislocated workers in Pennsylvania (Katz 1991). The
study used data on UI recipients in Pennsylvania during the period
1979–1987. In those years Pennsylvania claimants were not required to
register for job search with the ES. Most states require ES registration
of UI claimants as part of their work test to reduce moral hazard
(Blaustein, O’Leary, and Wandner 1997, pp. 28–29). 
Program effects were estimated by comparing labor market out-
comes of ES users against nonusers of ES. ES users had lower prior
earnings and longer periods of joblessness but were otherwise observa-
tionally similar to nonusers of ES services. A 5 percent random sample
of Pennsylvania UI recipients during years 1979–1987 yielded quarter-
ly data on 16,470 jobless spells nearly equally split between the two
largest cities in the state (8,198 Philadelphia; 8,272 Pittsburgh). De-
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scriptive characteristics of claimants in the samples were similar across
cities. 
By using a sample of UI claimants, the study contributed to delib-
erations on policy for dislocated workers who emerged as an important
program target group in the wake of the 1980s restructuring wave. UI
beneficiaries tend to have higher recent earnings and a stronger labor
force attachment than the average ES customer seeking work. This evi-
dence was viewed as a supplement to the national ES evaluation that
covered the entire pool of ES job seekers (Johnson et al. 1983; Johnson,
Dickinson, and West 1985). 
In addition to studying job interview referrals, the Pennsylvania
study also examined job search assistance (resume assistance, job
search workshops, job finding clubs, labor market information, and job
search planning) and job placements. Methods for measuring effects of
the latter must be clearly stated, as a job placement can be considered
an outcome by itself. The effects of ES services given in a particular
quarter were checked in subsequent quarters. Essentially, the durability
of an ES job placement was measured against that resulting from other
avenues of job finding. Katz (1991, p. 22) states that “[i]t is important
to note that an ES placement does not automatically imply an end to
joblessness as defined for this study. If an applicant was placed in any
given quarter, he/she would need to remain employed in the subsequent
quarter to be re-employed.”
Net impact estimates were computed in regression models control-
ling for differences in observable characteristics. Investigation of the
timing of using ES services revealed distinct patterns in effects. Job
search assistance was most effective right after the start of a spell of
joblessness. It was estimated to save up to 8.4 weeks of joblessness if
used within the first calendar quarter following job separation. 
Both job placements and referrals were found to be most effective
two or three calendar quarters after commencement of joblessness. For
users after two quarters, placements shortened jobless durations by an
estimated 14.8 to 20.7 weeks, while referrals shortened durations by an
estimated 10.5 and 13.2 weeks. For users after three quarters, place-
ment impact estimates were as large as –23.7 weeks, and with impact
estimates for job referrals between –14.8 and –20.5 weeks. Given their
huge magnitude, all the estimates were statistically significant. Place-
ments or referrals combined with JSA were estimated to have similar
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effects. The direction of impact estimates for ES services is consistent
with other research, but the estimated magnitude of impacts is much
larger than anything else reported in the literature. 
The key insight gained from this study regards the response to in-
terventions at differing times in the jobless spell. The pattern that
emerged led the study author to describe the ES as a “backstop,” or a
job-finding path followed when others have yielded no appealing
prospects. “The effectiveness of the ES appeared to be much less a
function of the characteristics of individual workers than the overall
length of their joblessness” (Katz 1991, p. 21).
While results of this study are qualitatively consistent with other
ES evaluations, the size of the impact estimates are astounding, being
nearly three times as large as the ES impact estimate for women pro-
duced by Johnson et al. (1983) and Johnson, Dickinson, and West
(1985). Any government program producing such success would likely
be swamped with applicants and government funding.
Effectiveness of Referrals and Placements in Washington 
and Oregon
During the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Labor sponsored re-
search to estimate the benefits derived from matching job seekers to
openings listed by employers with the public labor exchange in Wash-
ington and Oregon. The study comprised investigations using three data
sets, two from Washington and one from Oregon. The data for Wash-
ington consisted of survey data on 587 job seekers who used the public
labor exchange in the first half of 1998, plus administrative data on
328,815 jobless spells that occurred between 1987 and the middle of
1995. The Oregon data were based on administrative records for
138,280 jobless spells in 1995. 
Analysis of job placements using the Washington survey data re-
vealed differences in impacts across ES customers depending on their
recent patterns of job attachment. For job seekers characterized as hav-
ing a spotty work record, the impact of a job placement was estimated
to be –3.8 weeks, while the impact estimate was –7.2 weeks for those
with a strong work record. 
Impact estimation based on the administrative data did not distin-
guish between job seekers with spotty or strong work records. The im-
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pact of job placements based on the Washington data was estimated to
be –7.7 weeks, and the estimate based on Oregon data was –4.6 weeks.
These estimates of job placement impacts based on administrative data
were viewed as broadly consistent with those from the Washington sur-
vey data. 
The impact of job referrals based on the Washington administrative
data was estimated to be –2.1 weeks, and the estimate based on Oregon
data was –1.1 weeks. An ES job placement can be distinguished from a
job referral by the resources required to deliver the service. Nonethe-
less, the estimated cost of delivering either referrals or placements was
low relative to impact estimates so that benefit–cost ratios were com-
puted to exceed one for both interventions. The authors assert this to be
sufficient justification for further public investment in ES activities.
Concern about the degree to which the Washington and Oregon ES
evaluations were externally valid regarding displacement led to a relat-
ed study. Davidson and Woodbury (2000) used a computerized simula-
tion model of the labor market called a general equilibrium search and
matching model (Davidson and Woodbury 1993). They calibrated the
model with labor market data from Washington State and with impact
estimates of Washington public labor exchange (PLX) services (Jacob-
son and Petta 2000). “The crowding-out effects of PLX referral and
placement activities are small both absolutely and relative to the in-
creases in employment that result from PLX activities . . . the benefits
generated by PLX referral and placement activities outweigh the costs.
The benefits again are twofold: shorter unemployment spells for PLX
users and general improvements in the labor market that result from
PLX activities” (Davidson and Woodbury 2000, pp. 19–20). 
EFFECTIVENESS OF JOB SEARCH ASSISTANCE
Job search assistance comprises a bundle of services available from
the public labor exchange which may include resume preparation assis-
tance, job-finding clubs, provision of specific labor market information,
development of a job search plan, and orientation to self-service re-
sources (job vacancy listings, resume preparation, word processor com-
petency testing, and telephones for contacting employers). In evalua-
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tions of JSA, job search workshops (JSW) are treated as a distinct ser-
vice. 
Three specific evaluations of JSA performed in the past 20 years
have been particularly influential in shaping public labor exchange pol-
icy. The designs, samples, and findings from these studies are given in
Table 5.6. All three evaluations were done as field experiments involv-
ing random assignment. As mentioned above, evaluations of job refer-
rals and placements have not applied an experimental design due to the
untenable design requirement of withholding from the control group
basic services having universal entitlement. Consequently, JSA evalua-
tions have focused on UI claimants and have usually involved provid-
ing additional services. 
It is well documented that in performing its income replacement
function, UI acts as a disincentive to rapid return to work (Decker
1997). The work test that links the UI and ES programs in the United
States is an institutional mechanism for monitoring whether UI benefi-
ciaries are available and actively seeking work. The JSA evaluations
have investigated various approaches to improving the effectiveness of
the work test for UI. 
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment
The first field experiment addressing aspects of the UI work test in
the United States began enrollment in February 1983 in Charleston,
South Carolina. Random assignment of 5,675 new initial UI claimants
to three treatment groups and a control group was completed in De-
cember 1983. The experiment was designed to evaluate new procedures
intended to improve the UI work test and enhance ES practices. The
three treatments tested represented successively larger bundles of ser-
vices. This design permitted contrasts against each other as well as
against the single control group. 
Claimants assigned to the control group were given the customary
work test, which involved informing claimants that ES registration was
required but involved no systematic monitoring of this requirement.
The three treatments in Charleston were:
1) A strengthened work test. This test required that an ES registra-
tion notice be sent after the first UI benefit check was paid,
154Table 5.6  Studies on the Effectiveness of Job Search Assistance
Author/title Design Sample Findings
Corson, Long, and Nicholson 
(1985) Evaluation of the 
Charleston Claimant Place-
ment and Work Test Demon-
stration
T1: Stronger work 
test 
T2: T1 plus en-
hanced placement 
services 
T3: T2 plus JSW 
C: Customary work 
test
Charleston, SC 




T1: –0.55* weeks UI 
T2: –0.61** weeks UI 
T3: –0.76** weeks UI 
Impacts greater on men and con-
struction workers.
Johnson and Klepinger (1991) 
Evaluation of the Impacts of 








C: Existing work 
search policy
Tacoma, WA 
July 1986 to August 
1987 
T: 6,763 C: 2,871
T1: +3.34** weeks UI 
T2: +0.17 weeks UI 
T3: –0.47* weeks UI 
Exits increased preceding required 
service participation.
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Klepinger et al. (1998) Evalua-
tion of the Maryland Unem-
ployment Insurance Work 
Search Demonstration
T1: Report four em-
ployer contacts 
weekly 
T2: Two contacts re-
quired weekly, but 
no reporting 
T3: Report two con-
tacts weekly plus 
a four day JSW 
T4: Report two con-








but told data was 











T1: –0.7** weeks UI 
T2: +0.4* weeks UI 
T3: –0.6** weeks UI 
T4: –0.9** weeks UI 
Impacts identical against either con-
trol group, suggesting no Haw-
thorne effect present. Treatments 
1, 3 and 4 had no earnings im-
pacts. 
Treatment 2 raised earnings by 4** 
percent.
NOTE: T: experimental treatment group; C: experimental control group; JSW: job search workshop.
* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant at the 95 percent level in a two-
tailed test.
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with payment of the second check suspended for failure to reg-
ister with the ES. This required establishment of improved data
sharing systems between UI and ES.
2) A strengthened work test plus enhanced placement services;
such as a personal placement interview within one week of the
first UI check, a job referral or an outreach attempt to contact a
prospective employer (job development), and training in using
the job vacancy listings. Treatment assigned claimants were
also told they would be called for special services again once
they drew nine weeks of benefits. 
3) A strengthened work test, enhanced placement services, a
three-hour JSW, and, after four weeks of UI benefits, a JSW on
labor market information.
The strengthened work test had the greatest impact. It alone short-
ened the duration of compensated joblessness by more than half a week;
the impact estimate was –0.55 weeks of UI benefits. This effect was sta-
tistically significant, but not significantly different from the estimated
effect of the second treatment. The addition of enhanced placement ser-
vices resulted in an impact estimate of –0.61 weeks, or an insignificant
increase over the strengthened work test alone. The impact estimate for
the third treatment, which added JSWs, was –0.76 weeks of UI benefits,
a modest incremental effect over either of the other treatments. 
Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men who aver-
aged impacts of greater than –1.0 weeks for all treatments, and among
workers in the construction industry, who had impacts of over –4.0
weeks. The relatively low cost of treatments resulted in jaw-dropping
benefit–cost ratios in excess of 4. That is, more than $4.00 in UI benefit
payments were saved for every dollar spent on the work test, JSA, and
JSW services. The third treatment, which involved the largest number
of components, had an average cost of only $17.58 in 1983 dollars. 
In 1969 the UI trust fund was added to the federal unified budget.
Conservation of UI funds consequently improves the overall budget
picture. In the 1980s political environment of huge federal deficits, the
Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment drew atten-
tion to the strengthened work test, JSA, and JSW as appealing policy
tools. These instruments offered the potential of providing positive ser-
vices while conserving UI trust fund dollars.
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Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment
Effects of the UI work test and related services of the public labor
exchange were further investigated by a field experiment with random
assignment between July 1986 and August 1987 in Tacoma, Washing-
ton, job service centers. A total of 6,763 UI claimants were assigned to
one of three treatments, and 2,871 claimants were assigned to the con-
trol group, which followed the existing Washington State work search
policy. 
The standard work search rule required three employer contacts per
week plus an eligibility review interview (ERI) 13–15 weeks after the
initial claim was filed. This ERI involved a one-hour group session fol-
lowed by a 15-minute individual interview. The focus of both sessions
was on UI eligibility. The three treatments in Tacoma were:
1) Exception reporting—a complete relaxation of the work test.
Claimants were not required to file the standard biweekly con-
tinued UI claim form, and were told that UI payments would
continue until the claimant reported a change in circum-
stances, such as return to work or an increased level of earn-
ings. 
2) New work search policy—individualized work search require-
ments, including a group ERI followed by an intensive one-on-
one follow-up interview. 
3) Intensive services—individualized work search requirements
(treatment 2), plus a two-day JSW after 4 weeks (two days of
classroom instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing), plus
a group ERI after 12 weeks with a focus on employability de-
velopment, plus individual follow-up. 
Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier
than planned because the larger than expected response could easily be
detected with a sample much smaller than designed. Claimants were re-
lieved of the work test, and continued claim filing increased their weeks
of UI benefits drawn by a statistically significant 3.34 weeks. This im-
pact was bigger for women with children and men without children,
and for married women and unmarried men. 
The new work search policy providing custom-tailored services
and schedules had an effect on UI benefit receipt of +0.17 weeks, and
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was statistically indistinguishable from the existing standard work
search rule applied uniformly to all claimants. 
Treatment number three, which was customized and had a JSW af-
ter 4 weeks and an ERI after 12 weeks, had a statistically significant
impact of –0.47 weeks. Impacts were bigger for women without chil-
dren and unmarried women. An analysis of the timing of the treatment
and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks), compared to the standard
treatment given the control group (at 13–15 weeks) provided new in-
sight into claimant behavior. Researchers observed suspension of UI
benefit receipt to be more common immediately before a scheduled in-
tervention rather than after the service was provided. Such a response
might be termed an “invitation effect.”
This led to the conclusion that the timed elements of the work test—
JSW and ERI—acted more like a stick-prodding return to work than a
carrot providing nourishment for achieving that end. The researchers
speculated that the response to treatment 2 had no identifiable peaks in
the timing of exit from UI receipt because the individually customized
schedule attenuated the observed response to an ERI invitation. 
Needless to say, exception reporting was estimated to be very cost-
ly. Individualized requirements generated no differential impact. An in-
vitation to attend either an ERI or JSW shortens duration, with the lat-
ter having a bigger effect. Exit rates are lower during and after the ERI
and JSW, suggesting it is the requirement to attend rather than the val-
ue of the session which shortens duration. 
Maryland UI Work Search Experiment
Enrollment into the Maryland UI work search experiment was con-
ducted in six public labor exchange offices around the state throughout
the entire calendar year of 1994. A combined sample of 23,758 new
monetarily eligible UI claimants were enrolled in the experiment. 
The standard work search policy was given to the control group.
This required two job search contacts per week, which must be report-
ed on the biweekly UI continued claim form but are not verified. The
four alternative treatments tested were:
1) Report four weekly employer contacts, which are not verified.
2) Contact two employers per week but need not report the two
contacted.
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3) Report two weekly employer contacts, which are not verified,
plus attend a four-day JSW early in the unemployment spell.
4) Report two weekly employer contacts; claimants are told con-
tacts would be verified. 
Requiring four employer contacts per week yielded a statistically
significant impact of –0.7 weeks of UI benefits. This reduction in dura-
tion resulted even in the absence of any verification of the offers. Re-
quiring two employer contacts per week but removing the requirement
to report them resulted in a statistically significant increase in UI bene-
fit durations of +0.4 weeks. The impact of requiring two employer con-
tacts per week, which were not verified, plus attendance at a four-day
JSW early in the unemployment spell was –0.6 weeks of UI. Like the
Tacoma experiment, this impact was due to raising the hassle associat-
ed with staying on UI, not due to increasing claimants’ job search skills.
Notable for employers, this third treatment also reduced the probability
of returning to the prior employer. 
Requiring two employer contacts to be reported and telling
claimants that their two contacts would be verified impacted UI benefits
by –0.9 weeks. The verification rate of 10 percent appeared to be an ad-
equate threat. Notably, the impact of this fourth treatment occurred dur-
ing the first spell of joblessness. Similarly, the first treatment generated
the bulk of its response during the first spell of joblessness in the bene-
fit year. 
The effects of treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with low-
er reemployment earnings. However, eliminating the work search re-
porting requirement, as in treatment two, raises reemployment earnings
by a statistically significant 4 percent. 
A second control group facing the standard work test was also
tracked, but claimants assigned to this group were told that their behav-
ior was being tracked as part of an experiment. This was done to permit
testing for the presence of a Hawthorne effect. This is relevant in ensur-
ing external validity of the evaluation. If part of the treatment response
to a new work test is simply due to added attention on the work test,
then such an effect could quickly dissipate after actual implementation.
Impact estimates computed as a contrast between the participant group
and each of the two control groups were virtually identical, suggesting
the absence of any Hawthorne effect.
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EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED JOB 
SEARCH ASSISTANCE
Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during the 1990s fol-
lowing the massive economic restructuring and worker dislocation of
the previous decade. Earlier research had identified JSA as a cost-effec-
tive tool for promoting return to work. The question of whether JSA
would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment was
evaluated in the context of a major field experiment in New Jersey
(Corson et al. 1989). Together with earlier evidence on JSA cost effec-
tiveness, results from the New Jersey experiment supported establish-
ment of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) sys-
tem, which required targeted JSA (Wandner 1994). 
Three subsequent studies have evaluated the effectiveness of target-
ed JSA. The first was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up
with special accommodations made to ensure experimental integrity
(Decker et al. 2000). The other two evaluations were done in the con-
text of WPRS (Dickinson et al. 1999, 2002; Black et al. 2003). In this
section, we briefly review the design and findings of these studies. 
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment
Enrollment into the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment was
done between July 1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989). The sam-
pling frame for random assignment was set to target the evaluation to
dislocated workers claiming UI benefits. Characteristics screens were
set to construct the sampling frame. 
These conditions required that a claimant must receive a first UI
payment and that payment must be within five weeks of applying for
benefits, must be at least 25 years of age, must have worked for the pre-
UI claim employer for at least three years, may not be on standby
awaiting return to the previous job with a specific recall date, and may
not be a union hiring hall member. 
The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer 
of an intervention early in the jobless spell; the second two ensured
that subjects of the experiment were well-established labor force mem-
bers separated from a long job attachment; the last two conditions pro-
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vided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans.
Claimants who are awaiting recall to their prior job and members of
union hiring halls are not required by the UI system to engage in active
job search. 
Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and
8,675 to one of three treatment groups. All three treatments included
JSA, the first being JSA alone. The second treatment added job training
to JSA.5 The third treatment added a cash reemployment bonus to JSA.
The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was
a cash payment of half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial of-
fer good for two weeks and then declining by 10 percent per week. The
bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if the job was tem-
porary, seasonal, part time, or with a relative. For all three treatments, at
five weeks into the claim all were given JSA orientation, skills and ap-
titude testing, JSA workshop, and an assessment or counseling inter-
view.
During the benefit year, the impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt
were –0.47, –0.48, and –0.97 for the three treatments, respectively. All
of these impacts were estimated with statistical significance. The cumu-
lative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years after the
initial benefit claim were –0.76, –0.93, and –1.72 for the three treat-
ments, respectively, with the impact from the third treatment estimated
with statistical significance (Corson and Haimson 1996). 
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that
JSA targeted to claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the
same cost-effective impact as that found for other groups of UI
claimants—about a half-week shorter UI receipt. The encouraging re-
sults for the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labor to fur-
ther investigate the ideal design for a reemployment bonus offer (Deck-
er and O’Leary 1995). 
Job Search Assistance Experiment
The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 author-
ized the U.S. Department of Labor to conduct the “Job Search Assis-
tance Experiment.” The experiment was designed to evaluate whether
providing early JSA to claimants identified by statistical models as
likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlements would be cost effective
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(Decker et al. 2000). During the planning stages of the evaluation to be
run in the District of Columbia and Florida, federal legislation leap-
frogged public policy analysis.
In 1993 President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which re-
quired state employment security agencies to establish and use a sys-
tem of profiling all new claimants for regular UI benefits. The Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to
identify UI claimants most likely to exhaust their regular benefits so
that they may be provided early reemployment services to make a faster
transition to new employment. 
The WPRS established a two-stage process. First, UI recipients
who are expecting recall or who are members of a union hall are
dropped. These groups are excluded because they are not expected to
undertake an active independent job search. Second, remaining UI re-
cipients are ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemploy-
ment insurance benefits. Beneficiaries are then referred to early reem-
ployment services in order of their ranking until the capacity of local
agencies to serve them is exhausted. The early assistance is comprised
of at least eight hours of job search assistance, which usually includes
an orientation to self-help facilities available at the public labor ex-
change and a JSW.
The JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment in Florida between
March 1995 and March 1996 in 10 sites around the state where regular
WPRS operations were temporarily delayed. Random assignment in
Florida involved 8,071 claimants. In the District of Columbia, the ex-
periment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation. Ran-
dom-assignment enrollment to the JSA experiment was done in all pub-
lic labor exchange offices throughout the District between June 1995
and June 1996, and involved 12,042 claimants. 
The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using
a two-stage process: exclude job attached and union hiring hall mem-
bers, then evaluate the probability of exhausting UI entitlement and tar-
get those with highest probabilities for the evaluation. These claimants
were randomly assigned to control or one of three treatments. The treat-
ments were:
1) Structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing,
JSW, one-on-one assessment interview. Failure to participate
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could result in denial of UI benefits. Two additional visits with
staff to report job search progress.
2) Individualized job search assistance (IJSA): orientation and
one-on-one assessment interview. Individual plan developed
which may include additional mandatory services.
3) Individualized job search assistance with training (IJSA+):
identical to IJSA plus a coordinated effort with Economic Dis-
location and Worker Adjustment Assistance Act (EDWAA) staff
to enroll the customer in training. 
The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation
in the benefit year in D.C. were –1.13, –0.47, and –0.61, respectively;
all estimated with statistical significance. Estimates of the same param-
eters in Florida were –0.41, –0.59, and –0.52, all of which were statisti-
cally significant. Both evaluations indicated that reemployment oc-
curred at wage rates similar to prior levels. The treatments had
generally positive and significant effects on earnings in DC, but no im-
pact on participant earnings in Florida.
Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention ex-
amined. The authors of the evaluation report attributed the generally
larger impacts observed in DC to stricter enforcement of JSA participa-
tion requirements. They recommend making particular JSA services
mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the
new one-stop environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
Evaluation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
The first national evaluation of WPRS was based on data from two
sources: surveys in 1996 and 1997 of administrators in all states about
the implementation and operations of their WPRS systems, and
claimant-level data from a sample of states (Dickinson et al. 1999,
2002). 
Surveys were administered to officials in all states responsible for
UI, ES, and EDWAA programs, and state WPRS operations. These sur-
veys found that “by and large, states have met the legislated require-
ments for implementing WPRS systems and have generally followed
ETA guidance as well. Most of the major components of a WPRS sys-
tem are in place in all states” (Dickinson et al. 1999. pp. II-36). Fur-
thermore, it was found that over time states have refined WPRS systems
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by adding variables in statistical referral models and by increasing the
timeliness of referrals to services. 
For the claimant level data, states were chosen to represent varia-
tion in the intensity of reemployment services provided under WPRS.
The evaluation was performed using data drawn in six states: Connecti-
cut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, and South Carolina.6 For
each of these states, data were compiled from administrative records on
all UI claimants starting new benefit years between July 1995 and De-
cember 1996 who were eligible for referral to mandatory WPRS JSA.
That is, those with either a definite recall date or union hiring hall mem-
bership were removed from the sampling frame. The combined sam-
ples included 92,401 profiled and referred claimants, and 295,920
claimants who were profiled but not referred to WPRS JSA.
The quasi-experimental evaluation of WPRS impacts in each state
contrasted those profiled and referred to WPRS JSA against those pro-
filed but not referred. The mean impact estimate for each of the six
states on weeks of UI benefits drawn is reported in Table 5.7. These re-
sults suggest that WPRS modestly shortened the duration of UI benefit
receipt in five of the states examined. The impact estimates were statis-
tically significant in all states except South Carolina, where the impact
was not significantly different from zero. The largest impact was –0.98
weeks in Maine, with the other impacts ranging from –0.21 to –0.41
weeks of UI benefits. Furthermore, in the states studied, those referred
to mandatory WPRS had reemployment earnings on a par with those
profiled but not referred to services. 
Evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky
While Kentucky was included among the states studied in the na-
tional evaluation of WPRS, an independent assessment of WPRS in
Kentucky based on an experimental design arrived at a much different
conclusion. The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by
economists at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the
University of Kentucky (Berger et al. 1997). In working with the Ken-
tucky Department for Employment Services on the WPRS system, the
economists advocated a methodology for assignment to WPRS, which
provided ready data for an experimental evaluation of WPRS effective-
ness.
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Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20
groups spanning 5 percentile points each. Every week the local WPRS
capacity is hit within one of the 20 groups. That group is referred to as
a profiling tie group (PTG). In Kentucky, profiled WPRS customers
within PTGs are randomly assigned to WPRS, or not. This is viewed as
an appropriate rule for referral to WPRS from a group of UI claimants
having scores that are not statistically significantly different. It also
provides the basis for evaluation of WPRS based on random trials. 
From the PTGs, experimental and control groups were formed by
the random trials to conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky
(Black et al. 2003). Data were collected at the very beginning of WPRS
implementation in Kentucky from October 1994 through June 1996.
The PTGs yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, with 1,236 of
these assigned to mandatory WPRS JSA. Compared to the total popula-
tion of 48,002 profiled and referred Kentucky claimants in that period,
means of observable characteristics (age, schooling, gender, race, prior
earnings, weekly benefit amount) for the experimental treatment group
were not statistically significantly different from those in the control
group. 
The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic. On
three outcomes of interest, the estimated impacts were: –2.2 weeks of
UI, –$143 UI benefits, and a $1,054 increase in earnings during the UI
benefit year. The difference in these estimates from the national WPRS
evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) es-
sentially confined their contrasts within PTGs, thereby achieving a
closer counterfactual. Dickinson et al. (1999, 2002) compared those as-
signed to WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit exhaustion
against all those profiled but not referred, including many with very low
exhaustion probabilities. As a result, the comparison group in the na-
tional evaluation was likely to have a shorter mean benefit duration than
program participants, even in the absence of WPRS services. 
The extraordinary foresight of the Kentucky Department of Em-
ployment Services to include randomization in assignment to WPRS
should be a model for all state and local employment service delivery
agencies. In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orienta-
tion to help resolve the resource allocation problem. When resources
are limited, randomization in program assignment can always be
166Table 5.7  Studies on the Effectiveness of Targeted Job Search Assistance
Author/title Design Sample Findings





T2: JSA plus train-
ing or relocation 
assistance 
T3: JSA plus a cash 
bonus 









T1: –0.47** weeks of UI 
T2: –0.48** weeks of UI 
T3: –0.97** weeks of UI 
6 Year T1: –0.76 weeks of UI 
6 Year T2: –0.93 weeks of UI 
6 Year T3: –1.72** weeks of UI
Decker et al. (2000) Assisting 
Unemployment Insurance 
Claimants: The Long-Term 
Impact of the Job Search 
Assistance Demonstration
T1: Structured JSA 
T2: Individualized 
JSA 
T3: T2 plus training 
C: Not on standby or 
a union hiring hall 
member, and pre-
dicted likely to 
exhaust UI enti-
tlement.
DC and Florida 
DC: June 1995 to 
June 1996 
8,071 claimants 
FL: March 1995 to 
March 1996 
12,042 claimants
DC T1: –1.13** weeks of UI 
DC T2: –0.47** weeks of UI 
DC T3: –0.61** weeks of UI 
FL T1: –0.41** weeks of UI 
FL T2: –0.59** weeks of UI 
FL T3: –0.52** weeks of UI
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Dickinson et al. (1999) Evalua-
tion of Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services: Final 
Report
P: WPRS profiled 
and referred to 
early JSA. 
C: Profiled but not 
referred (not on 
standby or a 
union hiring hall 
member)
CT, IL, KY, ME, NJ,
SC 




CT: –0.25** weeks of UI 
IL: –0.41** weeks of UI 
KY: –0.21* weeks of UI 
ME: –0.98** weeks of UI 
NJ: –0.29** weeks of UI 
SC: 0.02 weeks of UI
Black et al. (2001) Is the Threat 
of Reemployment Services 
More Effective than the Ser-
vices Themselves?  Experimen-
tal Evidence from the UI 
System
T: WPRS profiled 
and referred to 
early JSA. reem-
ployment services 
C: Profiled and in 
the same predict-
ed UI exhaustion 
cohort as T, but 
not referred to 
JSA.
Kentucky 




In the benefit year 
T: –2.2 weeks of UI,
T: –$143 UI benefits 
T: $1,054 earnings
NOTE: T: experimental treatment group; P: participant group; C: experimental control group or comparison group; JSW: job search work-
shop.
* Statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; ** statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence lev-
el in a two-tailed test.  
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viewed as an equitable mechanism. It has the added benefit of provid-
ing for very strong evaluation evidence.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ES is the public labor exchange in the United States. Its main
functions are job brokering and administration of the work test for UI
claimants. The work test requires UI claimants to make an active search
for a job, which may involve use of labor exchange services such as as-
sessment services, job search assistance, job interview referrals, and job
training referrals. As a job broker, the ES serves both sides of the job
market: job seekers looking for work and employers looking to hire. 
The job seekers served by the ES are similar to the universe of un-
employed in terms of gender and race. However, compared to their
share of all unemployed, youth are a smaller share of ES customers,
while the less educated are a greater share of job-seeking customers.
Among those registered with the ES, job seekers not eligible for UI
tend to use ES services more than UI beneficiaries. 
Employer services include public listing of job vacancies and
screening and referral of job candidates. Among U.S. employers, three
industry groups tend to have larger shares of job listings than employ-
ment: 1) agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 2) services; and 3) public
administration. Public administration jobs are listed at a high rate be-
cause of government requirements for publicly posting job vacancies.
High listing rates for agriculture and services may be partly explained
by high employee turnover rates, but much of the difference across in-
dustries may be attributable to the occupational mix of employment
within industries. Job listings span the range of occupations; however,
the ES fill rates differ across occupations. The ES was successful in fill-
ing more than 40 percent of job vacancy listings in three occupational
groups: domestic services, processing, and materials handling. 
Comparison group design evaluations of ES activities have focused
on three topics: 1) job interview referrals; 2) job search assistance; 3)
and targeted job search assistance.7 Each of the studies reviewed in this
chapter used a distinct research design, and some satisfied higher
methodological standards than others. Impact estimates differ across
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the studies because of methodology and also because the samples and
time frames for analysis differed. Nonetheless, each of the studies re-
viewed adds to our understanding of labor exchange services in the
United States; taken together, evidence from these studies has helped
shape the direction of public labor exchange policy. Research has guid-
ed development of programs for dislocated workers, targeted job search
assistance, and institutions for coordination of services, such as WPRS,
establishment of one-stop career centers, and state ERI programs as
part of the ES administered UI work test. 
Following is a list of key findings from ES evaluation studies:
• The first national evaluation of the ES in the United States found
that job referrals are most effective for women and are also ef-
fective for men over 45 years of age, and men in urban areas—
evidence for services to middle-aged dislocated workers (John-
son et al. 1983; Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985).
• A study of ES effectiveness for dislocated workers in Pennsylva-
nia found JSA to be most effective early in a spell of joblessness,
and that ES job referrals act as a back stop once job seekers ex-
haust other avenues of search—evidence for early JSA interven-
tion (Katz 1991). 
• An evaluation in Washington and Oregon found ES job place-
ments most effective for those with a strong record of job attach-
ment, providing evidence for JSA as an intervention for dislocat-
ed workers (Jacobson and Petta 2000).
• Evaluation studies in South Carolina and Maryland found that a
stronger UI work test achieved by requiring reporting of job
search contacts and validation of contacts through cooperation
between UI and ES leads to significantly shorter periods of com-
pensated joblessness, providing evidence for the importance of
interagency cooperation (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985;
Klepinger et al. 1998). Such cooperation can be facilitated in the
one-stop career centers required by WIA in all local areas.
• A field experiment in Washington found that eliminating both
continued claim filing and the work test leads to dramatically
longer spells of compensated joblessness, providing further evi-
dence of the importance of UI and ES cooperation in requiring
and monitoring job search activity (Johnson and Klepinger
1991; 1994).
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• Evidence from evaluations in Maryland, Washington, DC, and
Florida demonstrated that standardized ERI and JSW are inex-
pensive to administer and have a sizeable effect on reducing pe-
riods of compensated joblessness—evidence in support of
WPRS and state-adopted ERI programs (Klepinger et al. 1998;
Johnson and Klepinger 1991; Decker et al. 2000).8
• Evidence from the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment
showed that JSA targeted to dislocated workers at risk of long-
term employment can be a cost-effective intervention and can be
very simple and structured. These results led directly to WPRS
implementation (Corson et al. 1989).
• Statistical targeting of JSA to those at risk of long-term jobless-
ness tested in DC and Florida through field experiments, provid-
ing further evidence supporting the cost effectiveness of targeted
JSA (Decker et al. 2000). 
• Recent evaluations of WPRS indicated shorter jobless duration
for program participants. An evaluation of WPRS in Kentucky,
applying an experimental design, found that WPRS shortens UI
duration by more than two weeks (Dickinson et al. 1999; Black
et al. 2003). 
All studies evaluating the effectiveness of ES interventions consis-
tently report very low costs per customer served by the public labor ex-
change. This fact is key to the cost-effectiveness of ES interventions.
Even services resulting in a modest reduction in jobless duration show
a significant return on public investment when costs are low. State and
local ES agencies should keep clear and reliable cost records to support
effective management, administration, and evaluation. 
Legislation authorizing employment and training initiatives nearly
always include both a requirement for program evaluation and a sunset
clause (O’Leary and Straits 2003). Employment policy makers at all
levels of government have an interest in knowing “what works.” Re-
search evaluating the ES has helped to affirm some ideas and discard
others. Public employment agencies benefit from evaluation research
and would be wise to keep such activity central to their operations. Fo-
cusing on results can improve professionalism among the staff and in-
crease customer satisfaction. The case of Kentucky using research prin-
ciples to set administrative rules in WPRS demonstrates exemplary
foresight. 
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A recent U.S. General Accounting Office (2003) report identified
the ES as the employment and training program serving the largest
number of customers. In fiscal year 2002, the ES served more than 19
million customers, a total more than seven times the next largest pro-
gram. In that same year, the ES budget ranked eighth among federally
funded employment and training programs. The evaluation studies re-
viewed in this chapter suggest that many services of the ES are cost ef-
fective; however, numerous other activities of the public labor ex-
change remain to be studied. 
The main evaluations to date have examined interventions directed
to job seekers. Policy and management of the public labor exchange in
the United States would benefit from research into the effectiveness of
services provided to employers as well. A variety of in-person services
provided by the ES have been found to be cost effective; however, public
labor exchange services are becoming increasingly automated. While
these services have received a steadily rising share of public labor ex-
change funding, the effectiveness of automated and self-serve assistance
provided by the ES is not well known and should be evaluated. Improved
data systems for tracking customers and services would greatly facilitate
proper evaluation of both employer and automated services. 
Evaluation research over the past 20 years on ES activities has con-
tributed greatly to the direction of public employment policy. It is now
standard practice for the Employment and Training Administration of
the U.S. Department of Labor to cite evaluation research findings when
providing policy guidance to states (DeRocco 2002). 
Notes
I thank David Balducchi, John Palmer, Helen Parker and Jeffrey Smith for valuable
comments on an earlier version. Opinions expressed are those of neither the W.E. Up-
john Institute nor the U.S. Department of Labor, but are my own. Errors and omissions
are mine as well.
1. Excellent previous summaries of ES evaluation research have been provided by
Jacobson (1991, 1995); Kulik (1995); Meyer (1995); Balducchi, Johnson, and
Gritz (1997); Fay and Lippoldt (1999); Grubb, Benes, and Lippoldt (2000); and
Thuy, Hansen and Price (2001). 
2. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) enumerate the assumptions implicit in
such a view of random assignment field experiments as a means for model-free
impact estimation. 
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3. A Hawthorne effect is the initial improvement in a process of production caused
by the obtrusive observation of that process. The effect was first noticed in the
Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company during studies of workplace
behavior in the 1920s and 1930s. Production increased not as a consequence of
actual changes in working conditions introduced by the plant’s management, but
because management demonstrated interest in such improvements. A recent reex-
amination of the Hawthorne data has called into question whether such an effect
actually occurred during the original studies (Jones 1992).
4. This discussion of impact estimation and most of the studies reviewed here focus
on partial equilibrium effects of interventions. That is, they assume away any ex-
ternal validity issues. Among external validity issues, entry and displacement
effects must clearly be accounted for in estimating general equilibrium effects of
interventions. Some ES evaluations have directly accounted for such considera-
tions (Davidson and Woodbury 2000). 
5. A relocation allowance was also available in treatment 2, but it was rarely used. 
6. Data from 6 additional states were deemed inadequate for evaluation. Samples
were originally drawn in 12 states. “Two of these 12 states made errors in imple-
menting their profiling procedures. One inadvertently matched the wrong profil-
ing score to individual claimants’ records; the other incorrectly identified which
claimants had the highest scores. Further, in three additional states we found that
a substantial number of local offices did not systematically refer claimants with
the highest scores to services. None of these states were aware of their implemen-
tation problems” (Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer 2002, p. 65). 
7. Two early studies evaluated the effectiveness of counseling provided by the ES
(Benus et al. 1977 and Johnson et al. 1981). Both studies found “no significant
impact of counseling on duration of unemployment, earnings or job satisfaction”
(Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 485). 
8. In an interstate study of UI recipiency Vroman (2002, p. ii) finds that states with
established ERI programs have shorter durations of compensated unemployment.
On the technical support Web site for the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment
and Training Administration, links to ERI programs in four states—Florida,
Michigan, Tennessee, West Virgina—are provided under the heading “Best
practices.” <http://www.itsc.state.md.us/Best_ Practices/Eligibility_Review_
Program.htm> (Accessed: July 9, 2003) The states of Georgia and Missouri also
operate ERI programs. 
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Information, Tools, and Technology
Informing Labor Exchange Participants
Jim Woods and Pam Frugoli
LABOR EXCHANGE—CASTING THE ’NET
Fueled by the opening of the Internet to public use, the last eight
years have witnessed revolutionary changes in the availability of infor-
mation on the labor market and in labor exchange services provided by
both the private and the public sector. Most obvious has been the ex-
plosive growth in proprietary and public job search sites on the Web,
providing unparalleled access to job openings information through
thousands of job search sites. The most visible examples in the pub-
lic labor exchange and workforce development system are America’s
Job Bank and state job banks, but there have been many other public
sector investments as well. Technology and the Web have stimulated
new methods and processes for bringing together employers and work-
ers. Never before have employers, job seekers, students, counselors,
educators, and others had such access to a vast array of job openings,
services, higher quality labor market information, and assessment
tools. 
The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) has taken major strides to
improve labor market information (LMI), much of it through work of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, state workforce agency LMI divisions,
and the Employment and Training Administration (ETA). Investments
have been made to automate processes to support workforce develop-
ment including Unemployment Insurance (UI) systems and one-stop
operating systems to organize and track services to customers. The
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USDOL also undertook major work to replace the Dictionary of Occu-
pational Titles with the new Occupational Information Network
(O*NET) system, which provides a common language of occupational
characteristics that better reflects the contemporary workplace. Most
importantly, nearly all of the data and information developed through
USDOL investments are accessible not only to customers through state
and federal Internet sites and other products, but also to other public
and private application developers who are building customized prod-
ucts for different customer groups. 
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) and its emphasis on
providing universal services has stimulated the public workforce devel-
opment system to develop new ways to serve a wider range of users.
The WIA established a national policy that recognizes providing infor-
mation to the public is one of the primary rather than ancillary func-
tions of the public workforce investment system. As a result of the
USDOL investments in information and the potential offered by the In-
ternet, nearly every citizen has reasonably easy access to information
that can support their participation in the labor market.
In this chapter, we explore the significance of technology, particu-
larly automation and the Internet, on the labor exchange process and
services. Much of this discussion will focus on public sector use of
technology to improve labor exchange services. However, we also con-
sider the larger context of private and public operators that have ex-
ploited technology and the Internet to provide labor exchange and labor
market information services. To a great extent, we argue that advances
in labor exchange are due to the greater availability of more extensive
and higher quality information and services that provide for the flow,
exchange, and interpretation of the information to smooth the opera-
tions of the labor market. Another important theme of this chapter is the
power of the Internet to provide interconnectivity between Web-based
services. This interconnectivity is due in no small part to information
standards followed by USDOL and the states in developing and provid-
ing labor market and job openings information. To fully appreciate
such seamless access to information, the reader is encouraged to try out
selected Web resources referenced throughout the text and notes.
While the explosive growth of labor market and job search infor-
mation on the Internet provides greater potential than ever to smooth
the labor exchange and job match connections, it is not a panacea. We
must avoid the temptation to rely overmuch on electronic self-service
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tools, to assume that these will meet the needs of every employer and
person. A balanced approach of electronic self-service and staff-sup-
ported services is key to meeting the diverse needs of a wide range of
customers (Balducchi and Pasternak 2000). The WIA paradigm of uni-
versal service creates a significant challenge to the public workforce
development sector: how to serve a much larger audience, theoretically
all citizens and employers, while at the same time ensuring that more
intensive services are provided to those who need it the most. Automa-
tion, technology, and the Internet have provided some of the tools with-
out which the public one-stop delivery system could not begin to meet
the needs of this larger audience. Many of the new resources provide
the tools for front-office staff in one-stop career centers and other work-
force development settings to better serve more customers. It is only
with adequate resources to collect, compile, and analyze information,
as well as quality staff who are trained and equipped to understand and
use the power of information on the marketplace that the public work-
force investment system can successfully meet its mission.
There are many factors that have changed the face of labor ex-
change. Among them are those listed below:
• The profusion of job search sites on the Internet, both public and
privately developed and operated.
• The expansion of a nationwide labor market information system
with even higher quality and more extensive labor market infor-
mation.
• The development of a common occupational language and struc-
ture through the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC)
and O*NET systems, which has significant implications for in-
terconnectivity of information to meet customer needs.
• The migration of career information delivery systems (CIDS),
state supported labor market information delivery systems, and a
host of private sector products and services to the Web, as well
as national products and systems such as the suite of tools avail-
able through the CareerOneStop portal (formerly known as
America’s Career Kit), O*NET OnLine, the Occupational Out-
look Handbook, and others.
• Automation of many of the UI benefit and tax systems and de-
velopment of statistical profiling models associated with state
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services systems in the
states.
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• The development of new processes to serve customers in one-
stop career centers, including customized information systems
such as the One-Stop Operating System, decision support sys-
tems, and other means to more effectively serve customers who
are preparing for the labor market or seeking employment.
• Transactional data analysis to identify changing marketplace
needs.
• And most significantly, the interconnectivity among many dif-
ferent Internet sites to provide easy access to employers and job
seekers to information about the labor market to support labor
exchange activities.
The full impact of the improved exchange of information in the
economy remains to be seen, particularly in regard to how it might im-
prove the connections between employers and workers and what prob-
lems might arise. Any judgments made today might well be tempered
by the observation and advice offered by Joseph A. Schumpeter in Cap-
italism, Socialism and Democracy,1 “since we are dealing with a pro-
cess whose every element takes considerable time in revealing its true
features and ultimate effects at a given point of time; we must judge its
performance over time, as it unfolds . . . we are dealing with an organic
process, analysis of what happens in any particular part of it . . . may in-
deed clarify details of the mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that”
(Schumpeter 1950).
Some consideration of both public and private sector resources,
tools, and services are covered in this overview, although much of the
detail will focus on the public sector, particularly as related to USDOL
efforts. America’s Job Bank (AJB) will be explored in more detail than
other resources because it is among the most visible of USDOL invest-
ments, and because a recent study of AJB affords a detailed view of the
dynamics of Internet-based job search services. There also are tensions
between private and public operators in providing information and la-
bor exchange services because the Internet has expanded the capability
of both sectors to deliver information directly to the consumer. In spite
of, or perhaps because of, concerns with the appropriate roles for the
government and private parties, new opportunities have developed for
direct or indirect private and public collaboration in both the develop-
ment and delivery of information, and this issue will be considered as
well.
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LABOR EXCHANGE: A LIFELONG VIEW
We borrow from Schumpeter’s notion of the economy as an organ-
ic process and explore the impacts of automation and information on
labor exchange in a much broader context than just the point at which
job seekers and employers are matched. Labor exchange is a lifelong,
dynamic process for individuals and employers. For convenience of
discussion it is useful to consider labor exchange in two contexts: first,
from the perspective of the “job market”2 in which the focus is on the
more immediate job search and hiring process—this is the traditional
concept of labor exchange; and secondly, within the broader view of a
dynamic labor market that encompasses short- and long-term flows and
evolution of employer skill requirements, job opportunities, and labor
supply.
Viewed in this light, the labor exchange process includes features
such as
• the employer/job seeker match—the job market hiring process;
• career planning, guidance, and preparation—preparing for the
workplace needs;
• economic development and employer planning, which has a pro-
found effect on labor exchange in terms of skill requirements,
the location of needed supply, and preparation of the workforce
to meet occupational needs; and
• educational preparation and curriculum development—ultimate-
ly for the employer/job seeker to make a successful match, the
marketplace must offer the necessary training and education for
individuals (and employers) to meet the production needs of the
business community.
If job seekers come to the marketplace without the requisite skills
demanded by the business community, then inefficiencies in the em-
ployer/job seeker match will raise the costs to employers, the job seek-
er, and the community at large. Similarly, if workers do not keep up-to-
date and prepare for changing skill needs, the potential mismatches
between business needs and job seekers’ skills will likely grow, leading
to longer spells of unemployment and decreases in product and service
output with resulting costs to the job seeker, employer, economy, and
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taxpayer. A study by the Office of Technology Assessment in 1990
(U.S. Congress 1990) noted, “churning in the economy far exceeds new
job creation as a driving force for training . . . This is true even for rap-
idly growing industries and occupations.” Such churning is to be ex-
pected to a degree in the market, but providing information to current
workers and the future worker pool, youth and those out of the labor
force, to help them better plan and prepare for careers and skill require-
ments in the workplace, may help reduce some of the churning as well
as reducing the time that it takes for an employer and job seeker to
make a match.
Whether viewed from the short-term job market perspective or
longer-term career preparation context, what is common to all of these
features of an organic labor exchange process is the need for shared in-
formation: signals from the marketplace on the changing skill needs,
listings of job openings, job seekers sharing their background through
resumes, information on occupational projections. Information “shar-
ing” is perhaps the most essential component of a successful set of la-
bor exchange services.
INFORMATION: THE FOUNDATION OF 
LABOR EXCHANGE 
A fundamental feature of a free market economy is open access to
information about the marketplace in all of its detail. Indeed, economic
theory assumes the availability and exchange of “perfect” information.
Information is the lifeblood of the economy (Lawrence 1991); without
it the free market, or any economic system, would wither and collapse.
There would be few understandable signals to producers and pur-
chasers of goods and services. Perfect information and complete access
to it as envisioned by theory is, of course, not possible in the complex
interactions of the consumer and labor markets. As Autor (2001) writes,
“The labor market is replete with imperfect and asymmetric informa-
tion.” However, the very fact that the marketplace can never produce
perfect information emphasizes the importance of discussion and con-
sideration of the ways that technology, automation, and new processes
have improved—and may further improve—the labor exchange pro-
cess. 
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The Internet has opened the door to a vastly expanded flow of infor-
mation and to new organizations to deliver information. It has significant
implications for improving not only the access to information, but the
range, quality, and interconnectivity of information that is available to
the job seeker, student, counselor, and employer. The remainder of this
chapter examines the significance of information and the impact of tech-
nology in improving the quality and timeliness of information, as well as
the systems that deliver it on the operation of the labor market. 
THE JOB MATCH—CONNECTING JOB SEEKERS 
AND EMPLOYERS
Undoubtedly the most dramatic and visible change in labor ex-
change services has been the birth and then explosive growth of job
search sites on the Internet. Workers have and will continue to use
many methods to find jobs including personal contacts (networking),
job postings within a business establishment, family, newspaper want
ads, professional association postings, unions, and public one-stop ca-
reer centers. The Internet does not necessarily replace such sources but
vastly expands access to job openings for individuals and access to
prospective workers for employers. Prior to 1994–1995, when the first
Internet job search sites began to appear on the Web, with AJB being
one of the first, it was difficult if not impossible for people to search
easily for job opportunities across the country or outside their local
area. 
Today, only eight years later, in the matter of a few minutes a per-
son can search for job listings throughout the nation using several dif-
ferent Web job search services. Employers can search databases of
thousands of resumes that have been posted by individuals to select
prospective workers. On-line job search sites provide better, more flex-
ible, and easier search capabilities than other job search resources. For
example, in less than five minutes on a 56K modem connection, nation-
al job searches of three job sites selected ad hoc were made. The results
of these searches are shown in Table 6.1. The table is not intended to
compare the three sites but rather to illustrate that almost instantly we
have access to information on thousands of job openings. While not
shown here, in a few additional minutes, the same searches were car-
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ried out for Maryland, California, and four selected local areas. Simply
put, the Web has opened the door to greater access by job seekers to
employer needs, information that can be used along with other sources
in the job search.
While there is little concrete information available on the impact or
success of job search sites on the Web, it is clear that job search on the
Web is here to stay and will likely continue to increase. However, it is
critical that consumers treat the Internet as only one source in their job
searches. Margaret F. Dikel writes, “The Internet is merely an added di-
mension to the traditional job search, and it is not an easy dimension to
add. Job hunters need to focus less on the search for job listings and
more on the idea of using the information accessible on the Internet as
a tool for researching organizations and finding possibilities” (Dikel
2001). Similarly, Richard Bowles suggests that the Internet supports la-
bor exchange in a broader context, that it provides a resource for job
listings; posting resumes; finding career counseling or job search assis-
tance; as a means for researching occupations, businesses, and geo-
graphical areas; and as a place to make contacts to help you find infor-
mation (Bowles 2001).
A variety of sources of job information and resume services are
available through the Web, including the following types:
• General job search sites covering a wide range of occupations.
Examples include sites such as America’s Job Bank, Monster.
com, CareerBuilder.com, and Hotjobs.com. 
• Specialty sites: focusing on a narrower range of jobs such as in-
formation technology. An example in the technology arena is
Dice.com 
• Mega search–engine sites—these sites search several available
job bank sites at the same time.
Table 6.1  Example of a National Job Search on Three All-Purpose Job
Search Sites
America’s Job Bank Monster.com CareerBuilder.com
Welder 1,568 92 107
Programmer 4,356 2,531 3,241
Secretary 4,007 1,975 1,373
Information, Tools, Technology 187
• Portal search sites that provide links to job search sites, but may
or may not include their own job search engines.
• Trade, professional association, and union sites.
• Corporate/employer-based sites—thousands of employers ad-
vertise their openings on the Web.
• Newspaper help-wanted ads available on the Internet—hundreds
of newspapers are available on the Web, and most include their
help-wanted ads.
In general, the more developed job search Web sites provide a vari-
ety of capabilities to employers and job seekers that potentially facili-
tate the job search and hiring process:
• Employers can post job openings information on the site. Some
sites may provide a variety of tools to assist employers. For ex-
ample, AJB allows employers to enter job openings directly into
the system or batch load multiple job openings at the same time.
Depending on the site, employers may enter a range of informa-
tion, such as the job description, task statement, skill require-
ments, educational requirements, experience requirements,
wages/benefits, and other pertinent information. A cursory re-
view of Web sites reveals that the Web contains more robust job
information than typical help-wanted ads in a newspaper.
• Many sites let users post their resumes on the Web, allowing job
seekers to include details about their education and work back-
ground, as well as other relevant information.
• Job seekers can search for job openings throughout the nation or
throughout entire databases of jobs included on a specific Web
site. Most sites provide simple-to-use search capabilities, includ-
ing keyword, job title, and/or searching by precategorized occu-
pational families. Many sites add optional advanced search ca-
pabilities, including parameters such as desired wage level,
geographical location, and educational requirements.
• Employers can search resumes that have been posted on the site,
again using different methods that typically include keywords,
occupational titles, and other criteria.
• Over the last two years, many of the job search resources have
added automated features and tools to search the site actively by
introducing job/resume “scouts” or “agents.” For example, a job
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seeker can store criteria to be used for different searches and
have the system carry out the searches and provide the results
the next time the job seeker logs on. Similarly, some sites allow
employers to request the system to search for resumes that are
active and meet their specified criteria. Some sites may e-mail
notices to employers or job seekers with results of “agent”
searches.
CAREERONESTOP: INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON 
THE INTERNET
The public labor exchange system has exploited technology to at-
tempt to improve labor exchange services for the last 25 years. While
perhaps not recognizable today as “high tech,” efforts were made to be-
gin sharing selected job openings from state employment security (ES)
agencies across states in the 1970s through the Employment Security
Automated Reporting System (ESARS). Data were processed on main-
frame computers and microfiche with job openings provided back to
the states. In 1979, USDOL established a national job openings data-
base, dubbed the Interstate Job Bank (IJB), in which jobs were shared
among states via microfiche. By November of 1993, there were only
48,000 jobs on the IJB (Balducchi and Pasternak 2000). 
These early efforts provided experience and a foundation that posi-
tioned USDOL and the states to take advantage of the unanticipated op-
portunity offered by the Internet. With the Internet opening up to the
public in the early 1990s USDOL and state ES agencies working in part-
nership were among the first to take advantage of the Internet as a medi-
um for labor exchange by Web-enabling AJB in February of 1995. AJB
began as a means of electronically sharing job openings from ES offices,
a direct descendent of the IJB, but work soon began to expand AJB to in-
clude resume services, direct posting of jobs on AJB by employers, and
batch uploading of jobs by employers. On August 13, 2002, AJB had
over 900,000 active job openings and over 400,000 resumes posted,
making it one of the largest job search services on the Web.
With AJB as its core (known originally as America’s Career Kit),
USDOL undertook a key strategy to develop a larger suite of labor ex-
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change and career planning and preparation services on the Internet.
These services have recently been revamped as the CareerOneStop por-
tal. This suite of services takes advantage of the interconnectivity pow-
er of the Internet and was designed to provide a seamless source of
information on occupations including job openings, occupational pro-
jections, wage estimates, industry information, career planning re-
sources, information about states, as well as information on support
services. The implementation of this suite recognizes the importance of
viewing labor exchange as a much broader activity than just job place-
ment, though the ultimate goal is the successful match between em-
ployers and job seekers. The components of this set of Internet sites are
described in Table 6.2.
In addition to the CareerOneStop products, there are several other
USDOL-sponsored national sources of LMI and occupational informa-
tion. Most notably, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides a vast
amount and range of information for the nation, states, and even local
areas at the BLS Web site, http://stats.bls.gov, including data on unem-
ployment, occupation and industry estimates and projections, wage in-
formation, labor force participation, the Occupational Outlook Hand-
book, the Career Guide to Industries, and the Monthly Labor Review.
Another key resource provided by the ETA is O*NET OnLine
http://online.onetcenter.org/, which provides direct access to the
O*NET information.
AMERICA’S JOB BANK: A CASE STUDY IN PUBLIC
AUTOMATED LABOR EXCHANGE
As noted earlier, there is little information available on employer or
job seeker outcomes using Internet job openings services. Any outcome
information for most of the job search sites is generally proprietary in
nature and would not be available for any broad-based study of job
search site outcomes. While it is easy to track the usage of a site, it is
more difficult to determine whether an employer actually makes a hire
or a job seeker finds a job using a particular service. However, there is a
notable exception, thanks to AJB. In 2001, USDOL commissioned an
outcomes study on AJB, which provides useful insight into the dynam-
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• America’s Job Bank (AJB) [www.ajb.org]. This is one of the most used job service sites on the Web.  The
AJB site advertises, “America’s Job Bank is the biggest and busiest job market in cyberspace.  Job seekers
can post their resume where thousands of employers search every day, search for job openings
automatically, and find their dream job fast.  Employers can post job listings in the nation’s largest online
labor exchange, create customized job orders, and search resumes automatically to find the right people
fast.” With over 900,000 job postings and 400,000 resumes in mid August 2002, AJB provides a foundation
for USDOL investment in automated services to support job seekers and employers directly in the labor
exchange process.
• America’s Career InfoNet (ACINet) [www.acinet.org]. This site is designed to help individuals make
better, more informed career decisions.  It provides invaluable information for employers, job seekers,
human resource specialists, counselors, students, and workforce investment specialists in one-stop career
centers and other settings.  The Web site helps customers do the following:
 Obtain information on wage and employment trends for occupations and across industries.  Selected
information is presented at the state and major metropolitan level with comparisons to national trends.
State employment security agency LMI divisions (funded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
Employment and Training Administration) develop most of this information.
 Learn about the education, knowledge, skills, and ability requirements for occupations.  Much of this
information is from the O*NET system.
 Search for employer contact information nationwide—a powerful feature of the system that allows
any user to directly search employer files or identify employers through occupational and industry
searches.
 Use over 5,000 external links to the most extensive set of career resources on the Internet.
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• America’s Service Locator (ASL) [www.servicelocator.org]. This service is offered both through the
Web and via a toll-free hot line [www.servicelocator.org and 1-877-US-2JOBS].  It provides a
comprehensive source of information on service providers and services available in local areas including job
training, unemployment insurance benefits, education opportunities, seminars, special services for the
disabled or older workers, and much more.  The site is possible as a result of a partnership among USDOL,
state governments, and local agencies that support this nationwide database.  This information directly
supports public sector efforts to provide re-employment services support to displaced workers and also
supports the public at large.  By automating this information and making it easier for individuals to access in
a self-service mode, it saves staff time and reduces costs and increases productivity, allowing staff in one-
stop career centers and other service providers to focus their efforts on direct services.
• Workforce Tools of the Trade [http://www.workforcetools.org/]. This service is intended to support the
professional growth of workforce development personnel at all levels.  The site provides easy access to a
large database of training resources, providers, and institutes for human resource development professionals.
It also provides features that support collaboration and communication among workforce development
personnel.
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ics of Internet job search for both employers and job seekers. The un-
published findings from this study, conducted by TATC Consulting
(2001), are summarized below and should be reviewed with three
caveats in mind:
1) The findings do not provide a definitive evaluation of AJB,
rather, they represent an initial investigation into the degree to
which employers use and hire applicants from AJB, and simi-
larly the extent to which job seekers find jobs using AJB.
2) The results of the study do not represent all job service sites on
the Web, but may at least be suggestive of some aspects of In-
ternet labor exchange job listing services.
3) Internet job search is simply one more means for employers
and job seekers to find each other, and the results of the initial
AJB study must be viewed in this context.
With these parameters in mind, however, the study does provide the
first real glimpse into some of the dynamics associated with Internet-
based job search and may be instructive not only for the initial findings,
but as a guide for further research and examination as well.
The AJB Outcomes Study, conducted between April 2001 and Feb-
ruary 2002, used a short-term longitudinal study to track AJB users
(employers and job seekers) posting new jobs and resumes over a three-
month period. Both employers and job seekers were interviewed every
two weeks on the relevant study questions. The study results are based
on 251 employer participants and 264 job seekers. Participants in the
study were “recruited” from a sample of AJB customers who had re-
cently posted a job or resume, so there is a degree of self-selection. As
such, some of the characteristics of the customers may not be represen-
tative of all employers or job seekers using AJB, but we believe this is a
minor limitation relative to the insight provided by this study.
During the study period, national unemployment rose from 4.5 per-
cent to 5.5 percent (peaking at 5.8 percent in December 2001). While it
is impossible to determine the full impact of this economic downturn
on hires, it is conceivable that the percentage of hires may have been
less during the study period than in prior years of AJB operation. This
provides further context in which to view the findings.
Of the employers participating for the full three months, about one-
third represented the staffing industry (31 percent), information tech-
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nology (14 percent), manufacturing (14 percent), finance/insurance (7
percent), and retail/wholesale trade (7 percent). Job seekers, by type of
job sought, included information technology (19 percent), sales/mar-
keting (8 percent), clerical (5 percent), manufacturing (4 percent), proj-
ect management (3 percent), administration (3 percent), and manage-
ment (3 percent). The key findings of the study are listed in Table 6.3,
followed by our analysis of the findings.
The study results provide several interesting insights on the use of
AJB. A key question is whether AJB appears to be an effective method
for making such connections among many methods. In our view, the
AJB study provides initial evidence that AJB is an effective resource
for several reasons. 
First, it appears that employer postings on AJB successfully attract
job seekers, with over 80 percent of the employers receiving at least 1
resume; on average, those receiving resumes received nearly 21 re-
sumes. Also, almost 50 percent of the postings of these employers re-
ceived at least 1 resume. From these results, AJB appears to be a very
successful resource to make an initial set of contacts between employ-
ers and job seekers. 
Secondly, with employers interviewing 665 individuals (about 13
percent of the resumes received), AJB was effective in providing
enough quality resumes to interest employers in the second stage of the
job match process. This averages out to about three interviews per em-
ployer receiving resumes. 
The important third stage, hiring, requires a little more analysis.
Eight percent of the job orders led to at least one hire compared to 19
percent of job orders filed through non-AJB sources. Because job or-
ders/postings may actually include more than one job opening, it is im-
portant to highlight that 4 percent of all openings were successfully
filled, compared to 10 percent through all other sources. On the surface,
this may raise a question on the relative success of AJB. But on further
view, note that this comparison is between AJB and all other sources,
including private job banks, other public employment services, help-
wanted ads, and private employment agencies. The ratio of resumes re-
ceived from all other sources to AJB-generated resumes was approxi-
mately 3.4 to 1, while the ratio of hires by job orders from all other
sources to AJB was 2.4 to 1. This indicates that for the study group of
employers, AJB was actually relatively successful in leading to hires.
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• 83% of employers received at least one resume in response to their job postings and 46% of postings by
those employers received at least one resume.
• 5,088 total resumes were received in response to AJB postings; employers reported receiving 17,180
resumes from all other sources combined (e.g., other job sites, newspaper ads, etc.).
• Employers who received resumes from AJB received an average of 20.8 resumes.
• 665 job interviews resulted from AJB use by employers in the study.
• Approximately 50% of the employers using AJB conducted at least one interview.
• Employers conducting interviews conducted an average of 4.5 interviews.
• 8% of all job postings in AJB led directly to at least one hire (+/– 3%; – 95% confidence interval) [Note—
19% of job orders were filled through all non-AJB sources combined.]
• 4% of all job openings were successfully filled (Note—postings may include multiple job openings, thus
the small percentage), (+/–2%) [Note: 10% of all openings posted were successfully filled through all non-
AJB sources combined.]
• 35% of the employer sample hired at least one person through AJB.
 30% hired at least one person based on job postings.
 11% filled jobs using the resume search (5% used only the resume search to make a hire while 6%
also hired through resume search and job posting).
• 45% of the employers making a hire through AJB hired more than one person through AJB during the
three-month study period.
• A total of 222 hires were made using AJB by employers in the sample during the three months they were in
the study.
Employer outcomes (251 employers)
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Job seeker outcomes (264 job seekers)
• 10% (26/264) of participants found jobs directly through AJB.  Because of the small sample, this reflects
only 26 people.  Of those finding a job through AJB:
 46% were employed, 46% were unemployed, and 8% did not specify employment status.
 38% had some college, 31% were college graduates, and 12% were high school graduates.
• 28% (72/246) found jobs through all other sources.
• 62% (164/246) found no job during the course of the study. 
• Characteristics of the job seekers participating in the study (while not an outcome, the characteristics are
important in reviewing the above outcomes):
 65% were unemployed, 28% were employed, and 10% did not specify.
 All levels of education were represented, but some college (28%) or college graduate (29%) were the
most common levels, followed by graduate degree (17%) and high school graduate (9%).
SOURCE: AJB Outcomes Study, April 2001–February 2002.
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The study clearly confirms that employers who use AJB also use other
resources to recruit prospective employees, and that AJB is an addition-
al resource to facilitate labor exchange.
Finally, the study confirms that employers who register with AJB
use the services, with 97 percent of the employers posting at least one
order and 76 percent searching resumes at least once during the study
period.
From the job seeker perspective, the size of the sample limits our
analysis because for each individual, we are studying success in a single
job seeker/employer match. However, based on the study findings, AJB
appears reasonably successful, with 10 percent of job seekers obtaining
a job compared to 28 percent through all other sources (which includes
networking, family connections, and other listing services and employ-
ment agency support). There is not sufficient information to analyze all
of the results in detail, including the observation that 62 percent (164)
did not find a job during the study period (a period in which national un-
employment increased). This would appear to be a promising area for
future research to shed more light on the dynamics of AJB use.
The AJB study goes on to extrapolate the study findings for the July
1, 2000, through June 30, 2001, period. Although such an extrapolation
is not exact because the study is not totally random, it does provide a
reasonable snapshot of the magnitude of employers and job seekers
who have successfully used AJB to make a hire or get a job. The study
extrapolated the findings for the year July 1, 2000, through June 30,
2001, as shown in Table 6.4.
Because the sample was not random, the extrapolated results pro-
vide only a broad range of estimates. We would expect the number of
openings filled to be larger than the number of job postings for which a
hire was made (since job postings may have multiple openings). This is
not the case in the extrapolation. This is largely explained because the
sample employers had on average 2.33 openings per posting, while for
PY 2001 the average openings were only 1.6 for each posting. The esti-
mate of 449,100 openings filled is very conservative and may well be
higher. Also, we would expect the number of job seekers placed to be
similar to the number of openings. While the sample does not allow
such precision, there is another significant reason for the difference.
The AJB permits job seekers to search and apply for jobs without regis-
tering with AJB, so nonregistered job seekers are likely to account for
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Table 6.4  Extrapolation of AJB Outcomes Study Findings
AJB data for program year (PY) ending June 2001 (actual data):
• 6,962,692 new job orders posted.
• 11,228,690 new openings posted.
• 66,563 new employers registered; 226,274 total employers registered.
• 8,234,049 resume searches conducted.
Extrapolation of results for PY ending June 2001 for employers:
• Assuming 8% job order fill rate, an estimated 557,000 job posts led to a
hire. 
• At a 4% opening fill rate, an estimated 449,100 new openings were
filled. 
• An estimated 23,300 new employers and 79,000 total employers hired at
least one person through AJB.
Extrapolation of results for job seekers:
• At a 10% placement rate, an estimated 345,000 people were placed
through AJB.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from TATC.
part of the difference. It is likely that the extrapolation of 345,000 job
seekers finding jobs is lower than the actual figure. Based on these
rough approximations, the data appear to show that at least 450,000 in-
dividuals were placed through AJB during the year, and it is likely that
the figure is higher.
AUTOMATING LABOR EXCHANGE SUPPORT SERVICES:
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND ONE-STOP
OPERATING SYSTEMS
In addition to the information and job-matching services provided
through the public workforce investment system, USDOL and states
have invested in a number of improvements to work processes to sup-
port customer needs. Automation has played a key role in supporting
UI benefits and employer tax payments and in developing operating
systems to better serve customers in one-stop career centers. The use of
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technology to improve the way in which customers are served poten-
tially makes it easier for the customer to obtain necessary services and
can free up staff time to support direct labor exchange services.
Automation has dramatically changed the face of the UI system
over the past few years for both beneficiaries and employers. As of Au-
gust 2002, the status of computerized and telephone UI claims was as
follows:
• Internet claims (systems that allow individuals to make UI
claims over the Internet): 22 states had operational systems, 24
states were planning systems, 1 state was considering the possi-
bility, and 6 had no plans.
• Telephone claims (individuals can make claims via the phone):
29 states had operational systems, 4 were partially implemented,
17 were planning systems, and 3 had no plans
• Telephone weeks claimed (individuals can confirm unemploy-
ment status over the phone after having registered): 44 states had
implemented systems, 8 were planning such systems, and 1 had
no plans.
These automation efforts by states have been supported by 35 state
grants for Internet-enabled UI systems and 40 state grants for tele-
phone-based UI systems. In most states, individuals now can register
for benefits and subsequently confirm their UI status without coming
into an office. This has allowed states to consolidate UI services, reduce
costs, and provide efficient service to beneficiaries. However, the lack
of contact between UI claimants and staff may impact negatively on the
job search and other services that could help claimants find new jobs
more quickly. While there are as yet no research study findings to con-
firm this (see USDOL 2002, pp. 140–142), it would still seem that a key
consideration for states must be how they both link claimants to self-
service tools on the Web and encourage them to visit the one-stop ca-
reer centers for staff-assisted labor exchange and training services.
The expansion of USDOL-funded workforce development initia-
tives to provide universal service through the one-stop delivery system
has led to efforts to use automation to streamline and organize registra-
tion and intake and determination of appropriate services for different
customers. Both USDOL and states, or consortia of states, have funded
different systems that generically are referred to as one-stop operating
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systems. While the philosophy and features of such systems vary across
states, the purposes of such systems generally are to provide staff as-
sisted, self-service resources, and tracking capabilities. They are in-
tended to allow staff to provide services to customers more efficiently
and effectively, organize and provide access to self-service resources
for direct use by customers, and record and keep track of customers,
services provided, and outcomes. Table 6.5 lists features3 that are illus-
trative of those offered in the different versions of such systems.
Operating systems such as this can organize a wide range of work
processes and information resources, allowing staff and customers to
more easily manage and negotiate services facilitating labor exchange
activities, both immediate job placement as well as longer-term prepa-
ration for the marketplace.
Another interesting state model designed to reduce some of the
friction of labor exchange dynamics is a joint demonstration effort by
ETA, the Georgia Department of Labor, and the Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research to develop a Frontline Decision Support System
(FDSS). While bearing some similarities to one-stop operating sys-
tems, FDSS is focused more specifically on providing tools and cus-
tomized information about employment prospects and services (Eberts,
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Table 6.5  Illustrative Features of One-Stop Operating Systems
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mentary modules that generate recommendations to help staff and cus-
tomers make informed decisions regarding job prospects and service
referrals. The Systematic Job Search Module includes a reemployment
probability component to determine the likelihood of a person being
employed in the industry in which he or she was previously employed
(particularly useful for dislocated workers). A second component is an
earnings algorithm to estimate the expected range of job earnings for a
person. A third component is a related-occupations module that em-
ploys an algorithm to identify occupations related to the job seeker’s
previous occupation. Together, these components allow a dislocated
worker to consider some alternative scenarios. Customers can explore
questions such as, “What if I have to seek employment in a different in-
dustry, or train for a related occupation, what range of wages can I ex-
pect and what training might I need?” The information provided by
FDSS can make contemplating such changes less threatening by filling
in some of the unknown variables. These components use current labor
market information to facilitate informed decision making. 
Next, the Service Referral Module provides a list of available ser-
vices, ranked in order of expected effectiveness. What makes this ap-
proach unique is that the rankings in this module are based on informa-
tion derived from the experience of job seekers with characteristics
similar to those of the person being served, using administrative data on
the characteristics, services received, and outcomes of people who have
participated in employment services offered by one-stop career centers
in Georgia. The system also uses related occupations identified in the
O*NET system as one input. The FDSS provides an example of the val-
ue of transactional data to improve the labor exchange process by using
these data to inform the services provided to the customer. Such use of
more “real-time” data to improve labor exchange services and out-
comes is possible only because of advances in technology and informa-
tion systems. The combination of more robust labor market information
through standardized programs used in conjunction with transactional
data may help to better link employers and job seekers, and to better
prepare workers. The Frontline Decision Support System serves as a
demonstration of such potential. An evaluation of the FDSS demonstra-
tion may aid understanding of its effectiveness and exportability to oth-
er states.
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LABOR MARKET AND CAREER INFORMATION—
MEETING MARKETPLACE NEEDS
Labor market information has long been a staple good provided
through a federal–state cooperative program between state ES agencies
and BLS, with funding support for several LMI-related activities from
ETA. Labor market information has supported the needs of employers
and job seekers, and of education and workforce development. Howev-
er, the combination of technology, the Internet, new ways of organizing
and sharing LMI databases, and, most significantly, the passage of WIA
in 1998, have raised the status of LMI as a primary product and service
under workforce investment programs.
WIA, as noted, extended workforce investment programs to a uni-
versal audience, with the idea that self-directed services may serve the
needs of many citizens. Section 309 of WIA amended the Wagner-
Peyser Act by adding a new Section 15, “Employment Statistics”,4
which states, “The Secretary [DOL] . . . shall oversee the development,
maintenance, and continuous improvement of a nationwide employ-
ment statistics system . . .” Among the types of data to be gathered are
employment, unemployment, industrial distribution of occupations,
projected employment opportunities, wages, information on state and
local employment opportunities, and other appropriate statistics related
to labor market dynamics. Also required under WIA was the develop-
ment of an annual plan on employment statistics developed for the sec-
retary by BLS in cooperation with the states. 
This language led to several developments. In the 1990s, ETA es-
tablished the America’s Labor Market Information System (ALMIS),
which provides both an infrastructure for research and development to
improve LMI, as well as state funding to support customer-based prod-
ucts and improved quality of information. A Workforce Information
Council (WIC), consisting of representatives from BLS and other fed-
eral and state statistical agencies, was set up to plan, guide, and oversee
the nationwide workforce information system. The WIC prepares an
annual LMI plan for the Secretary of Labor, thus providing for greater
participation by states in the planning process and raising the visibility
of LMI as a key USDOL product and service to the country. Much of
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the information is intended to support improved labor exchange by in-
forming both employers and job seekers of labor market conditions and
opportunities and by enabling longer-term planning and preparation by
individuals so they are better prepared to enter the labor market more
quickly or keep current with changing skill needs. The Secretary of La-
bor’s Workforce Information System Plan for 2001–2005 established
three priorities: 1) strengthen customer feedback for continuous im-
provement; 2) work to fill critical data gaps, and 3) improve workforce
information analysis and delivery.5 The WIC and ALMIS efforts are di-
rectly linked and support a vastly expanded LMI program that pro-
duces, wage information, industry estimates, occupational projections
for about 450 areas of the country, and a host of other information.
Most critical is how USDOL and the states have worked to make
such information available to the public. First, many states have devel-
oped sophisticated but easy-to-use LMI sites on the Web. Four of many
examples are the Oregon Labor Market Information System
(www.olmis.org); Washington’s WILMA (www.wilma.org); North
Carolina’s WEBSARAS (http://eslmi12.esc.state.nc.us/websaras/); and
New York’s Career Zone (www.nycareerzone.org). Some of these sys-
tems, are also designed to support regional labor market analysis for
economic development and planning purposes. These systems and in-
formation analyses go hand in hand with workforce investment activi-
ties to ensure that workers have the skills needed to attract new busi-
ness.
In addition to sites operated by state LMI programs, there are liter-
ally thousands of other sites that provide occupational and career infor-
mation and services, some proprietary, some public. Among the most
important are career information delivery systems (CIDS). These sys-
tems are integrated and comprehensive, providing labor market infor-
mation, occupational characteristics, and education and training pro-
gram information in a career development framework. Many states
have adopted a particular system statewide, though individual school
districts may select different systems as well. Most of the systems are
licensed, with a school or school district or state paying a licensing fee
for their use. Nearly all CIDS are available on the Web as well. All
CIDS include various search capabilities, assessments, and detailed in-
formation brought together from many different sources. 
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CIDS have been leaders in the use of technology, with automated
mainframe systems appearing in the late 1960s and early 70s, migrat-
ing to microcomputers and networks in the 80s and now available on
the Web as well as through local networks. These CIDS reach millions
of users throughout the country, and nearly all of the major CIDS are
now linked to AJB at the occupational level, allowing a user to explore
an occupation on CIDS and link directly to the America’s Job Bank to
explore job openings information, without having to respecify the oc-
cupation or state.
To find state LMI, CIDS, and other key information sites, ACINet
provides an excellent set of links at http://www.acinet.org/acinet/
library.asp. When you reach that page, select “Career and Labor Market
Information” under the heading “State Resources.” Many other states
have developed customer-oriented LMI systems, and many are adopting
similar systems and customizing them as appropriate to their state.
COMMON LANGUAGE FOR OCCUPATIONS
The O*NET system developed by USDOL supersedes the Dictio-
nary of Occupational Titles and provides a common language to de-
scribe occupational knowledge, skills and abilities, worker require-
ments, tasks, generalized work activities, related interests, and other
attributes. “O*NET is the first available system with planned national
scope that brings together the most current category and enumerative
systems and the most comprehensive descriptive analytical systems and
makes the data readily available in electronic form.”6 O*NET occupa-
tions are fully compatible with the Standard Occupational Classifica-
tion (SOC) system using the same codes, although the O*NET data-
base provides additional occupations within the SOC framework. This
integration with the SOC is key, because data such as occupational esti-
mates, projections, and wage information collected by the federal gov-
ernment and by state LMI divisions are collected at the SOC level. As a
result, it is now possible for both public and private information and
application developers to provide customers, easily and transparently,
with information on occupational characteristics and requirements
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(from the O*NET database), along with key LMI related to the occupa-
tion. A good example of such power was noted earlier in this chapter in
the descriptions of the CareerOneStop products. A customer can search
for job openings for welders in Missouri and then link directly to infor-
mation about welders in ACINet, which includes occupational projec-
tions, estimates, and wages along with O*NET characteristics and re-
quirements information, without the need for the customer to reenter
information on the search. Once the customer selects the occupation
and the state, he or she simply moves between the systems. Similarly, a
person could begin career exploration in O*NET OnLine, link over to
ACINet by specifying the state, and explore wages and trends informa-
tion about that same occupation. One could then move to job openings
in AJB without having to reenter the occupation or state. Such links are
only possible because of the common language afforded by the
SOC/O*NET system, the detailed occupational attribute information
available in the O*NET database, which is available electronically.
USDOL made an operational decision to provide O*NET informa-
tion as an electronic database available for free to private and public ap-
plication developers and, most significantly, that the primary means of
providing O*NET information to the end-line customer would be
through such private or public (particularly state agencies) developers
rather than the federal government serving as the principal developer
of applications. This strategy has proved very successful, with hun-
dreds of vendors downloading O*NET from the O*NET Center Web
site and developing applications based in part or in total on O*NET.7 As
a result of this approach, O*NET information reaches tens of millions
users through state LMI Web sites, through private and public CIDS,
through ACINet, through human resources information systems, and
through many other sources. The O*NET classification serves as the
underlying occupational structure for systems such as AJB and for
some proprietary job openings systems, as well.
In addition to the O*NET database, there are three O*NET Career
Exploration Tools: O*NET Interest Profiler, O*NET Work Importance
Locator, and O*NET Ability Profiler. After a customer takes one of
these assessment instruments, the results are tied to O*NET occupa-
tions so that an individual can identify and then explore information
about the occupations that best match the results of his or her assess-
ment. All of these tools are intended for career planning and explo-
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ration to help an individual identify and prepare for the skill require-
ments of the workplace. Several public and private vendors have com-
puterized the first two instruments (which are designed for both self
and staff-assisted service use) and built them into their information sys-
tems. Already some systems are available that allow a person to take
one of the O*NET assessments on the Internet, access information on
occupations that best match the resulting scores from O*NET and LMI
sources and then link to AJB—all seamlessly. In addition, several orga-
nizations that have developed their own proprietary assessment instru-
ments over the years have now tied their systems to O*NET occupa-
tions, and individuals using these assessment tools can be linked to
O*NET information as well as LMI and job openings.
Never before has such capability existed for employers, individu-
als, and intermediaries to so easily use and move between assessment
tools, occupational characteristics, LMI, and actual job openings. The
implications for improved labor exchange are enormous, allowing indi-
viduals to better plan and prepare for workplace needs based on easily
accessible information and support tools and services. The public labor
exchange and workforce investment systems have played a major role
in this effort by working collaboratively with the private sector to pro-
vide better LMI and more detailed links to AJB and other USDOL
products, and by building a common SOC/O*NET occupational lan-
guage that provides a foundation for interconnectivity among various
information resources.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE—ISSUES, RESEARCH,
AND PROSPECTS
Automation and the Internet have altered the labor exchange pro-
cess, but the exact nature of the consequences remain to be seen. It is
likely that there will be overall gains in the efficiency of labor exchange
dynamics, but as is the case with the economy in general, not everyone
will enjoy these benefits equally. There are a number of potential issues
and opportunities that arise as a result of the ease of electronic access
between employers and job seekers and the growing wealth of labor
market information, several of which we consider below.
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First, there is a risk that the increased capabilities of automated sys-
tems to provide easier connections among employers and job seekers
may reduce the perceived need for staff-assisted services. Disinvest-
ment in staff-assisted services could put at risk those individuals most
in need of intensive workforce investment services. It is important that
the public investments in improved automated labor exchange services
are used to help frontline staff serve customers more effectively and
identify those who require more staff-assisted services and then provide
the appropriate interventions. Staff-assisted services are crucial to
meeting the needs of many citizens and employers.
Second, the very ease with which job seekers can locate jobs on the
Internet and with which employers can advertise jobs and search re-
sumes paradoxically could lead to both frustration and inefficiencies in
automated labor exchange. Job search and submitting job applications
on the Web comes with little cost to the job seeker other than time
(which is significantly reduced), and job seekers can easily send re-
sumes to many different employers. This potentially could lead to too
many resumes for employers and, for the job seeker, too many com-
petitors for the same job. From the employer’s perspective it may be
difficult to judge quality resumes, and some job seekers may begin to
view the search as akin to a lottery system. Autor (2001, p. 30) address-
es this issue by suggesting we group information into low and high
bandwidth categories. Low-bandwidth data are items that are verifiable,
such as diplomas, certificates, credentials, previous salaries, and expe-
rience. High-bandwidth data relate more to personal traits, including
motivation, quality of work, worker relationships, commitment, or re-
actions to work situations. The Internet can transmit information relat-
ed to low bandwidth, but high-bandwidth information generally re-
quires personal interactions; even then, a simple interview often does
not suffice. Of course, this is not a new phenomenon, but rather a very
natural part of the labor exchange dynamic; however, with the Internet,
the issue looms larger. 
Even with types of low-bandwidth data, verifying the information
in the resume may be problematic. There is a growing interest in stan-
dardizing certain types of information, such as verifiable certifications
that could easily be checked by an employer. For high-bandwidth infor-
mation, services on the Web might expand to include additional infor-
mation, such as samples of work products, evaluations from previous
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clients, or online assessments. Ironically, such information needs may
lead to new organizations or expanding services by public and private
employment agencies to verify information and serve as the intermedi-
ary between employers and job seekers, moving away in some cases
from the direct employer/job seeker connection. Both employers and
job seekers might work with outside organizations (many of which may
be Web-based) that carry out the initial resume, job search, and verifi-
cation, and then present a portfolio of promising candidates to the em-
ployer or a list of jobs to job seekers. The public ES has long provided
such services, and while about half of the jobs on AJB are direct post-
ings by employers (or staffing agencies), the growth of such Internet ca-
pabilities could lead to new opportunities for the one-stop career cen-
ters and public ES systems to provide more rather than fewer
staff-assisted services for employers and job seekers.
There may be an initial tendency by job seekers to rely too much on
the Web for job search, which could lengthen, rather than shorten, the
job search. The Web should be considered one more facet of the job
search. Job seekers should use the Web not just to search for job open-
ings, but as a job and career research tool to find out about employers,
skill requirements, education, and training.
Job and career counselors and facilitators should view the Web as a
significant tool to better serve customers and build their expertise in us-
ing the Internet as a research “library,” and not just a quick source of
job openings information or LMI. The critical need is for human
resource development specialists to learn to use and perceive the Inter-
net as a time saver that provides an opportunity for more “quality” time
with their customers, rather than one that detracts from their client ser-
vice.
An area of great potential is the use of job openings information
from the Internet as transactional information to identify changing em-
ployer skill needs and emerging occupations. For the public sector, in-
vestment in analysis of AJB transactions may serve as a first step. Ide-
ally, a consortium of public and private job search sites that are willing
to share information that could then be searched using data mining soft-
ware would provide a more robust source that better reflects the overall
economy. Over time, regular analysis of a select number of job search
sites might be used to provide more real-time information on current
occupational demand, wage rates, and other labor market trends. Such
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data could supplement and complement data developed by BLS and
state LMI divisions, providing a more dynamic view of the economy. 
USDOL might consider larger scale studies of AJB use both to
identify improvements and also as a means of understanding the dy-
namics of labor exchange processes over the Internet. This information
could be invaluable for employers, job seekers, and workforce invest-
ment professionals on how to use Web services more effectively, and
for DOL and states to improve labor exchange services. In addition to
expanding the number of employers and job seekers who might be in-
cluded in studies similar to the first AJB study, information could be
gathered from one-stop services (including UI) that provide intermedi-
ary services between employers and job seekers to determine how
many jobs are filled and job seekers placed using AJB when an inter-
mediary is involved.
CONCLUSION
Use of the Internet as a means for job search and labor exchange
will likely grow, although there will be a shaking out of the various
players and tools provided. The public ES system will be a direct play-
er in the system. Beyond that, USDOL and the public sector in general
can play a major role in working to reduce inequities in access to infor-
mation and services. As envisioned under WIA, continued or even ex-
panded emphasis on staff-assisted services is one means to achieve eq-
uity in service delivery. Another important goal for the public sector is
to continue to maintain and enhance a high-quality nationwide LMI
system and provide such information through public applications and
products, as well as encourage private sector dissemination of such in-
formation in customized applications. In partnership with the private
sector, USDOL also could encourage expanded use of job openings in-
formation as a source of real-time transactional information to provide
greater insight into changing skills and market needs. 
Finally, the public workforce investment system can work to build
the skills of employers and job seekers to better use self-service prod-
ucts and resources. Providing guidance and instruction on the use of re-
sources and career planning will help individuals take direct responsi-
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bility for their career planning, preparation, skills development, and job
search, and over time will require less staff-assisted service in future
career or job transition activities. Ultimately, a successful labor ex-
change system depends in large part on the flow of quality information
between the job seeker and the employer—a challenge that the public
workforce investment system has taken on for the last 70 years.
Notes
1. See Chapter VII for discussion of his theory on how the free market grows as a re-
sult of changes in technology, new work processes, etc. that tear down the old
structures and build new ones. The growth of information technologies and the In-
ternet provide a remarkable example of Schumpeter’s theory, first published in
1942, at play. The same effect seems to be playing out in the labor exchange pro-
cess, though it is too early to judge how different the labor exchange process will
ultimately be.
2. See Yavitz, Morse, and Dutka (1973) for a discussion of job market versus the
broader labor market.
3. For examples of features in a specific system, see the America’s One-Stop Operat-
ing System Web site: http://ososinfo.ajb.org/.
4. Prior to WIA, the Wagner-Peyser Act, CETA, and JTPA all had requirements for la-
bor market information. The WIA is significant because it outlined in much greater
detail the parameters of a nationwide LMI system, it required development of a
plan by state and federal partners, and it provided emphasis on the provision of
LMI and career information as a primary or core service to support both employers
and job seekers.
5. The plan provides additional details for each priority. To access the plan go to the
WIC Web site at <www.workforceinfocouncil.org>.
6. See National Research Council (1999, pp. 5–7) for implications of changing nature
of work to classification systems and the aegis of O*NET.
7. See <www.onetcenter.org> for information on O*NET system, databases, and oth-
er products, resources, and services.
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Public Provision of Employment
Services in Selected 
OECD Countries
The Job Brokerage Function
Douglas Lippoldt
Melvin Brodsky
In 2000, following a decade-long series of public employment ser-
vice reviews, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) held a conference in Prague to take stock of the con-
clusions and look forward (OECD 2001b). The final report of the
conference found that “a sea change” in public employment services’
working methods had taken place during the decade. Public employ-
ment services (PES) in many OECD countries have indeed undergone
substantial changes during the past decade as policymakers sought to
improve the effectiveness and flexibility of labor market measures in
the face of change and stress in labor markets. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a succinct, comparative review
of key developments in the public provision of employment services in
selected OECD countries, with particular emphasis on the job broker-
age function (defined broadly to include vacancy and job seeker regis-
tration, counseling and placement); reference is also made to mecha-
nisms for referral to active labor market programs. The chapter focuses
primarily on a group of OECD countries selected from among those
whose PES systems were reviewed by the OECD during the past de-
cade and for which data were available: Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
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France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States. For an overview of the PES job brokerage
operations in each study country, see Table 7.1. It is important to note
that this selection of countries, while covering a broad range of exam-
ples, is not necessarily representative of the OECD countries as a
whole. The analysis draws substantially on OECD databases and sever-
al recent survey papers. Due to the pace of policy change in this area, it
has by necessity been illustrative rather than comprehensive in ap-
proach. 
The role of PES job brokerage services can be important in ad-
dressing market failures. First, they can help to improve the transparen-
cy of the labor market by registering and listing vacancies for job seek-
ers and employers who might not otherwise have ready access to this
information. Second, they provide tools (e.g., access to the Internet)
and assistance (e.g., advice on job search strategies) to the job-ready
unemployed and other job seekers, potentially helping them to find em-
ployment more rapidly or with a better match than might otherwise be
the case. Third, for those who are not yet job ready or who face a mis-
match vis-à-vis available vacancies, the PES can make and support re-
ferrals for training, specialized counseling or other assistance (which
may be otherwise under-supplied in the market), with a view to facili-
tating the early placement of these job seekers. Fourth, access to quali-
ty PES brokerage services can reduce the cost of job search and, in as-
sociation with benefit conditionality, can increase the job search effort
and motivation among the unemployed, thereby increasing employ-
ment probabilities and reducing unemployment.1
Although the PES play a key role in facilitating the matching of la-
bor supply and demand, they are not generally the main channel for fill-
ing vacancies.2 Typically, its market share for placements is one-third
or less (measured in terms of placements as a percentage of all hirings
in the economy; see Table 7.2).3 In an effort to improve their effective-
ness and respond to changing labor market conditions, many PES un-
dertook a restructuring of their job brokerage operations. Thus, the
1990s witnessed government action to modernize and reform PES sys-
tems by taking advantage of new technologies, empirical evidence, and
policy perspectives, thereby enhancing performance. While countries
differed in the resourcing, structure and content of their approaches,
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there were also significant, common features in their restructuring
strategies. 
OVERVIEW
Already by the late 1800s or early 1900s, various types of labor ex-
changes were functioning in most, if not all, of the study countries.4
Over the decades, such exchanges were subsumed into PES systems
with activities going well beyond basic placement activities. Now, the
core PES functions generally comprise job brokerage, administration
of unemployment compensation, and administration of labor market
programs (OECD 2001b).5 In addition, the PES play an important role
in labor market information systems, both collecting some primary data
and helping to disseminate information to users including job seeker
and employer clients, among others. 
The OECD typology of labor market measures has traditionally
made a distinction between passive and active measures. The OECD
defined passive measures to include unemployment compensation and
early retirement for labor market reasons, while active measures in-
cluded PES and administration, labor market training, youth measures,
subsidized employment, and measures for the disabled. Expenditure on
passive measures tends to dominate.
In most OECD countries, some form of activation has been built
into most labor market measures, and as a consequence the effective
differences between these two categories have been reduced.6 For ex-
ample, unemployment compensation is increasingly subject to condi-
tions involving active participation in labor market programs or demon-
stration of independent initiative (OECD 2001b, pp. 35–68). This
emphasis on activation is one key influence on PES restructuring.
The resources devoted to active labor market programs (including
direct program costs and payments of subsistence allowances to pro-
gram participants, as well as PES and related administrative costs) dif-
fer greatly among the countries examined.7 In 1999, for example, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden allocated
between 1.3 percent and 1.8 percent of their GDP to active labor market
214Table 7.1  Overview of PES Job Brokerage Operations in Selected OECD Countries
Country Description
Australia The Department for Employment and Workplace Relations is responsible for the job brokerage
function.  Placement services are provided primarily through the Job Network, which is comprised
of hundreds of agencies contracted by the Department (mainly in the private & community sectors). 
Belgium Placement and vocational training programs are primarily the responsibility of three separate regional
public agencies: FOREM, ORBEM and VDAB.   These bodies offer their services through a number
of subregional and local employment offices (as of 1997, about 100 each in Flanders and Wallonia). 
Denmark The National Labor Market Authority, working under the Ministry of Employment, provides oversight
for the job brokerage function which is implemented by the national employment service (AF).  The
public employment service is organized into 14 regional offices that direct about 95 local offices.
France The French National Employment Office (ANPE) is a national public establishment with a certain
degree of financial autonomy which is responsible for administering the job brokerage aspects of
employment services.  ANPE is organized into 22 regional offices and 750 local offices. 
Japan The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare provides oversight to the Public Employment Security
Offices (PESOs).  Supported by prefectural governments, the PESOs deliver job brokerage services
through a network of some 478 offices plus a number of branch and local offices. 
Netherlands The job brokerage service is primarily the responsibility of the Dutch Employment Office working in
co-operation with the municipalities and social partners.  Its regional offices support the delivery of
placement and reintegration services at the newly established  Centres for Work and Income that are
run on a collaborative basis.  
Sweden The National Labor Market Board (AMS) establishes general goals and guidelines for the 21 county
labor boards, which in turn are responsible for the local employment offices.  There are 403
employment offices, which operate in nearly all municipalities. 
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Switzerland The Federal Department of Economic Affairs provides policy direction for the 26 cantons, that have
substantial autonomy for implementation of the job brokerage function (through some 153 regional
placement offices). They have the option of contracting private placement agencies to provide
placement and counseling services to unemployed workers.
United Kingdom The Department for Work and Pensions provides oversight for the newly established Jobcentre Plus
which operates 1,133 local employment offices delivering job brokerage services. The operations are
relatively centralized. 
United States The US Department of Labor provides national level oversight for the PES, including the job brokerage
function.  States implement policy with considerable autonomy through a network of  roughly 2,500
local offices.  Core job placement operations must be implemented by government staff, but other
operations can be contracted out.
216Table 7.2  PES Workload and Market Share Indicators, 1999
Annual newly registered
Job seekers 








by PES as 











as a % of 
vacancies
Vacancies 
as a % of 
hirings
Placements 
as a % of 
hirings
Australiab — 8 4 — — 53 37 20
Belgiumc — — — — — — 39 —
Denmark 33 8 3 27 8 33 43 14
France 19 12 7 97
(46)
Japanb 10 9 3 113 26 29 76 23
Netherlands 13 4 3 19 17 50 28 14
Sweden 12 11 — — — — — —
Switzerland 6 4 1 12 24 37 24 9
United Kingdom — 9 5 41 — 52 44 23
United Statesd 13 5 1 27 11 26 — —
a Numbers in bold are calculated on the basis of staff in the job brokerage agency only.  The nonbold numbers, including the number in
parentheses for France, are calculated on the basis of PES-wide staffing including benefit administration but excluding staff in occupa-
tional training centers run by the PES.  
b Data for Australia and Japan refer to 1999–2000.
c Data for Belgium refer to 1995.
d Data for the United States refer to 1998–1999.
SOURCE: OECD labor market programs database, OECD PES database and, for Australian placements and vacancies, OECD (2001a).
34 56 39 22
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programs, while the United States and Japan spent 0.17 percent and
0.31 percent, respectively.8 With respect to the PES share of this active
expenditure, Martin and Grubb (2001) observe that “In 2000, the aver-
age OECD country devoted 17 per cent of active spending to PES ad-
ministration, a proportion which has been very stable over the period
1985–2000.”
Although the PES in each of the study countries delivers services in
each of the core PES functional areas, spending on the PES agencies
and related administrative costs varies widely between these countries
(see Table 7.3).9 This expenditure category includes costs of the job
brokerage function as well as the administrative costs for unemploy-
ment compensation and labor market programs.10 In 1999, the Nether-
lands and Sweden expended 0.28 percent and 0.27 percent of their
GDP, respectively, on these items. Australia, which has privatized most
of its PES activities in 1998, allocated 0.20 percent of GDP or an
amount slightly above the average for the 10 countries examined here.
The United States allocated just 0.06 percent of GDP for these expendi-
tures.
The amount of PES and related administrative expenditure per de-
pendent employee provides a comparative indication of the available
resources.11 By this measure, Australia, France, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland all expended in 1999 more than U.S.$100 per
dependent employee, while the PES in the United States expended just
U.S.$41 per dependent employee. An indication of the resource intensi-
ty of the PES can be had by comparing key results to expenditure on the
PES and related administration. For example, the PES and related ad-
ministrative costs per vacancy registered varied between U.S.$3,483 in
the Netherlands to just U.S.$632 in the United Kingdom. In relation to
each placement, these costs ranged from U.S.$6,585 in Switzerland to
U.S.$1,204 in the United Kingdom.
Staffing of the PES also varies widely, as shown by a review of the
indicators in Table 7.4. Due to a lack of consistent data, the table pres-
ents these data in two categories: those covering just the job brokerage
function and those covering the overall PES. One indicator of the poten-
tial personal service availability is the average number of dependent em-
ployees per staff member. Among the countries for which data on just
the job brokerage function are available, this indicator ranges between
365 for Sweden and 1,198 for France (ANPE, i.e., the French National
218Table 7.3  Public Employment Service Expenditures, 1999
PES and related administrative 
expenditures (in U.S. dollarsc)
Active labor market
policy expenditure 
as a % of GDPa
PES and related 
administrative expenditures 








Australiad 0.45 0.20 111 1,152 2,154
Belgium 1.34 0.18 — — —
Denmark 1.78 0.12 78 850 2,591
France 1.37 0.17 113 788 1,398
Japand 0.31 0.20 84 759 2,573
Netherlands 1.62 0.28 197 3,483 5,377
Sweden 1.81 0.27 170 1,385 —
Switzerland 0.66 0.14 115 2,440 6,585
United Kingdomd 0.36 0.13 71 632 1,204
United Statese 0.17 0.06 41 713 2,789
a The active labor market policy budget figure includes PES and administration costs, labor market training, youth measures,
subsidized employment, and measures for the disabled. (See OECD 1994a, pp. 52–53 for full definitions of expenditure cat-
egories.)
b PES and related administration costs include placement, counseling, and vocational guidance; job search courses and related
forms of intensified counseling; support of geographic mobility and similar costs; all administration costs of labor market
agencies (including unemployment benefit agencies), and other labor market programs.
c The conversion of PES expenditure data is based on market exchange rates as of July 1, 1999.
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d Expenditure data for Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom refer to 1999–2000.   For Australia and Japan, PES vacancy
and placement data refer to 1999–2000, as well.
e Data for the United States refer to 1998–1999.
SOURCE: OECD labor market programs database and OECD PES database.
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stock of job 
seekers per 
staff member
PES—Job brokerage and program management only
Denmark 95 25 454 2,775 889 48 103
France—ANPE onlyb 750 19 732 15,200 1,198 131 193
Netherlands 243 27 168 8,500 657 — 89
Sweden 403 22 1,117 10,455 365 22 41
PES—Overall, including benefit administration 
Belgiumc 123 25 248 12,300 245 48 59
Franceb — — — 37,000 570 62 93
Japan 478 27 790 15,273 3,490 70 165
Switzerlandd 153 18 270 4,483 674 25 38
United Kingdome 1,133 26 204 34,963 691 32 43
United Statesf 2,528 28 3,707 70,050 1,825 33 —
NOTE: Excludes staff in occupational training centers run by the PES.
a Data for these indicators are not available for Australia due to the privatization of PES service delivery.
b The institution in France responsible for the job brokerage function is ANPE (see Table 7.1 for a description).  The number of staff per lo-
cal office refers to 1995.  French data under “PES—Overall” include staff in ANPE, UNEDIC (unemployment benefits), Ministère du tra-
vail, and AFPA (training).




d The Swiss local office count refers to placement offices only.
e Data for average stock of job seekers per staff member in the United Kingdom are from (OECD 2001b).
f Data for the United States refer to 1998–1999 (U.S. staffing and local office numbers are estimated based on 1997 data).  Data for benefit
recipients per staff member in the United States are from (OECD 2001b).
SOURCE: OECD PES database, except as noted.
Employment Office). For the other countries, the calculation is based on
overall PES staffing data and ranges from between 245 for Belgium to
3,490 for Japan. In terms of actual client loads per staff member, Sweden
and Switzerland were the best resourced in their respective groupings,
while France (ANPE) and Japan had the largest client stocks per staff
member in their respective groupings. Despite low staffing relative to
dependent employment, the PES in the United States fell below the av-
erage for its grouping in terms of benefit recipients per staff member, re-
flecting the relatively limited use of unemployment benefits. 
ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
SERVICE PROVISION 
In each of the study countries, the PES might be thought of as a net-
work or system comprised of a number of institutions.12 National gov-
ernments have established the framework for each PES, assigning the
responsibilities for the functions of the PES to various institutional
units. Among public institutions engaged in the system, there is a divi-
sion of labor along functional lines with some responsibilities devolved
to the regional or local levels. In most of the countries, there are mech-
anisms for consultation with the social partners (i.e., employers and
worker representatives) on the functioning of the PES.13 And, increas-
ingly, there is an engagement of nongovernment organizations and oth-
er bodies in partnership arrangements with the PES, sometimes on a
contractual basis.
In 9 of the study countries, the job brokerage function is adminis-
tered under a mechanism separate from that for unemployment benefits
(Table 7.5).14 Japan is an exception in the study group, whereby a sin-
gle institution—the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare—adminis-
ters both the job brokerage and unemployment benefits functions. The
United Kingdom has restructured its system over the years first to sep-
arate, then to reintegrate the service delivery of the two functions; now,
it has moved to establish more fully integrated PES administrative
arrangements.15
The basic organization for the placement function tends to be a
tiered one consisting of a national level, regional offices, and local of-
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fices, sometimes with branch offices or part-time service windows in
other institutions. Each of the 10 study countries has at the core of its
PES a network of local offices to deliver basic placement and counsel-
ing services. However, there are many variations in the specific struc-
ture and linkages. These variations have been underscored in recent
years by differences across countries in approaches toward activation of
policy measures, introduction of new technologies, and efforts toward
improved policy coherence (among other initiatives). 
In 9 of the countries, these local offices operate under national or
regional government agencies, some of which have a fair amount of au-
tonomy.16 Australia is the exception (see “Job Network: The Australian
Case,” on p. 229) in that key placement-related services are delivered
locally for the central government on a contractual basis by private or
nonprofit providers (i.e., most basic placement services are no longer
provided directly by the state).17
A number of OECD countries have introduced or expanded decen-
tralization in service delivery, as central governments focus increasing-
ly on the policy framework and mandates and on monitoring outcomes
while permitting regional or local offices and service providers more
flexibility in implementation (OECD 2001b).18 In Denmark, this in-
volved greater engagement of the social partners in the oversight of the
PES.19 In some countries, this may involve local engagement of other
partner institutions (e.g., municipal government, educational institu-
tions, or nongovernmental organizations) with a view to expanding the
pool of knowledge and expertise in addressing labor market problems
and potentially expanding “buy-in” to agreed policy approaches (as in
some areas of the United States). 
The study countries, with the exception of Japan and the United
Kingdom, have substantially decentralized the implementation of the
placement function (Table 7.5) such that regional or local operations
can be tailored to needs in specific areas. Belgium, Switzerland, and the
United States have devolved responsibility for local PES placement of-
fices to subnational levels of government, with the result that different
office networks operate in different regions while still conforming to
the national PES frameworks.20 Under recent PES reforms that came
into effect in January 2002, the Netherlands has established centralized
oversight for the job brokerage function under the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, but has given the local Centers for Work and
224Table 7.5  PES Placement Operations and Linkages
Separate administration of PS
and UBs?
Separate PS and UB 
local client service units?
Significant 
decentralization in 
management of local 
placement offices? Adult training provision







Belgium Yes (UBs under a national
agency, PS under regional
agencies)
Yes Yes (autonomous at
regional level)
Most is provided by the
regional PES agencies.
Denmark Yes (UBs through autonomous
funds, PS through national
agency)
No, in practice (i.e., most
clients register for UBs at
PS office, but separate UI




Most is purchased from a
PES institution, some
externally.a
France Yes (UBs through  autonomous
funds under social partners,
PS through a national
agency)




Most is purchased ex-
ternally or  provided via
a government supported
association (AFPA).
Japan No (both under Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare)
No (but separate ES and UI
sections within offices)




Netherlands Yes (UBs through industrial
insurance boards & joint
bodies, PS through national
agency & partners)
Yes, but moving to co-
locate services with one-





local Centres of Work
and Income)
Most is purchased ex-
ternally.a
Sweden Yes (UBs through autonomous
funds & municipalities, PS
through national agency)
No (claims handled usually




Most is purchased ex-
ternally.
Switzerland Yes (although both under 
same federal department,




Yes Yes (semi-autonomous at
the canton level)
Most is purchased ex-
ternally, with some
provided through PES &
its partners.
United Kingdom Implementing a merged system Generally no, with some
variation by locality (but
implementing a merged
system)
Limited Most is provided through
PS referral to an external
partner institution
(Learning &  Skills
Council).






Mixed (there is a national
initiative for one-stop
shops, but some state
variation; e.g., UB tele-
phone/internet initial




NOTE: PS = Placement service; UB = unemployment benefit.
a In these countries (Australia 1999–2000, Denmark 2000, Netherlands 2000, United States 1998–1999), adult training was the largest
ALMP category in terms of participant inflows (excluding PS).
SOURCE: PES Internet sites and OECD PES reviews; OECD 1993a,b; 1996a,b,c; 1997; 1999; 2001a.
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Income a degree of independence in management and mandated “inte-
grated co-operation” with similar departments in the municipalities
(Struyven and Steurs 2002).
As a complement to the network of local placement offices, some
countries have set up separate PES offices for special target groups. For
example, in France, special local units have been set up to place and
counsel youth (espaces jeunes), professionals (espaces cadres), or em-
ployees in specific industries.21 In Belgium, each of the three regional
placement agencies runs separate (for profit) offices for placements into
temporary work. In Japan, the work of the main PES offices is bolstered
by satellite branch and local offices set up to serve particular local areas
or client groups (e.g., students, part-time workers, women with chil-
dren) (Ministry of Labour 1995).22
Provider networks extend well beyond the local offices in the study
countries and are used to address job seeker needs beyond the basic
placement, counseling, and unemployment benefit services. Placement
offices refer individuals to active labor market programs or to other ser-
vice providers addressing special needs (e.g., to respond to psychologi-
cal problems). While subsidized employment programs are often ad-
ministered directly through the placement offices, most of the other
programs and measures are operated through PES partners or contrac-
tors. For example, in most if not all of the study countries (Belgium
may remain an exception), training referrals are generally made to out-
side providers (Table 7.5). This is the case even in those countries that
20 years ago may have relied more on state-run training centers (e.g.,
Netherlands or Sweden). The use of networks of providers enables the
PES to provide individuals with access to a broad range of targeted as-
sistance.
Even though placement services are often administered separately
from unemployment benefits and program services, there is nevertheless
a move toward functional integration across providers. This is seen, in
part, as a means of rendering the system more transparent to users and
more capable of capitalizing on synergies between the various services
available in an area. In some cases, this has involved actual co-location
of placement services and registration for unemployment benefits, as in
Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands (now being implemented), Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States (some areas). In others, it has
involved “virtual” links, as in some areas of the United States.
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A broader approach can be seen in the ongoing implementation of
one-stop shop facilities in countries such as the Netherlands and much
of the United States.23 While the exact definition of one-stop shops
varies by country, these offices are generally structured to include a lo-
cal employment center at their core (providing placement services,
counseling, and referral to programs), plus unemployment benefit ad-
ministration and representation of other partners such as government
agencies, nonprofit organizations, educational institutions or private-
sector firms. One-stop shops sometimes take the form of unified intake
points for labor market and social services provided by different agen-
cies or suppliers; sometimes they are even more ambitious, with a co-
location of service delivery.
Another organizational development in the PES structure of sever-
al of the study countries is the increase in contestability of employ-
ment services. Australia has perhaps gone the furthest in this regard,
maintaining a public vacancy and resume database system, but deliver-
ing most other labor exchange and reintegration services through pri-
vate providers (see “Job Network: The Australian Case,” on p. 229).
The Netherlands has gone part of the way down this pioneering path
by moving toward contestability in the delivery of reintegration ser-
vices (Struyven and Steurs 2002). On the other hand, most OECD
countries have introduced contestability in the delivery of at least a
portion of their long-term training (Table 7.5). In a twist on the theme
of contestability, the Swiss system has introduced performance-related
payments to the cantons, which have management responsibility for
the local public providers. Moreover, treatment of private employ-
ment services has been liberalized in many OECD countries, even
those that formerly maintained a monopoly for the PES (e.g., Den-
mark). In sum, the employment services market has become much
more competitive.
In 1997, a new International Labour Office convention (C 181) rec-
ognized that private employment services could contribute to the
healthy functioning of labor markets and advocated PES cooperation
with them, while still envisaging regulation to prevent abuses (Thuy,
Hansen, and Price 2001).24 This reflected the (sometimes newly devel-
oped) thinking in most OECD countries that such agencies could com-
plement the PES. In all of the study countries, private employment ser-
vices now play a significant role. For example, in the United States
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there are over 31,000 private employment agencies that offer labor ex-
change services (Balducchi and Pasternak 2001). 
The shift to decentralized systems with networks of providers 
and functional integration across core PES activities has been helped 
by new technologies and management information systems. Office
automation and communication
technology has expanded the pos-
sibilities for exchange of informa-
tion concerning labor market con-
ditions (supply, demand, wages),
job seekers, and employers (e.g.,
resumes and vacancies), or pro-
gram administration (within the
bounds of privacy constraints on
sharing of client information).
While potentially benefiting all
labor market participants, these
systems play a critical role in the
operation of the PES. The infor-
mation they generate empowers
PES managers with timely infor-
mation on local conditions and the
performance of their offices. The
information also feeds back into
the policy and budget formation
processes. For example, local per-
formance is taken into account in
the contracting process in Aus-
tralia and the determination of
central budget funding for PES
operations in Swiss cantons. A
number of other OECD countries
(e.g., Sweden, the United King-
dom, and the United States) have
invested in developing perfor-
mance measurement systems that
provide incentives for managers
JOB NETWORK:
THE AUSTRALIAN CASE
In recent years, the Australian gov-
ernment has energetically pushed forward
with far-ranging employment service re-
forms that extend and combine a number
of the innovations discussed above.  In
particular, major PES reforms were im-
plemented from 1998, whereby the for-
mer Commonwealth Employment Ser-
vice was shut down and most labor
market programs and the previous case
management system were abolished.  The
government established a new system de-
pending substantially on contracted ser-
vice providers.  
Centrelink, a single point of initial
contact for job seekers, was established
for individuals wishing to access income
support and employment services (as well
as certain other government benefits and
services).  This government-sponsored
service provider operates under a busi-
ness partnership arrangement funded by
several government agencies.  At intake,
it employs a “job seeker classification in-
strument” to profile clients and—together
with other criteria—determine the level
and types of assistance that can be of-
fered.
Centrelink refers eligible job seekers
(primarily the unemployed and new or
reentrants to the labor market) to the Job
Network, which consists of hundreds 
of competitively contracted service pro-
to deliver outcomes and satisfy
their clients. 
CLIENT FLOWS: FINDING 
A JOB
The OECD publication La-
bour Market Policies for the 1990s
laid out a labor market policy
agenda highlighting three priori-
ties: 1) mobilizing labor supply, 2)
developing employment related
skills, and 3) promotion of a spirit
of active search among job seek-
ers. Service provision was to focus
first on steps that would rapidly act
to motivate the job seeker while
increasing the individual’s search
efforts and job readiness. The
more intensive measures were to
be reserved for later in the period
of job search, to be made available
only if the first round of services
failed. This agenda was affirmed
in 1992, when OECD labor minis-
ters endorsed a “long-term strate-
gy for a progressive shift from pas-
sive to active labor market
measures and related social poli-
cies.” (OECD 2001c). Subsequent
OECD reviews of the PES ap-
proaches to client flows indicate
that many have substantially fol-
lowed through in the implementa-
tion of such a strategy.
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viders.  They deliver the bulk of govern-
ment-funded employment services, in-
cluding placement services, through five
principal measures:
1) Job Matching (basic labor ex-
change services),
2) Job Search Training (JST, selected
off the shelf assistance and coun-
seling delivered according to an
agreed job search skill plan),
3) Intensive Assistance (IA, substan-
tial personalized assistance deliv-
ered according to a negotiated
preparing for work agreement),
4) Project Contracting (seasonal
placement services), and
5) New Enterprise Incentive Scheme
(self-employment development).
In addition, job seekers with special
needs such as severely disabled, youth
and indigenous people can be referred to
other measures operated by a variety of
public agencies.
Technology is widely employed for
the administration of the system and the
delivery of services.  A user-friendly va-
cancy database is available and accessible
via the Internet and touch-screen kiosks
in Centrelink offices and other locations.
Employers can list open vacancies direct-
ly via the Internet (i.e., with full infor-
mation accessible to all job seekers) or 
in a semi-open fashion via the Job Net-
work providers (i.e., employer informa-
tion is not available until the job seeker
registers with the provider).  Listings via
the Job Network are generally (but not al-
ways) semi-open, because providers are
paid a fee for placing qualified job seek-
ers and want to retain the business for
themselves.  Contracted service providers
submit administrative information and
Is the Future PES a “Virtual”
Institution?
In terms of organization, the
development of the Internet has
transformed many PES into “vir-
tual” institutions that are accessi-
ble from any computer with Inter-
net access. While PES maintain
“bricks and mortar” office net-
works, their virtual services can
decouple the job-matching pro-
cess from the physical confines of
the employment office. PES agen-
cies also use the Internet to deliver
practical information to job seek-
ers on topics such as job search,
how to apply for a job, training op-
portunities, labor market informa-
tion, benefit entitlements, or addi-
tional services available to clients
in their facilities. In some cases,
job seekers can request via the In-
ternet e-mail notification of vacan-
cies that match their preferences
or they can post their resumes for
review by perspective employers;
or registered employers can list
their vacancies directly over the
Internet (e.g., in Australia, Swe-
den, and the United States). 
However, it is clear that the
use of the Internet has limitations.
Disadvantaged job seekers, for
example, may not have ready ac-
cess to a computer with Internet
access or may not have the skills
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track their contractual arrangements on
line.
As part of the reforms, income sup-
port measures were further activated with
mutual obligation requirements imposed
for younger unemployed (and the middle-
aged, ≤ 49 years of age) and Work for the
Dole activities (delivered via contracted
providers separate from the Job Network
and generally targeting young benefit re-
cipients after six months on benefit, but
also often taken up by other unemployed).
The number of unemployment benefit
sanctions increased significantly as a con-
sequence of the activation requirements,
with many sanctions linked to a failure to
attend measures (e.g., IA).
A recent OECD review of Australian
labor market policies (2001a) found that
the results of the first years of Job Network
operation were mixed.  Job seeker and em-
ployer satisfaction surveys indicate that
clients of the new system were generally
happy with it.  Placement results were
comparable to the previous system (e.g.,
in terms of market share) and, more re-
cently, improving.  Moreover, these re-
sults were achieved at significantly less
cost.  However, it was not clear that oppor-
tunities to serve the disadvantaged were
fully exploited.  For example, a substantial
number of IA participants reported that
they had little contact with their providers
after the first or second visit.  Another con-
cern was the integration of the various ele-
ments of the system, particularly with re-
spect to the very long-term unemployed.
As individuals are serviced by different el-
ements of the system over time, expertise
on their cases may be lost and thus their
needs may not be systematically treated.
Efforts are under way to address such
shortfalls. Source: OECD (2001a)
to use the services effectively. Highly qualified job seekers also may
need advice or information that is most efficiently delivered via an em-
ployment center with trained job counselors and ready access to refer-
ence tools and guidance materials. Thus, even where vacancy listings
are readily accessible, many job seekers continue to approach the PES
for additional information or services. For example in Belgium (Flan-
ders), although more than 90 percent of registered vacancies are adver-
tised on a fully open basis, direct referrals by employment counselors
account for a quarter to a third of the job applications that are made in
response to registered vacancies (OECD 2001b).
In sum, it appears that the employment office still has a critical role
to play in the PES organization. However, even in this regard, technolo-
gy is playing an increasing role. Employment services in many OECD
countries are tending to promote the primary responsibility of individual
job seekers for their own job search. In order to allocate scarce resources
with a view to targeting the most intensive services on those most in
need, the PES are increasingly relying on self-service approaches to de-
liver at least a portion of their services to other job seekers. 
Self-Service Initiatives and Job Seeker Access to 
Vacancy Listings 
While a primary focus of PES systems is to facilitate reemploy-
ment of the unemployed, all of the study countries make at least some
basic job placement services available to all job seekers, including em-
ployed individuals seeking a change of employment. Generally, this in-
cludes access to information from a national job vacancy database. 
In many countries, job seekers can gain access to searchable vacan-
cy listings of the PES even without registering. Where employer infor-
mation is provided in at least some of the vacancy listings (i.e., vacancy
listings are open), as in Australia, Belgium, France, Sweden, or the
United States, the job seeker can find a job match directly. The PES in
countries as diverse as Singapore and Slovenia have moved to post
open vacancies on the Internet. Similar initiatives have been undertaken
by private firms such as TMP (which operates Monster.com). And,
some PES Web sites provide links to such commercial vacancy listings
(e.g., as in the United Kingdom). Overall, the advent of the searchable
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vacancy listing has enhanced the transparency of the labor market, po-
tentially expediting the job-matching process. 
Where such services are sought by job seekers who face no partic-
ular disadvantage on the labor market, the PES tend to emphasize self-
service approaches. While the Internet is a key part of this strategy, job
seekers are also able to access a broad range of tools at local placement
offices. For example, some PES provide access to desktop computers or
reference materials. Japan is currently setting up “Hello Work Informa-
tion Plazas” as a way of providing a range of employment information
to job seekers. France has developed a computerized system of refer-
ences and descriptions of occupations and required skills. Touch-screen
kiosks are also widely employed in OECD countries (e.g., Australia,
Belgium, Sweden, and some U.S. states), powered by intuitive software
to assist job seekers—even to those who are not computer literate—
with easy access to vacancies and other information. 
In some of the study countries, many vacancies remain listed in a
semi-open fashion by the PES. Although countries such as Australia or
the United Kingdom have Internet-accessible vacancy databases, em-
ployer information is often not provided (i.e., such vacancy listings are
semi-open). This forces job seekers to contact the employment office
for details. The use of semi-open vacancy listings and employment of-
fice contacts can facilitate prescreening of potential applicants (e.g., as 
a service to employers), monitoring of the PES effectiveness and, in 
the case of Australia, tracking the delivery of contracted services by
suppliers.
Job Seeker Registration
Unemployment benefit claimants are generally required to register
as job seekers at a PES placement office as a precondition for benefit
payment (OECD 2001b, pp. 35–68).25 Registration is also generally re-
quired of other individuals seeking more intensive forms of assistance.
While all of the study countries encourage early placements of unem-
ployed who are job ready, only about one-third of OECD countries
“positively affirm that the placement service sometimes attempts place-
ment at the initial registration.” Following the first registration contact,
most countries conduct a detailed registration interview that may fol-
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low a week or more afterwards. Among other functions, the PES may
use this process to promote self-service job search, or in some cases to
establish individual action plans (e.g., in Australia, Belgium, France,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
Subsequently, for benefit recipients, regular signing-on or confir-
mation of status is required in most OECD countries as a condition of
benefit receipt (OECD 2001b, pp. 35–68). Australia, Belgium, Japan,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom require in-per-
son visits, whereas in Denmark, France, Sweden, and some areas of the
United States, this is done by mail.26 In Australia, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, these proce-
dures involve reporting on job-search efforts, but in Denmark, France,
and Sweden, job search is reviewed relatively infrequently. In Belgium,
there are no general procedures for reporting on job search. Research
reported by Martin and Grubb (2001) found that countries whose PES
effectively monitors unemployment insurance claimants’ search for
work can reduce the duration of unemployment and unemployment in-
surance payments.27
In seeking to improve the functioning of labor markets, the PES of-
ten take special initiatives to address the needs of those job seekers fac-
ing particular disadvantages. For example, this might include targeting
special initiatives on groups such as the long-term unemployed (a sub-
stantial share of total unemployment in most of the study countries) or
youth. Or, for example, in a few countries those with low educational at-
tainment are targeted.28Youth and those with low educational attainment
both experience above-average rates of unemployment (see Table 7.6).
Early in the registration process, Australia, the Netherlands, and the
United States use profiling to identify those likely to require and bene-
fit from intervention with more intensive assistance to address employ-
ment-related issues early in spells of unemployment.29 Some countries
use categorical targeting to respond to the needs of “at risk” groups,
such as youth and young adults (e.g., Australia’s Mutual Obligation ini-
tiative); others classify the unemployed into groups according to their
placement prospects, but rely on the judgement of the PES officers to
do so (e.g., Sweden and Switzerland).
As Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) note, “the experience of
unemployment has an adverse effect on search effectiveness.” Conse-









































Australiab 7.0 29.4 8.4 13.5 7,701 2.2 742 397
Belgiumb 8.6 60.5 12.0 22.6 3,015 1.1 149 109
Denmark 4.8 20.5 7.0 10.0 2,468 1.8 227 74
Francec 10.7 40.4 15.3 26.5 21,079 3.1 3,031 1,710
Japan 4.7 22.4 5.6 9.3 53,305 1.2 5,862 1,730
Netherlands 3.2 43.5 4.9 7.4 5,581 1.7 315 204
Sweden 7.2 30.1 9.0 14.2 3,816 — 468 —
Switzerland 3.0 39.6 5.0 5.6 3,020 1.7 143 53
United Kingdom 5.9 29.6 10.0 12.3 24,172 2.2 2,724 1,430
United Statesb 4.2 6.8 7.7 9.9 127,842 — 7,372 1,886
a Long-term unemployment refers to spells of 12 months or more.
b Dependent employment, hiring rate, total vacancies notified and PES placements data refer to 2000 for Australia, 1995 for Belgium and
1998 for the United States.  
c For France, the hiring rate is based on data for the private sector only.
SOURCE: Unemployment rates are from the OECD (2002), except for those with less than upper secondary education, which are from OECD
(2001c). Entries for other items are from the OECD PES database.
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quently, as durations of unemployment spells increase, many PES
agencies take the initiative to suggest that job seekers should apply for
a specific vacancy; in effect, they imply an obligation to attend a job in-
terview with an employer (e.g., Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States). While most PES target
additional assistance on the long-term unemployed to promote job
readiness and motivation for job search, the United Kingdom has
adopted a work first approach that more aggressively seeks to place in-
dividuals into employment as soon as possible, even while seeking to
address any potential impediments to successful labor market experi-
ences (Wells 2001). Both obligations to interview and placements into
temporary employment help job seekers to maintain some contact with
the labor market, which can provide them insights into possibilities for
finding a job.
Alternatively, the PES may seek to place job seekers into active la-
bor market programs as their job search lengthens. Countries such as
Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, or the
United Kingdom have used preestablished durations as triggers for re-
ferral of clients to such programs. In the Netherlands, for example,
about half of the unemployed are likely to be placed in a program after
12 months on the job seeker register (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001). In
many cases, employment counselors have some discretion and may use
other criteria in making referrals. Some programs are also open to job
seekers who voluntarily request admission as a way of improving their
job prospects. In Denmark and Sweden, upgrading workforce skills is
an integral part of the PES remit, and there is relatively open access to
training programs. 
Vacancy Registration and Employer Services
While employers in some OECD countries increasingly register
their vacancies directly via the Internet, local employment offices still
strive to maintain direct contact with employers. This allows counselors
to cultivate an understanding of the local labor market and to increase
employer awareness of additional services available through the PES
beyond the basic vacancy listings (e.g., prescreening of candidates or
tailored training). New resume talent banks enable employers in some
countries to search actively for suitable job applicants, including direct-
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ly via the Internet (e.g., Sweden and the United States). In some cases,
the PES has sought to market fee-for-services options to employers
along with the basic free provision of the core job brokerage services
(e.g., in Belgium).
Vacancy registrations are for the most part voluntary. A few coun-
tries require employers to list their vacancies with the PES (Belgium
and Sweden), but this is rarely enforced. The French ANPE includes in
its vacancy listings not only those vacancies about which it has been di-
rectly notified, but also vacancies advertised in newspapers and maga-
zines. The Danish PES also registers job announcements placed by em-
ployers in newspapers. 
A study by de Koning, Denys, and Walwei (1999) found the PES to
be a very important recruitment tool for employers because it provides
a ready source of available workers and is free of charge. The PES in
the examined countries have employed a variety of strategies to in-
crease the number of registered vacancies. Some countries (including
Belgium, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom) have organized mar-
keting campaigns to get employers to increase vacancy notifications. In
the United Kingdom, the PES has appointed specific officers as account
managers to manage the PES relationship with particular firms. In Swe-
den, every employer has one counselor as a point of contact (about 150
employers per counselor). Counselors are expected to spend 15–20 per-
cent of their time visiting employers. In Belgium (Wallonia), the PES
has established units to conduct vacancy searches. In Denmark, ap-
proximately 30–40 percent of PES staff are required to keep in contin-
uous contact with employers, and their performance in listing vacancies
is systematically evaluated (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001).
PES PERFORMANCE
Goals and Objectives
The study countries employ a variety of management tools to pro-
vide policy direction and results-orientation in the work of the PES,
with goals and objectives set through different channels depending on
institutional arrangements. Implementation is monitored through PES
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performance indicators and management information systems. Fulfill-
ment is assessed through a variety of strategies, such as external evalu-
ations and audits or client satisfaction surveys.30 For example:
• The Australian labor market reforms launched in 1998 incorpo-
rated provisions for a three stage evaluation (including an ele-
ment of external evaluation) focused on four key criteria: 1) ef-
fectiveness, 2) efficiency, 3) quality of service, and 4) equity.
The elaboration of these criteria helped to provide direction for
the PES and its service providers (whose contracts were speci-
fied with these criteria in mind). 
• In Denmark, local PES management contracts with each em-
ployee or team with regard to annual resources and targets. Re-
gional offices also have agreements with local offices and with
the National Labor Market Board. 
• In France, a Contrat de Progres agreement between the ANPE
and the Ministries of Labor and Finance sets the direction of the
agency for a four-year period. The agreement contains a number
of qualitative targets, such as widening the range of services,
fighting social exclusion, and decentralizing budget manage-
ment.31 A tableaux de bord report provides monthly information
for managers on the PES results for the regions and the country
as a whole. 
• The Netherlands sets the total number of placements as its main
goal but differentiates between placements in regular jobs versus
subsidized jobs, and direct placements made by job centers ver-
sus indirect placements made by other public institutions such as
local community organizations cooperating with job centers. 
• The Swedish PES uses four indicators to measure PES success:
1) rate of filling vacancies; 2) proportion of previously unem-
ployed persons as part of total hiring; 3) the vacancy registration
rate; and 4) the job seeker registration rate. A computerized
management information system called “Leda” displays opera-
tional targets for various levels and organizations of the PES on
an annual, quarterly and monthly basis. Access to the system is
open to all PES employees.
• Switzerland has recently implemented a system to measure the
placement performance of local employment offices in terms of
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the average duration of job search, the proportion of unemploy-
ment spells which result in benefit exhaustion, and the propor-
tion of unemployed workers who reregister after leaving the un-
employment rolls (OECD 2001b). 
• In the United Kingdom, a recent employment service annual
performance agreement lists performance requirements and tar-
gets for six major elements (Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer 2001).
For example, the PES aims to offer unemployed people, particu-
larly the long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged people,
help and advice in finding work or appropriate training. Its ef-
fectiveness is measured in terms of such absolute figures as the
total number of vacancy registrations and the total number of
placements. In addition, the government hires an independent
research company to survey the PES performance at local job
centers. 
• In the United States, the evaluation system for the PES consists
of three components: 1) a set of labor exchange performance
measures (e.g., job seeker entered-employment rate and employ-
ment retention rate at six months); 2) reporting requirements for
labor exchange services and outcomes; and 3) procedures for es-
tablishing performance goals that state agencies and the U.S.
Department of Labor can use in assuring the quality of labor ex-
change services (U.S. Department of Labor 2001). 
• In addition, in recent years the PES in a number of the OECD
countries have placed more emphasis on how PES customers
(i.e., employers and job seekers) rate the services they have been
receiving from the PES. This customer service orientation has
been reinforced in some countries, such as Australia, Belgium
(VDAB), France, Sweden,32 the United Kingdom, and the Unit-
ed States through the use of client satisfaction surveys. 
Comparative Review of PES Performance
International comparisons of PES performance indicators can help
to provide a rough appreciation of PES outcomes. However, care must
be taken in drawing any conclusions due to the important influences of
specific national contexts. 
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Market share indicators can help to situate PES performance in the
labor market. Examples include PES vacancy listings as a percentage
of all hirings in the economy, and PES placements as a percentage of all
hirings in the economy (Table 7.2). Among the countries examined, the
Japanese PES reported the highest percentage of registered vacancies
relative to hirings. The PES in Japan and the United Kingdom delivered
the highest percentages of placements relative to hirings. Switzerland
delivered the lowest market share results in these two indicators (24
percent and 9 percent, respectively).33
In terms of internal performance, the ability of the PES to place job
seekers into vacancies is regarded as one of the most important factors.
An indicator for PES placements as a percentage of new job seeker reg-
istrations with the PES, which can sometimes be readily calculated
from PES reporting, provides a rough gauge of performance in this
area. Table 7.2 shows the wide range in this indicator for the study
countries, which range from 8 percent in Denmark and 11 percent in
the United States, to 34 percent in France and 26 percent in Japan.
The number of placements per PES staff member provides a rough
indicator of the labor intensity of one aspect of the PES operations.34
Here again, there is wide variation. In 1999, among countries for which
the basis of the calculation was PES-wide staffing, this indicator ranged
from 113 placements per staff member in Japan to 12 placements in
Switzerland.35 Among the countries for which the calculation was
based on job brokerage agency staff only, it ranged from 97 in France to
19 in the Netherlands.
When comparing the data on placements, the following caveats
should be kept in mind. First, the number of placements says nothing
about the quality of the job or the labor market readiness of the job
seeker. It is much more difficult to place someone from a disadvantaged
labor market group in a well-paid job than it is to place a highly quali-
fied applicant into a temporary job. Second, PES placements are diffi-
cult to measure. For example, many PES placements achieved through
self-service or general PES job search assistance are not easily tracked.
Third, PES placements are sometimes not well defined or properly
recorded.36 Moreover, while the PES takes credit for many placements,
job seekers often do not recognize the PES as the main reason for find-
ing a job.37
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Effectiveness of PES Placement-Related Programs
The OECD has actively reviewed the growing evaluation literature
on placement-related programs (among other areas). The evidence,
while not without qualification, indicates positive findings with respect
to several approaches that help to support and motivate active job
search:
• Job-search assistance38 tends to be viewed as an effective and in-
expensive way of getting the unemployed back to work quick-
ly.39
• Efforts to maintain closer contacts with unemployed workers
through an intensified interview process can help to motivate job
search.40
• Compulsory referral of job seekers to labor market programs af-
ter a specified period in unemployment has been effective in re-
ducing unemployment.41
• Tightening unemployment benefit eligibility requirements and
increasing their enforcement (along with increased monitoring
of job search) have been found to help motivate effective job
search.42
As for active labor market programs that go beyond job-search as-
sistance, the literature has tended to indicate that large-scale public em-
ployment programs deliver the least positive postprogram effects.43
Training programs and recruitment incentives to the private sector fall
somewhere in the midrange between job search assistance and public
employment programs, with their success depending largely on design
characteristics and the type of target groups addressed (Schwanse
2001).
CONCLUSION
This chapter has underscored current approaches to implementa-
tion of the PES job brokerage function in 10 OECD countries. While
there is wide variation in the resourcing, structure, and content of the
various approaches, there are some crosscutting themes and principles
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that have emerged as part of efforts to improve the effectiveness of the
PES. These touch on the following aspects of PES operations:
• Institutional structure: emphasizing decentralization and net-
working among service providers, combined with functional in-
tegration in the field operations. 
• Delivery of job brokerage services: emphasizing contestability
through the liberalization of private employment services, in-
creasing competitive contracting of services by the PES, and
performance monitoring of service delivery within the PES.
• Service delivery: emphasizing customer service orientation.
• Reemployment strategies: emphasizing job search and activation
measures, while targeting or tiering more intensive services on
disadvantaged job seekers.
• New information technologies: emphasizing delivery of infor-
mation over the Internet, self-service approaches, and manage-
ment information systems.
While OECD countries have found that diversity in approach is ap-
propriate in view of the differing national contexts, experience in many
has highlighted the common utility of certain of these recent innova-
tions.
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1. See Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) for a useful discussion of job search and
unemployment.
2. In many labor markets, the PES market share for placements is smaller than such
channels as newspaper advertisements, direct application to employers, or con-
tacts through personal networks. 
3. For example, figures from the European Commission indicate that the PES in Eu-
ropean Union member states intervene in between 10 percent and 30 percent of
total hiring, although the number of unemployed people receiving help from the
PES in finding employment is higher (European Commission 1998).
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4. Janoski (1990) and OECD (1999), for example, provide information on the ori-
gins of employment services in the United States and certain other OECD coun-
tries.
5. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, the PES have a regulatory or legal
oversight role (e.g., related to dismissal procedures or work permits).
6. Among policymakers in most OECD countries, activation had already become an
important theme by 1990 (e.g., see OECD 1990).
7. See the notes to Table 7.4 for an explanation of these terms. 
8. One factor contributing to this divergence is the prevalence of long-term unem-
ployment (defined as spells of 12 months or more, see Table 7.2) in certain Euro-
pean countries and their use of active labor market programs to address the prob-
lem. It is interesting to note that among the study countries, Sweden tended to
devote the highest share of its overall labor market program expenditure to active
measures (more than one-half in 1993 and 1998), whereas most of the other study
countries expended between one-fifth and two-fifths of the total on active spend-
ing during these two years (OECD 2001c, p. 24).
9. In the Netherlands, for example, the share of GDP spent on these costs was more
than seven times greater than the share in the United States.
10. To the extent that this expenditure category also includes the administrative costs
related to unemployment benefits (but not the cost of unemployment benefits
themselves), it is not a “purely” active category. 
11. Dependent employment refers essentially to wage and salary jobholders.
12. There is some debate about the importance of PES institutional issues. de Koning
(2001), for example, argues that OECD governments have tended to “overesti-
mate the role of the institutional framework,” but also acknowledges that “organ-
isation and implementation of active policies matter to outcomes.” An ILO survey
of the PES around the world (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001) found that most of
the well-established PES had been through a phase whereby a standardized and
structured set of services, procedures, and processes were the norm throughout lo-
cal offices. The authors observe a broad “recognition that a standardized organi-
zation fails to produce the desired results” and note a broad shift internationally
“toward a more flexible and decentralized service-delivery approach tailored to
the conditions and needs of local areas.”
13. In about half the countries, the social partners (i.e., employers representatives and
unions), or the unions alone, participate in the actual administration of benefits
(e.g., France or Sweden). But, with respect to the labor exchange function, their
role tends to be advisory.
14. This is one area where bias is evident in the selection of countries for the present
study. The share of OECD countries with fully integrated systems is higher than
10 percent. Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Korea, and Norway have fully inte-
grated systems.
15. At the local office level in the United Kingdom, the delivery of employment ser-
vices and unemployment benefits has been reunited for about a decade. Now, ad-
ministrative operations of the former Employment Service and certain elements
from the former Benefits Agency (including some benefits in addition to unem-
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ployment benefits) are being merged under the new Jobcentres Plus service in the
Department for Work and Pensions.
16. For example, state offices in the United States have a fair amount of autonomy to
innovate within the federal framework or, in France, ANPE has a fair degree of
autonomy governed in part by the contrat de progrès agreement with the govern-
ment.
17. Interestingly, the United States has taken the opposite position. Despite the heavy
use of contracted services in some PES areas such as training, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor insists that basic placement services must be delivered by govern-
ment personnel (as a way of ensuring that these basic services are delivered to job
seekers in an objective fashion).
18. By the early 1990s, a number of OECD countries were already applying decen-
tralization in service delivery (e.g., the Netherlands and the United States). Still,
even where decentralization already existed, often new means of implementing it
were applied during the course of the 1990s.
19. In another example, Austria shifted a substantial share of implementation discre-
tion to the regional and local offices, with greater engagement of the social part-
ners in oversight. The Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom abandoned
tripartite approaches in 1994, 1991, and 1987, respectively. 
20. Canada has also substantially decentralized its placement services, transferring
nearly all of the resources and responsibilities for this function from the federal to
the provincial level.
21. For example, this occurs under “conversion agreements” with companies to pro-
vide services to employees being laid off.
22. Japanese secondary school students are served primarily by the PES, whereas
university students are served by their school guidance/placement services
(http://www2.mhlw.go.jp/english/e_text/outline/02-5.htm).
23. In France, “single window” facilities exist for access to a range of services for
certain client groups (e.g., some facilities target youth or professionals), but they
do not integrate unemployment benefits. Australia has unified unemployment
benefit administration with job brokerage intake; delivery of job brokerage ser-
vices remains separate (see “Job Network: The Australian Case,” on p. 229).
24. The ILO previously sought to restrict such agencies via Convention 96.
25. There are some exceptions, such as benefit claimants in the United States who are
temporarily laid off with a specific recall date.
26. In some parts of the United States, such as Wisconsin, benefit claimants confirm
their status via telephone.
27. Chapter 5 in this volume by Christopher O’Leary underscores importance of
monitoring and verifying active work search by UI claimants. Also, a useful sum-
mary of PES administration of the work test can be found in (Thuy, Hansen, and
Price 2001).
28. For example, measures targeted on those with low educational attainment exist in
Belgium (via individual action plans) and France (Contrat Jeunes).
29. See Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) for an overview on the statistical
models of UI benefit exhaustion used by U.S. states in Worker Profiling and
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Reemployment Services systems for targeting of early reemployment services on
those at greatest risk of long term UI benefit receipt. 
30. For a discussion of approaches, see Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer (2001) and Wal-
wei (1997).
31. The 1999–2003 agreement emphasizes modernization of the ANPE, integrating
of youth into the labor market, and reducing long-term unemployment.
32. In 1998 and 1999 the Swedish National Labor Market Board promoted customer
satisfaction as a PES goal. However, this indicator was dropped at the national
level in the year 2000 in order to simplify the performance management system
and to concentrate PES work on reducing the unemployment rate to 4 percent by
the end of the year 2000 (Mosley, Schütz, and Breyer 2001). Local employment
offices continue to carry out their own client interview surveys as a basis for local
operations’ planning.
33. In the United States, Holzer (1998) reports that PES agencies account for about 3
percent of newly hired workers in all jobs.
34. The use of placement indicators must be taken in the national context, controlling
for a variety of factors (discussed below).
35. The PES in Japan has a well-developed self-service information system that has
operated for a number of years. The use of this system and related self-service
tools is well established and may account partly for the low labor intensity of its
PES operations (Thuy, Hansen, and Price 2001).
36. For example, repeated short-term placements of a relatively small proportion of
job seekers are sometimes found to account for a large proportion of all place-
ments, or local offices are sometimes found to be recording placements in situa-
tions where they did not really achieve the match (e.g., in cases of recall follow-
ing a temporary layoff or where the employer has applied for a hiring subsidy to
be granted in respect of a specific candidate who was not identified with PES as-
sistance).
37. For example, the Swedish National Labor Market Board (AMS) asked workers
who had been hired during 1992 and 1993 where they received the decisive infor-
mation about these jobs (OECD 1996b). The proportion mentioning the PES was
13–14 percent. Yet a review of PES job placements as a percentage of vacancy
registrations using AMS data implies that the PES was in part responsible for 47
percent of job placements.
38. Job search assistance is a term covering a variety of relatively low-cost and gen-
erally short-term services aimed at equipping and motivating job seekers to find a
job. Examples include initial interviews at PES offices, in-depth counseling dur-
ing an unemployment spell, reemployment bonuses, and jobs clubs (Martin and
Grubb 2001). Such services are also sometimes combined with increased moni-
toring and enforcement of the job search requirements for receipt of unemploy-
ment benefits.
39. For example, Martin and Grubb (2001) report that evaluations in Canada, Swe-
den, the United Kingdom, and the United States support this finding, although a
study in the Netherlands found no significant impact.
Public Provision of Employment Services in Selected OECD Countries 245
40. For example, the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1994b) found that increased PES ef-
forts to maintain closer contacts with the unemployed through frequent job inter-
views was effective, and that interviewing unemployed people, when such a pro-
cedure was rarely used before, resulted in 5–10 percent of benefit claims being
dropped. In the Netherlands, employment counselors who increased the amount
of time spent interviewing the unemployed found an almost one-third increase in
the number of job applications.
41. For example, evaluations in Denmark and Switzerland found that establishing an
obligation to enter a labor market program increased the rate at which the unem-
ployed found a job.
42. For example, Abbring, Van Den Berg, and Van Ours (1999) found that imposing
benefit sanctions on the unemployed in the Netherlands raised their subsequent
transition rate to employment by 77 percent in the metal sector and 107 percent in
the banking sector. A Danish study (Ministry of Finance 1998) on the strictness of
eligibility criteria in 19 OECD countries concluded that strict benefit eligibility
criteria can reduce long-term unemployment and offset the impact of high re-
placement rates in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden.
43. However, as noted in Martin and Grubb (2001) the preprogram or motivation ef-
fects of potential referral to such programs can be significant. For example, in
U.S. welfare reform, the decline in entries to welfare has been as important as the
increase in exits from welfare in accounting for the caseload declines (Moffitt
2002). Beyond the United States, public employment programs with emphasis on
training have often been a component in strategies where motivation effects play
an important role (e.g., the New Deal in the United Kingdom or Work for the Dole
in Australia). Moreover, such programs can help severely disadvantaged labor
market groups to stay economically active as part of an overall strategy against
social exclusion (Brodsky 2000).
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Experience and Prospects 




Seventy years ago, in the depths of the Great Depression, the Unit-
ed States instituted a national labor exchange policy to aid economic re-
covery and labor market stability. To implement it, the new Roosevelt
Administration and Congress established a federal–state system of pub-
lic employment offices. Throughout subsequent economic, social, and
political changes, the federal–state system under the Wagner-Peyser
Act has provided steady and equitable labor exchange services to job
seekers and employers. This chapter describes the evolution of labor
exchange policy in the United States, summarizes the major findings in
the preceding chapters, and provides reflections about the future of la-
bor exchange policy.
EVOLUTION OF LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY
In the 1890s, state labor departments started denouncing as im-
moral the practices of many private employment agencies accused of
fleecing the unemployed. Guzda quotes Iowa’s Commissioner of La-
bor, J. R. Sovereign, who complained that Iowa’s private employment
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agents were the “most unscrupulous, despicable, double-dyed villains
that ever lived . . .” (Guzda 1983, p. 13). Around this time, reformers in
Ohio established the first continuous public employment offices in the
five largest cities in the state (Guzda 1983, p. 13). A number of other
states and cities soon followed the Ohio example and set up public em-
ployment offices offering no cost job-matching services. 
To help accommodate the influx of European immigrants during
the early years of the 20th century, the first federal employment office
was set up in 1907 on Ellis Island in New York harbor. The Division of
Information within the U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor ad-
ministered federal employment activities until it was reassigned to the
new U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) in 1913. With America’s en-
try into the First World War, the Division of Information was renamed
the U.S. Employment Service. It established federal–state employment
service (ES) offices in 40 states with the purpose of recruiting defense
workers, adverting labor shortages, and aiding industrial production.
Most of the employment offices were shut down after the first world
war ended. “The economic prosperity that followed World War I left lit-
tle policy sentiment for retaining a national ES system until the tumult
of the Great Depression” (Balducchi, Johnson, and Gritz 1997, p. 495). 
Not until 1933, when unemployment reached 13 million, was the
contemporary federal–state ES system established under the Wagner-
Peyser Act. At the time, only 135 employment offices existed under
public administration in 24 states (Persons 1933, p. 6). To fill the gap
until states could establish public employment offices under the feder-
al–state program, the National Reemployment Service (NRS) was set
up as part of the U. S. Employment Service. By November 1933, NRS
established 2,000 federal reemployment offices to function as place-
ment agencies for the Public Works Administration, Civil Works Ad-
ministration, Works Progress Administration, other public works agen-
cies and private employers. The NRS was a successful incubator for the
federal–state ES system, and by 1939 it was dissolved when all states
established ES programs under the Wagner-Peyser Act (Balducchi
2002, p. 103). During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the ES system
placed 26 million workers in jobs.
The federal–state ES system was started as a service to employers
who could voluntarily use the service free of charge for screening and
referrals of job seekers to vacancies. The first major expansion of labor
exchange policies came when the Social Security Act of 1935 created
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the federal–state Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. Functions of
the ES were expanded to provide the UI system validation that benefi-
ciaries were engaged in active and useful job search activity while be-
ing paid jobless benefits.
During the Second World War, the federal government nationalized
the ES system. It was placed under the Federal War Manpower Com-
mission and charged with helping fill job openings for employers
deemed essential for the war effort, directing the flow of migrant work-
ers, and recruiting new workers (Kulick 1994, pp. 1–3). At the close of
the war, USDOL resumed responsibility for the ES system and the fed-
eral–state structure was reestablished. In the years immediately follow-
ing World War II, the ES system aided the return of nearly 12 million
veterans to civilian jobs. To achieve this, it adopted a labor exchange
policy known as the “Six-Point Program,” which included job place-
ment, employment counseling, services to special applicant groups,
management services to employers, labor market information, and ser-
vices to community constituencies (Haber and Kruger 1964, p. 34). In
the 1950s, the ES system provided additional manpower services for
older and disabled workers, and created special local offices devoted to
the placement of professional workers.
In the 1960s, the policy focus of the ES system ostensibly shifted
from employers to job seekers, and attempts were made to separate ES
systems from UI operations. During this period, labor exchange policy
emphasized job placement, and industry-specific offices were estab-
lished in some urban areas. Moreover, human resource development
policies initiated through Great Society legislation unevenly steered the
ES system to act as a job-finding medium for economically disadvan-
taged groups (Trutko and Barnow 1996, pp. 6 and 8). 
These changes were not warmly welcomed by some employers. In
response, the National Employer Committee, known as the Vickery
Committee, was formed in 1971. Two years later, based upon the Vick-
ery Committee report, USDOL launched the Job Service Improvement
Program. The program was designed to reestablish relations between
the ES system and the business community, and to return the ES system
to the delivery of basic labor exchange services (Trutko and Barnow
1996, p. 15). 
In the 1980s, a major shift in labor exchange policy took place.
Amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act contained in the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 and accompanying regulations de-
volved the bulk of federal responsibility for labor exchange policy to
the states. Writing in 1994, Kulick asserted that the single most impor-
tant goal of the amendments—to devolve responsibility for ES opera-
tions from the federal to state governments—succeeded (Kulick 1994,
pp. 1–5). During the 10-year span following JTPA’s enactment, ES ef-
fectiveness slipped because of diminished attention by the federal part-
ner—including decreased federal funding to support state ES opera-
tions.
In the first decades of the federal–state ES system, the focus was on
service to employers. As part of the broad agenda for social justice in
the 1960s, the ES was reoriented to address economic and social dis-
parities and focused services on to hard-to-employ job seekers. By the
1980s, federal labor exchange policies reflected a political and budget
conservatism that consigned to states a greater responsibility for pro-
gram administration. The current labor exchange environment, codified
in the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, regards the public la-
bor exchange system as a central feature of the federal–state workforce
development system. 
As mandated by WIA, each local area receiving federal job-train-
ing funds must establish a one-stop center that is a central physical lo-
cation for the provision of services by the following federal and state
programs: UI, ES, Dislocated Worker and Youth Training, Welfare-to-
Work, Veterans Employment and Training Programs, Adult Education,
Post-Secondary Vocational Education, Vocational Rehabilitation, Title
V of the Older Americans Act, and Trade Adjustment Assistance. Other
programs may also be included under a one-stop center’s umbrella of
services. Services provided by the one-stop centers are divided into
three levels: core, intensive, and training. Services within each level are
characterized by the amount of staff involvement and the extent to
which customers can access the service independently. Core services
typically have the broadest access and the least staff involvement of the
three categories. Many core services are accessible on a self-serve ba-
sis. All adults and dislocated workers can access core services, which
include assessment interviews, resume workshops, labor market infor-
mation, and interviews for referral to other services. Intensive services
require a greater level of staff involvement, and consequently access is
more limited than for core services. Services within the intensive cate-
gory include individual and group counseling, case management, apti-
tude and skill proficiency testing, job-finding clubs, creation of a job
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search plan, and career planning. Training services, the third and high-
est level of service intensity, are open to customers only through refer-
rals. Training services typically include adult basic skills education, on-
the-job-training, work experience, and occupational skills training.
Services delivered with Wagner-Peyser Act funds are either in the core
or intensive categories. 
WIA spawned a fresh interest by governments in constructing work-
force development systems to meet the changing job and training needs
of workers and employers in the emerging information economy. As a
result, there was resurgence in the type and use of labor exchange ser-
vices. Together with WIA, a variety of contemporaneous institutional
changes contributed to the renewal of ES activity. These include:1
Federal–state implementation of WPRS. Between 1993–1996,
nationwide implementation of Worker Profiling and Reemploy-
ment Services (WPRS), a legislative mandate for states to identify
UI claimants who are likely to exhaust benefit entitlements and re-
fer them to reemployment services, resulted in states’ establishing
new job search workshops and linkages between UI, ES and job-
training programs. Between PY 1993 and PY 2001, the use of job
search workshops by UI claimants increased from 37.2 percent to
78.8 percent. In concert with this growth, state workforce develop-
ment agencies expanded the availability of both self-service and
staff-assisted employment services. In many one-stop centers, the
presence of WPRS job search workshops likely expanded the
availability of such workshops to other job seekers.
Customer service. In the 1990s, a customer service revolution
swept the public sector. State and local workforce development
agencies incorporated many customer-driven techniques common-
ly used by private sector companies (e.g., surveys and focus
groups). The WPRS initiative complemented this revolution as job
search workshops prompted strong customer satisfaction and in-
creased service usage. 
One-stop implementation funds and WIA one-stop delivery
systems. Between PYs 1994–2000, ETA distributed to states
$826.5 million in one-stop grants to replace disparate job finding
and training structures with consolidated one-stop delivery sys-
tems. Many states selected their ES systems as the frameworks for
consolidating new one-stop delivery systems. Under WIA, 17 sep-
arate workforce development programs are required to be part of
the one-stop delivery structure. In 2003, an estimated 3,459 local
offices comprise the public workforce system and are designated
as one-stop centers or affiliated sites. 
Resource rooms. Many one-stop centers provide job seekers and
employers with easy access to labor exchange services through re-
source rooms that contain personal computers, telephones, work
areas, and fax and copy machines. Resource rooms provide job
seekers and employers with information and equipment to conduct
their job searches in a professional and effective way.
Technology. In most resource rooms, job seekers and employers
may access Web-based job-finding software through portal sites
called Career One-Stop. Its major component is a national data-
base of job openings and resumes called America’s Job Bank
(AJB), a computerized job vacancy and resume listing system. Be-
tween 1995 and 2000, AJB experienced a tremendous growth, ris-
ing to an average stock of 1.5 million job openings. “(S)tates vol-
untarily connect their job openings to AJB, and one-third of the
job openings are listed directly by employers” (Balducchi and
Pasternak 2001, p. 148). 
Universal access to Wagner-Peyser Act and WIA Title I ser-
vices. Under the original Wagner-Peyser Act, a requirement for
state agency affiliation with the U.S. Employment Service was
that state ES agencies make labor exchange services available at
no cost to employers and job seekers who are eligible to work in
the United States. This universal service requirement was expand-
ed to Title I programs of WIA that fund services for adults and dis-
located workers. As a result, there has been an increase in the use
of labor exchange services in one-stop centers and at remote self-
service locations.
ETA policy leadership. ETA issued numerous WPRS, one-stop,
and WIA policy directives, technical guides, and regulations to
spur systemwide capacity building and compliance. To promote
effective service delivery, ETA hosted numerous national WPRS,
one-stop, and WIA conferences that showcased state and local ap-
proaches.
Sustained economic growth. Prior to the recession of 2001, the
United States experienced an unprecedented economic expansion
that began in 1993. A bustling U.S. economy with a strong de-
mand for workers may have enabled states to expand labor ex-
change service availability. These expanded self-service and staff-
assisted services are designed for employers and three types of job
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seekers: 1) first-time job seekers who are entering the labor mar-
ket, 2) job seekers who are laid off and face greater job finding
challenges, and 3) job seekers who are employed seeking better
jobs.
AN OVERVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED
In the opening chapter of this book, Eberts and Holzer tackle the
broad issue of who uses public ES services and how often. They note
that federal and state governments have long recognized the importance
of providing free labor exchange services. They assert that if labor ex-
change services were restricted to only privately provided sources, a
type of market failure may result. In particular, a public agency has the
potential to redistribute job opportunities to those individuals with lim-
ited opportunities, such as disadvantaged and disabled workers. Eberts
and Holzer report that public employment agencies are not the most
heavily used avenues of job search by the unemployed, but that public
services are used by a significant fraction of the unemployed, especial-
ly those who lose their jobs involuntarily. They conclude that the Inter-
net may be seen as complementing the public ES and other search
methods, while substituting for informal networks of family and
friends. Eberts and Holzer suggest that the “relevant question for the
public ES is whether those who use it have significantly better out-
comes than they would have had the service not been available, and
how any such gains compare to the public cost of providing the ser-
vice” (p. 21). They conclude that without a random assignment evalua-
tion, or a close approximation, it is difficult to provide definitive an-
swers to these questions. Eberts and Holzer assert that WIA has
restored the role of the public ES to provide basic labor exchange ser-
vices, while consolidating those services into a broader array of other
workforce development services.
Balducchi and Pasternak examined the division of power between
federal, state, and local partners managing workforce development pro-
grams. They point out that since its inception as part of the New Deal,
with the exception of the World War II period, the ES has remained a
cooperative federal–state program administered by governors, while
job-training programs have been locally administered since the 1960s.
They observe that the one-stop approach implemented under WIA did
not reapportion political control of ES and job-training programs. Dur-
ing the first three decades following the 1933 Wagner-Peyser Act, there
were efforts to shift the federal–state balance of power toward federal
control, while during the last three decades efforts have been directed at
localizing power. Power sharing under the Wagner-Peyser Act is
framed by federal requirements that a state agency must administer
programs, the agency must submit a plan of service to USDOL for ap-
proval, a merit personnel system must be utilized, and services must be
delivered by state agency employees. During 1997 and 1998, a compli-
ance dispute in Michigan tested the federal government’s power to set
and enforce requirements upon states when dispensing financial grants
to administer the ES. A federal court decided that the requirement for
administration by state merit personnel was a reasonable rule to ensure
consistent and equitable delivery of labor exchange services statewide.
Balducchi and Pasternak state that in the face of this court decision,
Wagner-Peyser Act regulations promulgated by USDOL in 2000
strengthened the authority of state ES agencies. They anticipate that is-
sues of centralization and decentralization will continue to pose “splen-
did tensions” in American workforce federalism.
Ridley and Tracy observe that one impressive trend in the U.S. la-
bor market is the explosive growth of intermediaries—organizations
that match job seekers with employers—and the present challenge of a
public ES is to, in their words, “remain relevant.” WIA firmly estab-
lished one-stop centers as the entry to a full range of publicly funded
workforce programs, and mandated that ES be one of the programs pro-
viding services through one-stop centers. They describe and explain the
shift from in-person job matching to self-directed services, and identify
a list of those activities that would benefit most from staff intervention,
such as working with employers to develop and list new job orders. In
addition to automated services, resource rooms containing a host of
job-finding aids have also transformed the way customers use ES ser-
vices. A key new role for Wagner-Peyser Act–funded staff in many one-
stop centers is to maintain these rooms and provide core services. Rid-
ley and Tracy assert that under the three-tiered service strategy of
self-services, facilitated self-help and staff-assisted services, staff-as-
sisted services tend to be provided mainly to subgroups of job seekers
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with particular barriers to employment. They also argue that since en-
actment of WIA, ES has forged new partnerships with other social and
workforce programs, but there has been a breakdown in the close rela-
tionship between ES and UI due largely to remote claims-taking tech-
nologies. Ridley and Tracy conclude that a key role of the public ES
may be to act as a “concierge for intermediaries” by creating pathways
for job seekers and employers.
Smole writes that ETA has worked with the states and made great
strides toward establishing a performance measurement system for the
public labor exchange, yet the task remains unfinished. Performance
measurement involves the ongoing monitoring of program outcomes to
provide guidance for managers and staff to improve program adminis-
tration and service delivery. In finalizing the labor exchange perfor-
mance measurement system, Smole recommends that states establish
clearly defined performance standards against which the delivery of la-
bor exchange services can be measured. As ETA and the states do this,
they should consider instituting a methodology for adjusting standards
for demographic and economic conditions, as well as differences in state
program administration. He asserts that doing so would make for fairer
comparisons across states and also would counteract tendencies for
“creaming” in service delivery. Smole suggests instituting performance
indicators for services to employers, such as the market penetration rate;
performance indicators that apply across the one-stop delivery system;
and methodologies for linking program benefits to costs to permit track-
ing of program cost effectiveness; and more closely linking the perfor-
mance measurement procedures applicable to state grantees under the
Wagner-Peyser Act and to ETA under the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993. Performance indicators merely track gross out-
comes; they do not measure the incremental value of a service. To do
that would require contrast of program participant success with that of
an appropriately specified counterfactual. Without more closely exam-
ining the effectiveness of the labor exchange through program evalua-
tion, the degree to which the public labor exchange aids the job-match-
ing process remains uncertain. Thus, performance indicators should not
be used in isolation, but should be part of a broader strategy used to mon-
itor and assess the delivery of labor exchange services. Nonetheless,
when properly employed, performance measurement is a valuable tool
for effective program administration and management. 
O’Leary reports that evaluations of job search assistance have fo-
cused on three main topics: job interview referrals, job search assis-
tance, and targeted job search assistance. He asserts that evidence from
these studies has helped shape the direction of public labor exchange
policy in the United States. ES job referrals are most effective for wo-
men and for men over 45 years of age and for men in urban areas. Link-
ing the ES to UI through the work test leads to significantly shorter pe-
riods of compensated joblessness. Standardized UI eligibility review
interview and job search workshops are inexpensive to administer and
have a sizeable effect on reducing periods of compensated joblessness.
Targeting job search assistance to dislocated workers at risk of long-
term employment can be a cost-effective intervention, by shortening
the duration of compensated joblessness. This research has shaped the
development of programs for dislocated workers, targeted job search
assistance, and institutions for coordination of services. These include
WPRS, establishment of one-stop centers, and state eligibility review
interview programs as part of the UI work test. 
Woods and Frugoli examine the most revolutionary change in labor
exchange services: the explosive growth in public and private job
search sites available on the Internet. ETA has made substantial invest-
ments in automation to state and local workforce development. These
have included development of one-stop computer operating systems,
UI telephone and Internet claims processing, and a new computer-
based occupational coding system called O*Net. Woods and Frugoli
see a natural tension developing between public and private labor ex-
change operators because the Internet has expanded the capacity of
both sectors to deliver information directly to consumers. However,
they assert that information sharing may be the most essential ingredi-
ent of a successful labor exchange system, and a public role is critical
to ensuring access for all. Labor market information provided through
the Internet can augment other means of job search. The USDOL strat-
egy was to provide labor exchange and career planning services
through the Internet, with America’s Job Bank (AJB) at the core. The
system was intended to facilitate the expansion of universal services
through the one-stop delivery system. It has helped streamline program
registration, intake and referral to services. Woods and Frugoli suggest
that the increased capabilities of automated systems to provide easy
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connections between job seekers and employers may reduce the de-
mand for staff-assisted services in one-stop centers.
Lippoldt and Brodsky provide a comparison of public labor ex-
change programs in 10 selected OECD countries: Australia, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The market share of all job
matches for the public labor exchange differs widely among these
economies. For example, in 1999 fully one-third of the labor force in
Denmark enlisted the public employment service (PES) in job search,
while only 6 percent of the labor force did so in Switzerland. Lippoldt
and Brodsky explain the difficulties in comparing performance mea-
sures of the PES across countries, but they provide evidence that the
Swiss PES was relatively effective by placing 24 percent of the job
seekers who registered for assistance. In contrast, the Danish, who reg-
ister the broadest cross-section of the labor force, placed only 8 percent
of registrants. Naturally, neither of these gross outcomes is a measure
of value added by the PES. Lippoldt and Brodsky summarize interna-
tional evaluations indicating positive findings with respect to several
approaches that help to support and motivate active job search: job
search assistance, intensified personal interviews, compulsory referral
of unemployment compensation recipients to labor market programs,
and tightening of unemployment benefit eligibility requirements. Each
country has pursued a distinct path, but certain trends in policy were
identified. Most countries are decentralizing management of programs
by giving more authority for decision making to the local level which is
closest to the problems. Simultaneously, central governments are re-
quiring that local areas improve their systems for cooperation among
service providers, including the PES, for-profit service providers, com-
munity-based agencies, and not-for-profit service providers. Local ar-
eas are also commonly accountable for performance through regular
monitoring of program outcome performance standards. The PES, driv-
en by results, is also emphasizing a customer-service orientation and
active job search assistance for those receiving public compensation for
joblessness. In a world of tight budgets, the PES is pursuing these am-
bitious goals using new automated methods of including Internet job
matching, self-service assistance modules, and improved management
information systems for PES management and frontline staff.
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC LABOR EXCHANGE POLICY
Like previous federal job training programs, WIA was enacted in
1998 with a “sunset” clause. WIA would end in five years if not re-
newed. The Bush Administration’s 2003 proposal to reauthorize and re-
vise WIA includes a further shift of power and authority from federal
and state governments to local governments. The Bush proposal con-
tains the following key elements (Executive Office of the President
2003):
• consolidating and improving workforce development programs
for adults,
• strengthening accountability for achieving results,
• improving workforce development services to youth by target-
ing funds to out-of-school youth, and 
• creating more effective state and local workforce investment
boards.
The proposal also calls for elimination of the distinct funding stream
for the ES, and abolishes the U.S. Employment Service, which was cre-
ated to administer national labor exchange policy. To accomplish this,
the proposal repeals the first 13 sections of the long-standing Wagner-
Peyser Act and incorporates the Act’s existing provisions related to the
collection of labor market information, administration of the UI work
test, and assistance to veterans, migrant, and seasonal workers into Ti-
tle I of WIA.
Ever since the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended in 1982, funds for
the ES have been distributed to states as special purpose block grants.
Under the Bush proposal, the Wagner-Peyser Act would be superseded
by a WIA block grant for adults.2 The block grant would consolidate
three funding streams: adult and dislocated workers under WIA of
1998, and the Wagner-Peyser Act. States and localities would receive a
single block grant funding the bulk of all core, intensive, and training
services at one-stop centers. While other provisions in the Bush propos-
al provide expanded authority to state governors, the proposal reduces
the power of governors to determine how funds are used for labor ex-
change services. Under the proposal, states must send 50 percent of
their adult block grants directly to local areas. Hence, in comparison to
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the Wagner-Peyser Act, state governors could lose authority over the
bulk of their state labor exchange funds, thereby compromising their
ability to steer statewide policies for workforce and economic develop-
ment.
Proponents of the Bush proposal argue that repeal of the Wagner-
Peyser Act would increase state and local flexibility to develop and
merge service delivery that best meets labor exchange priorities and
economic circumstances. They assert that it would simplify state and
local one-stop center administration, eliminate separate accounting for
labor exchange services, and increase the efficiency in delivery of core
services by public and private WIA service providers. Under the pro-
posal, Congress would appropriate federal funds for labor exchange
services from general revenues instead of the UI trust fund. Backers of
the proposal say that combining the three funding streams into a single
formula block grant would result in streamlined program administra-
tion and avoid the duplication in reporting and inefficiency of service
delivery that now exists in state and local one-stop delivery systems
(DeRocco 2003b).
Opponents argue that, if enacted, the proposal would eliminate the
70-year-old U.S. Employment Service, created to establish and main-
tain a system of public employment offices, and unravel the mutual
funding of UI and ES services through the UI trust fund; thereby rais-
ing as a prime issue the apportionment of power and authority between
state governors and local leaders for labor exchange policy. Other crit-
ics such as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) contended that eliminating ES is a harbinger
for privatizing the UI program. AFSCME anticipated that passage of
the proposal would resurrect an attempt in the 107th Congress to turn
the federal financing of UI administration back to the states (Loveless
2003).
Reflecting diverse political sentiments among its members, the Na-
tional Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA), took a mid-
dle-of-the road position. Supporting Bush’s proposal to provide greater
flexibility in the delivery of core, intensive, and training services,
NASWA acknowledged that some members were concerned that repeal
of the Wagner-Peyser Act would result in service disruptions as many
states used their ES structures as the foundation for building their one-
stop delivery systems (Leapheart 2003). Others, such as Oregon’s Gov-
ernor Kulongoski (2003), expressed more serious concerns of equity
and fairness:
We are concerned that the proposed repeal of the Wagner-Peyser
Act, would eliminate the Employment Service (ES), and under-
mine the principle of an unbiased, nonpartisan agency to adminis-
ter job referrals and assist in the payment of UI benefits. The
strong ES infrastructure in Oregon must be kept in place for the
benefit of employers and job seekers.
The Republican Party controlled the 108th Congress. In the House,
Republicans held 229 seats to the Democrats’ 205 seats and 1 Indepen-
dent. On March 13, 2003, Representatives McKeon (CA) and Boehner
(OH) introduced H.R. 1261, the “Workforce Reinvestment and Adult
Education Act” to reauthorize WIA. The Bush Administration did not
submit a separate bill in the House, but its policy proposal was substan-
tially the same as H.R. 1261. One difference in the House bill that typ-
ified the 30-year tendency of Congress to support federal–local work-
force federalism was in the distribution of state funds for the adult
block grant. Under H.R. 1261, like the Bush proposal, 50 percent of the
adult block grant must be sent directly to local areas. But, unlike the
Bush proposal, which reserves the remaining funds to state discretion,
the House bill requires one-half of the state’s 50 percent share must
also be sent to local areas either in funds or staff to support core ser-
vices in one-stop centers. The House took quick action on the bill, with
the Rules Committee limiting floor debate to one hour. As a result,
there was no substantial debate on the future of the Wagner-Peyser Act.
However, a floor amendment was approved that assured states would
receive the same proportional amounts of annual funds that they would
have received if the three adult workforce programs had not been con-
solidated. The House passed the bill on May 8, 2003, on mostly a par-
ty-line vote of 220 to 204. 
Upon passage, the Bush Administration strongly endorsed H.R.
1261, declaring that it “would promote economic development and bet-
ter equip businesses and workers for success” in the information econ-
omy (Executive Office of the President 2003). Expressing the views of
the opposition, Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (CA) declared that the
bill “will consolidate funding for services for adults, dislocated work-
ers, and employment services into a single block grant, forcing these
groups to compete against each other for assistance and likely leading
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to reduced funding. It will eliminate the U.S. Employment Service,
which maintains a free nationwide labor exchange that matches job
seekers and employers” (Pelosi 2003).
Since the mid-term election of 1994, a broadly backed part of the
Republican agenda has been to reduce the role of the federal govern-
ment in the everyday lives of Americans by shifting power and authori-
ty to other levels of government (Downs 1996). Establishing a second
order devolution block grant (see Chapter 2) to states and localities not
only reduces the role of the federal government, but also is likely to
curb the labor exchange policy-making role of state governors. Con-
gress may be shifting too much power to localities.3 Thus, Congress
may be exacerbating the innate conflict between the state and regional
characteristics of economic growth and the fragmented self-interests of
localities. If the bill is enacted, it will be interesting to see whether lo-
cal workforce boards consider state and regional economic perspectives
in carrying out labor exchange policies.
The fate of the Wagner-Peyser Act may be a marquee issue in the
Senate debate. The Bush Administration hopes to complete action on
the bill during the fall of 2003. While it may be too early to predict the
consequences of the House-passed bill if it were enacted without
amendment, it does appear that it would provide for greater flexibility
in the use of labor exchange funds. On the other hand, it would nullify
the public charter of ES, allow private service providers to deliver labor
exchange services, and may hamper coordination of labor exchange
and UI services.
While the destiny of the Wagner-Peyser Act is unknown as of this
writing, we foresee the continued emergence of new work methods that
may significantly alter job finding and employment arrangements. As a
result, it appears that government will continue to be engaged in efforts
to link education, economic development, and employment. Likewise,
the role of labor exchange services may continue to expand as new pub-
lic and private intermediaries are brought into the workforce develop-
ment system.
Notes
1. Parts of this section are drawn from Balducchi and Pasternak (2001) and Balducchi
(2002, pp. 105–107).
2. Block grants, sometimes referred to as “special revenue sharing” during the Nixon
era, are transfers of funds to state and local governments in broad functional areas;
they are more flexible than categorical grants (Nathan 1983, p. 22). During the
House Committee on Appropriations testimony, Assistant Secretary DeRocco dis-
puted a reference to block grants and called them a “formula grant program,
through a single consolidated grant” (DeRocco 2003a). The authors use the term
“block grant.”
3. Under H.R. 1261, power and authority vary between state governors and local
leaders. For example, local workforce boards received a greater say in the use of
adult block grants, but state governors received the power to certify one-stop cen-
ters and, in consultation with state workforce boards, divert federal funds that go to
one-stop partners programs to fund one-stop center administrative costs. The an-
swer to who won or lost in the power game often depends upon the political and
policy viewpoints of the person you ask. 
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